Games in Management Science: Essays in Honor of Georges Zaccour (International Series in Operations Research & Management Science (280))

Résumé : "This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements."-- Résumé de l'éditeur Preface Contents of the Book Contributions by Georges Zaccour Acknowledgments Contents Contributors About the Editors A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing 1 Introduction and Literature Review 2 A Differential Game of Pricing and Advertising 3 Concluding Remarks References On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products 1 Introduction 2 The Bass Model 3 The ch2:Mahajan1991 Model 4 Our Model 5 Results 5.1 Results Under the Modified M&M Model 5.2 Results with Our Model 6 Conclusion Appendix References The Effects of Consumer Rebates in a Competitive DistributionChannel 1 Introduction 2 Model 2.1 Consumer Utility and Demand 2.2 Firms' Decisions and Profits 3 Equilibrium Solutions 4 The Effects of Rebates 5 Conclusions References On the Coordination of Static and Dynamic Marketing Channelsin a Duopoly with Advertising 1 Introduction 2 The Static Game 2.1 Vertical Integration 2.2 Vertical Separation 2.3 The Mixed Case 2.4 The Upstream Stage 2.5 The Two-Part Tariff 3 The Differential Game 3.1 Vertical Integration 3.2 Vertical Separation 4 Concluding Remarks References Product Recalls and Channel Pricing 1 Introduction 2 Model 3 Results 4 Equilibrium Under Quadratic Recall Costs 5 Concluding Remarks References Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Price-Dependent Returns 1 Introduction 2 Dynamic Games 3 Equilibria 3.1 A Dynamic CLSC Using a Wholesale Price Contract: W-Scenario 3.2 A Dynamic CLSC Using a Revenue Sharing Contract: R-Scenario 4 Comparison Between Games 5 Conclusions Appendix Pareto Analysis on Different Sets References A Steady-State Game of a Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime 1 Introduction 2 Asymptotic Steady-State in Optimal Economic Growth Models 3 Long-Term Steady-State Model 3.1 List of Parameters and Variables 3.2 Steady-State Production 3.3 Steady-State Capital Levels 3.4 CDR and Steady-State Emission Budget 3.5 Steady-State CCS 3.6 Steady-State Carbon Market 3.7 Steady-State Consumption Level and Utility Function 4 Fully Cooperative Solution 5 Computing a Steady-State Nash Equilibrium 6 Scenario Analysis 6.1 Carbon Removed by DAC 6.2 Steady-State Carbon Emissions 6.3 Capital Stocks 6.4 Labor Allocation 6.5 Consumption 7 Conclusion References Dynamic Models of the Firm with Green Energy and Goodwillwith a Constant Size of the Output Market 1 Introduction 2 The Model 3 Analysis of the Model with Only Clean Input 4 Analysis of the Complete Model with Clean and Conventional Input 5 Convex-Concave Effects of Green Capital on Goodwill 6 Conclusions References A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics 1 Introduction 2 Equilibrium Prediction vs Behavior 3 Behavior and Strategy Types 4 Continuous Time Games 5 Conclusion References Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition 1 Introduction 2 The Model 3 The Managerial Subgame 4 Price Precommitment 4.1 Choice of Managerial Incentive Contracts 4.2 Monopoly Pricing 5 Flexible Pricing Mechanism 5.1 Input Pricing 5.2 Strategic Delegation 6 Comparing Equilibrium Outcomes 7 Conclusion Appendix 1: Proof of Eq.(14) Appendix 2: Proof of Eq.(31) Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2 Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4 References Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game 1 Introduction 2 A Linear-Quadratic Transboundary Pollution Differential Game 3 Incentive Equilibria 4 Credibility 5 Concluding Remarks References Strategic Interaction Among Firms in Output and Emission Markets: A Unified Framework 1 Introduction and Literature Review 1.1 Market Power Only in the Permit Market 1.2 Market Power Only in the Output Market 1.3 Market Power in the Permit and the Output Market 2 A Unified