Games in Management Science: Essays in Honor of Georges Zaccour (International Series in Operations Research & Management Science Book 280)

Résumé : "This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements."-- Résumé de l'éditeur Preface 6 Contents of the Book 8 Contributions by Georges Zaccour 13 Acknowledgments 26 Contents 28 Contributors 30 About the Editors 33 A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing 34 1 Introduction and Literature Review 34 2 A Differential Game of Pricing and Advertising 36 3 Concluding Remarks 45 References 46 On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products 48 1 Introduction 49 2 The Bass Model 50 3 The ch2:Mahajan1991 Model 53 4 Our Model 56 5 Results 58 5.1 Results Under the Modified M&M Model 58 5.2 Results with Our Model 60 6 Conclusion 64 Appendix 65 References 71 The Effects of Consumer Rebates in a Competitive DistributionChannel 73 1 Introduction 73 2 Model 75 2.1 Consumer Utility and Demand 75 2.2 Firms' Decisions and Profits 77 3 Equilibrium Solutions 78 4 The Effects of Rebates 82 5 Conclusions 86 References 86 On the Coordination of Static and Dynamic Marketing Channelsin a Duopoly with Advertising 88 1 Introduction 88 2 The Static Game 90 2.1 Vertical Integration 91 2.2 Vertical Separation 92 2.3 The Mixed Case 94 2.4 The Upstream Stage 94 2.5 The Two-Part Tariff 96 3 The Differential Game 98 3.1 Vertical Integration 98 3.2 Vertical Separation 100 4 Concluding Remarks 102 References 103 Product Recalls and Channel Pricing 105 1 Introduction 105 2 Model 107 3 Results 109 4 Equilibrium Under Quadratic Recall Costs 112 5 Concluding Remarks 114 References 115 Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Price-Dependent Returns 116 1 Introduction 117 2 Dynamic Games 119 3 Equilibria 121 3.1 A Dynamic CLSC Using a Wholesale Price Contract: W-Scenario 121 3.2 A Dynamic CLSC Using a Revenue Sharing Contract: R-Scenario 124 4 Comparison Between Games 128 5 Conclusions 134 Appendix 136 Pareto Analysis on Different Sets 140 References 142 A Steady-State Game of a Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime 143 1 Introduction 144 2 Asymptotic Steady-State in Optimal Economic Growth Models 145 3 Long-Term Steady-State Model 145 3.1 List of Parameters and Variables 146 3.2 Steady-State Production 147 3.3 Steady-State Capital Levels 148 3.4 CDR and Steady-State Emission Budget 149 3.5 Steady-State CCS 149 3.6 Steady-State Carbon Market 150 3.7 Steady-State Consumption Level and Utility Function 151 4 Fully Cooperative Solution 152 5 Computing a Steady-State Nash Equilibrium 153 6 Scenario Analysis 153 6.1 Carbon Removed by DAC 153 6.2 Steady-State Carbon Emissions 154 6.3 Capital Stocks 154 6.4 Labor Allocation 155 6.5 Consumption 155 7 Conclusion 156 References 157 Dynamic Models of the Firm with Green Energy and Goodwillwith a Constant Size of the Output Market 159 1 Introduction 159 2 The Model 161 3 Analysis of the Model with Only Clean Input 163 4 Analysis of the Complete Model with Clean and Conventional Input 167 5 Convex-Concave Effects of Green Capital on Goodwill 169 6 Conclusions 173 References 174 A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics 175 1 Introduction 175 2 Equilibrium Prediction vs Behavior 177 3 Behavior and Strategy Types 180 4 Continuous Time Games 181 5 Conclusion 188 References 190 Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition 192 1 Introduction 192 2 The Model 194 3 The Managerial Subgame 198 4 Price Precommitment 199 4.1 Choice of Managerial Incentive Contracts 199 4.2 Monopoly Pricing 201 5 Flexible Pricing Mechanism 202 5.1 Input Pricing 202 5.2 Strategic Delegation 203 6 Comparing Equilibrium Outcomes 205 7 Conclusion 208 Appendix 1: Proof of Eq.(14) 209 Appendix 2: Proof of Eq.(31) 209 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2 211 Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4 212 References 212 Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game 214 1 Introduction 214 2 A Linear-Quadratic Transboundary Pollution Differential Game 217 3 Incentive Equilibria 219 4 Credibility 224 5 Concluding Remarks 229 References 230 Strategic Interaction Among Firms in Output and Emission Markets: A Unified Framework 232 1 Introduction and Literature Review 232 1.1 Market Power Only in the Permit Market 235 1.2 Market Power Only in the Output Market 235 1.3 Market Power in the Permit and the Output Market 236 2 A Unified Model 237 2.1 Basic Elements 237 2.2 Competitive Output Market 239 2.2.1 Competitive Permit Market 239 2.2.2 Imperfect Competition in the Permit Market 241 2.3 Imperfect Competition in the Output Market 243 2.3.1 Competitive Permit Market 244 3 A Particular Model with Endogenous Permit Prices 247 4 Market Power in Both Markets 249 5 Conclusions 252 Appendix 253 References 255 Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games Through Environmental Personhood 257 1 Introduction 257 2 The Model and the Players 259 2.1 The Polluting Firm 259 2.2 The Downstream Resident 259 2.2.1 Tort Law 260 2.2.2 Mitigation 261 2.3 The Regulator 263 3 Environmental Personhood 265 3.1 Intrinsic Interests 266 3.2 A Cooperative Solution 267 3.2.1 Individual Rationality and Side Payments 268 3.2.2 Efficiency with Respect to Environmental Tax 269 3.2.3 Enforcement 269 4 Implementation 270 5 Conclusion 272 References 272 A Dynamic Game with Interaction Between Kantian Playersand Nashian Players 274 1 Introduction 274 2 A Brief Review of the Literature on the Role of Morality and Kantian Behavior in Economics 275 3 A Dynamic Game with Kantian and Nashian Players 278 4 An Application: Kant-Nash Equilibrium in a Modified Levhari-Mirman Model 280 4.1 Solution for the One-Period Horizon Game 281 4.2 Solution for the Two-Period-Horizon Game 283 4.3 Solution for the q-Period-Horizon Game 284 4.4 The Infinite-Horizon Problem 285 5 Extension: The Case Where the Resource Yields Amenity Values 287 6 Concluding Remarks 291 References 292 Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market 293 1 Introduction 293 2 The Model 296 2.1 The Game in Individual Strategies 296 2.2 The Market Equilibrium 297 2.3 Discussion 298 2.3.1 Individual Cost of Militancy 298 2.3.2 Impact on the Oil Industry 299 2.3.3 Social Costs of Militancy 299 3 Collective Outcomes 299 3.1 Four Polar Collective Outcomes 300 3.1.1 Individually Rational Outcome 300 3.1.2 Cooperative Outcome 300 3.1.3 Outcome of an Unconcerned Population 300 3.1.4 Outcome of a Radical Environmentalist Population 301 3.2 Discussion 301 3.2.1 Quantity and Price Comparisons 301 3.2.2 Welfare Comparisons 302 4 Conclusion 304 References 304 Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary StableEquilibrium 306 1 Introduction 306 2 Two Distinct Populations 309 3 Interaction and Imitation Between and Within Populations 312 4 Two Asymptotically Stable Equilibria 316 5 Differences Between Populations and Compliance Shares 321 5.1 The Distance Between Sanchos and Quixotes, (0=x"0122,α) 321 5.2 The Relative Size of Each Population 323 5.3 Real-Life Examples 327 6 Conclusions 329 Appendix: Proof of Propositions 330 References 335 Building Efficient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game 337 1 Introduction 337 2 The Economy 339 3 Equilibria 341 4 Numerical Illustration 345 4.1 Comparison 346 4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 346 4.3 Switching Time 349 5 Conclusion 350 Appendix 351 References 354 Game Theory and Cyber Defense 356 1 Introduction 356 2 Literature Review 360 2.1 Resource Allocation 360 2.2 Network Security 361 2.3 Agent Cooperation 362 3 Resource Allocation Game 363 4 Illustration 366 5 Application of the Game in Cyberspace: Challenges and Opportunities 367 5.1 Complexity of the Cyber Domain 367 5.2 Static Versus Dynamic Perspectives 368 5.3 Validity of Assumptions 368 6 Conclusion 369 References 370 A LQ Vaccine Communication Game 374 1 Introduction 374 2 Unvaccinated Subpopulation and Its Contrast 375 3 Equilibrium Vaccine Communication Campaigns 377 3.1 Pharmaceutical Firm Best Response 378 3.2 Health-Care System Best Response 378 3.3 Open-Loop Equilibrium 381 4 Numerical Example 382 5 Conclusion 385 Appendix 386 References 387 On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade 389 1 Introduction 389 2 The Economic Structure 391 3 The Meta-Game 393 4 Results 396 5 Conclusion 399 References 399 Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment 401 1 Introduction 401 2 The Model 403 3 Stability of a Coalition Structure 405 3.1 Non-transferable Profits 406 3.2 Transferable Profits 407 4 An Example 412 5 Conclusion 415 References 416 Front Matter ....Pages i-xxxv A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing (Steffen Jørgensen, Simon Sigué)....Pages 1-14 On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products (Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Sihem Taboubi)....Pages 15-39 The Effects of Consumer Rebates in a Competitive Distribution Channel (Salma Karray)....Pages 41-55 On the Coordination of Static and Dynamic Marketing Channels in a Duopoly with Advertising (Luca Lambertini)....Pages 57-73 Product Recalls and Channel Pricing (Olivier Rubel)....Pages 75-85 Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Price-Dependent Returns (Pietro De Giovanni, Talat S. Genc)....Pages 87-113 A Steady-State Game of a Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime (Olivier Bahn, Alain Haurie)....Pages 115-130 Dynamic Models of the Firm with Green Energy and Goodwill with a Constant Size of the Output Market (Herbert Dawid, Richard F. Hartl, Peter M. Kort)....Pages 131-146 A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics (Dina Tasneem, Hassan Benchekroun)....Pages 147-163 Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition (Denis Claude, Mabel Tidball)....Pages 165-186 Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game (Javier de Frutos, Guiomar Martín-Herrán)....Pages 187-204 Strategic Interaction Among Firms in Output and Emission Markets: A Unified Framework (Francisco J. André, Luis M. de Castro)....Pages 205-229 Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games Through Environmental Personhood (Michèle Breton, Suzanne Zaccour)....Pages 231-247 A Dynamic Game with Interaction Between Kantian Players and Nashian Players (Ngo Van Long)....Pages 249-267 Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market (Etienne Billette de Villemeur, Pierre-Olivier Pineau)....Pages 269-281 Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium (Francisco Cabo, Ana García-González, Mercedes Molpeceres-Abella)....Pages 283-313 Building Efficient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game (Fabien Ngendakuriyo, Puduru Viswanada Reddy)....Pages 315-333 Game Theory and Cyber Defense (Abderrahmane Sokri)....Pages 335-352 A LQ Vaccine Communication Game (Alessandra Buratto, Luca Grosset, Bruno Viscolani)....Pages 353-367 On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade (Sébastien Debia)....Pages 369-380 Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment (Elena Parilina, Artem Sedakov)....Pages 381-396 Résumé : "This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements."-- Résumé de l'éditeur This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph. D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements