Government and Markets : Toward a New Theory of Regulation

After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making. This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory. Its essays by leading scholars move past predominant approaches, integrating the latest research about the interplay between human behavior, societal needs, and regulatory institutions. The book concludes by setting out a potential research agenda for the social sciences. After Two Generations Of Emphasis On Governmental Inefficiency And The Need For Deregulation, We Now See Growing Interest In The Possibility Of Constructive Governance, Alongside Public Calls For New, Smarter Regulation. Yet There Is A Real Danger That Regulatory Reforms Will Be Rooted In Outdated Ideas. As The Financial Crisis Has Shown, Neither Traditional Market Failure Models Nor Public Choice Theory, By Themselves, Sufficiently Inform Or Explain Our Current Regulatory Challenges. Regulatory Studies, Long Neglected In An Atmosphere Focused On Deregulatory Work, Is In Critical Need Of New Models And Theories That Can Guide Effective Policy-making--provided By Publisher. Beyond Market Failure -- Government Failure Vs. Market Failure : Principles Of Regulation / Joseph E. Stiglitz -- Effective Regulation Through Credible Cost-benefit Analysis : The Opportunity Costs Of Superfund / Michael Greenstone -- From State Interference To The Return To The Market : The Rhetoric Of Economic Regulation From The Old Gilded Age To The New / Mary O. Furner -- Lessons From Europe : Some Reflections On The European Union And The Regulation Of Business / Neil Fligstein -- Confidence Games : How Does Regulation Constitute Markets? / Daniel Carpenter -- Beyond The Economic Theory Of Politics -- The End Of Special Interests Theory And The Beginning Of A More Positive View Of Democratic Politics / Donald Wittman -- Public Choice : A Critical Reassessment / Jessica Leight -- The Paranoid Style In The Study Of American Politics / David A. Moss And Mary Oey -- Law, Policy, And Cooperation / Yochai Benkler -- Beyond Command And Control -- What Opportunity Is Knocking? : Regulating Corporate Governance In The United States / Mary A. O'sullivan -- Taxation As A Regulatory Tool : Lessons From Environmental Taxes In Europe / Monica Prasad -- Redesigning Regulation : A Case Study From The Consumer Credit Market / Elizabeth Warren -- Origins And Regulatory Consequences Of The Subprime Crisis / Barry Eichengreen -- The Prospects For Effective Coregulation In The United States : A Historian's View From The Early Twenty-first Century / Edward J. Balleisen -- Deregulation Theories In A Litigious Society : American Antitrust And Tort / Tony Freyer -- Markets In The Shadow Of The State : An Appraisal Of Deregulation And Implications For Future Research / Marc Allen Eisner. [edited By] Edward J. Balleisen, David A. Moss. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Machine generated contents note: Introduction; Part I. Beyond Market Failure: 1. Government failure vs. market failure: principles of regulation Joseph E. Stiglitz; 2. Effective regulation through credible cost-benefit analysis: the opportunity costs of superfund Michael Greenstone; 3. From 'state interference' to the 'return to the market': the rhetoric of economic regulation from the old Gilded Age to the new Mary O. Furner; 4. Lessons from Europe: some reflections on the European Union and the regulation of business Neil Fligstein; 5. Confidence games: how does regulation constitute markets? Daniel Carpenter; Part II. Beyond the Economic Theory of Politics: 6. The end of special interests theory and the beginning of a more positive view of democratic politics Donald Wittman; 7. Public choice: a critical reassessment Jessica Leight; 8. The paranoid style in the study of American politics David A. Moss and Mary Oey; 9. Law, policy, and cooperation Yochai Benkler; Part III. Beyond Command and Control: 10. What opportunity is knocking? Regulating corporate governance in the United States Mary A. O'Sullivan; 11. Taxation as a regulatory tool: lessons from environmental taxes in Europe Monica Prasad; 12. Redesigning regulation: a case study from the consumer credit market Elizabeth Warren; 13. Origins and regulatory consequences of the subprime crisis Barry Eichengreen; 14. Prospects for economic 'self-regulation' in the United States: an historian's view from the early twenty-first century Edward J. Balleisen; 15. Deregulation theories in a litigious society: American antitrust and tort Tony Freyer; 16. Markets in the shadow of the state: an appraisal of deregulation and implications for future research Marc Allen Eisner; Conclusion. New Theory - 1 - TempCover.pdf......Page 1 New Theory - 2 - Front Matter.doc......Page 3 New Theory - Intro - Moss and Balleisen.pdf......Page 9 New Theory - 2 - Front Matter.pdf......Page 0 New Theory - Ch1 - Stiglitz.pdf......Page 16 New Theory - Ch2 - Greenstone.pdf......Page 45 New Theory - Ch3 - Furner.pdf......Page 74 New Theory - Ch4 - Fligstein.pdf......Page 105 New Theory - Ch5 - Carpenter.pdf......Page 122 New Theory - Ch6 - Wittman.pdf......Page 147 New Theory - Ch7 - Leight.pdf......Page 164 New Theory - Ch8 - Moss and Oey.pdf......Page 204 New Theory - Ch9 - Benkler.pdf......Page 236 New Theory - Ch10 - O'Sullivan.pdf......Page 263 New Theory - Ch11 - Prasad.pdf......Page 286 New Theory - Ch12- Warren.pdf......Page 315 New Theory - Ch13 - Eichengreen.pdf......Page 338 New Theory - Ch 14 - Balleisen.pdf......Page 358 New Theory - Ch15 - Freyer.pdf......Page 390 New Theory - Ch 16 - Eisner.pdf......Page 413 New Theory - Conclusion.pdf......Page 433 New Theory - 1 - TempCover.pdf 1 New Theory - 2 - Front Matter.doc 3 New Theory - Full Text.pdf 9 New Theory - 1 - TempCover.pdf -1 New Theory - 2 - Front Matter.doc -1 New Theory - Full Text.pdf 9 New Theory - 1 - TempCover.pdf -1 New Theory - 2 - Front Matter.pdf -1 New Theory - Intro - Moss and Balleisen.pdf 9 New Theory - Ch1 - Stiglitz.pdf 16 New Theory - Ch2 - Greenstone.pdf 45 New Theory - Ch3 - Furner.pdf 74 New Theory - Ch4 - Fligstein.pdf 105 New Theory - Ch5 - Carpenter.pdf 122 New Theory - Ch6 - Wittman.pdf 147 New Theory - Ch7 - Leight.pdf 164 New Theory - Ch8 - Moss and Oey.pdf 204 New Theory - Ch9 - Benkler.pdf 236 New Theory - Ch10 - O'Sullivan.pdf 263 New Theory - Ch11 - Prasad.pdf 286 New Theory - Ch12- Warren.pdf 315 New Theory - Ch13 - Eichengreen.pdf 338 New Theory - Ch 14 - Balleisen.pdf 358 New Theory - Ch15 - Freyer.pdf 390 New Theory - Ch 16 - Eisner.pdf 413 New Theory - Conclusion.pdf 433 "After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance and public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted not in new research but in outdated ideas focused on deregulatory work. Neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected, is in critical need of new models and theories to guide effective policy-making. This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory."--Publisher "After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making"--Descripción del editor "After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making"-- Résumé de l'éditeur