Model 2.1 Basic Elements 2.2 Competitive Output Market 2.2.1 Competitive Permit Market 2.2.2 Imperfect Competition in the Permit Market 2.3 Imperfect Competition in the Output Market 2.3.1 Competitive Permit Market 3 A Particular Model with Endogenous Permit Prices 4 Market Power in Both Markets 5 Conclusions Appendix References Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games Through Environmental Personhood 1 Introduction 2 The Model and the Players 2.1 The Polluting Firm 2.2 The Downstream Resident 2.2.1 Tort Law 2.2.2 Mitigation 2.3 The Regulator 3 Environmental Personhood 3.1 Intrinsic Interests 3.2 A Cooperative Solution 3.2.1 Individual Rationality and Side Payments 3.2.2 Efficiency with Respect to Environmental Tax 3.2.3 Enforcement 4 Implementation 5 Conclusion References A Dynamic Game with Interaction Between Kantian Playersand Nashian Players 1 Introduction 2 A Brief Review of the Literature on the Role of Morality and Kantian Behavior in Economics 3 A Dynamic Game with Kantian and Nashian Players 4 An Application: Kant-Nash Equilibrium in a Modified Levhari-Mirman Model 4.1 Solution for the One-Period Horizon Game 4.2 Solution for the Two-Period-Horizon Game 4.3 Solution for the q-Period-Horizon Game 4.4 The Infinite-Horizon Problem 5 Extension: The Case Where the Resource Yields Amenity Values 6 Concluding Remarks References Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market 1 Introduction 2 The Model 2.1 The Game in Individual Strategies 2.2 The Market Equilibrium 2.3 Discussion 2.3.1 Individual Cost of Militancy 2.3.2 Impact on the Oil Industry 2.3.3 Social Costs of Militancy 3 Collective Outcomes 3.1 Four Polar Collective Outcomes 3.1.1 Individually Rational Outcome 3.1.2 Cooperative Outcome 3.1.3 Outcome of an Unconcerned Population 3.1.4 Outcome of a Radical Environmentalist Population 3.2 Discussion 3.2.1 Quantity and Price Comparisons 3.2.2 Welfare Comparisons 4 Conclusion References Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary StableEquilibrium 1 Introduction 2 Two Distinct Populations 3 Interaction and Imitation Between and Within Populations 4 Two Asymptotically Stable Equilibria 5 Differences Between Populations and Compliance Shares 5.1 The Distance Between Sanchos and Quixotes, (0=x"0122,α) 5.2 The Relative Size of Each Population 5.3 Real-Life Examples 6 Conclusions Appendix: Proof of Propositions References Building Efficient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game 1 Introduction 2 The Economy 3 Equilibria 4 Numerical Illustration 4.1 Comparison 4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 4.3 Switching Time 5 Conclusion Appendix References Game Theory and Cyber Defense 1 Introduction 2 Literature Review 2.1 Resource Allocation 2.2 Network Security 2.3 Agent Cooperation 3 Resource Allocation Game 4 Illustration 5 Application of the Game in Cyberspace: Challenges and Opportunities 5.1 Complexity of the Cyber Domain 5.2 Static Versus Dynamic Perspectives 5.3 Validity of Assumptions 6 Conclusion References A LQ Vaccine Communication Game 1 Introduction 2 Unvaccinated Subpopulation and Its Contrast 3 Equilibrium Vaccine Communication Campaigns 3.1 Pharmaceutical Firm Best Response 3.2 Health-Care System Best Response 3.3 Open-Loop Equilibrium 4 Numerical Example 5 Conclusion Appendix References On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade 1 Introduction 2 The Economic Structure 3 The Meta-Game 4 Results 5 Conclusion References Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment 1 Introduction 2 The Model 3 Stability of a Coalition Structure 3.1 Non-transferable Profits 3.2 Transferable Profits 4 An Example 5 Conclusion References Correction to: Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market Résumé : "This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements."-- Résumé de l'éditeur This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph. D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements