Game Theory And Applications (economic Theory, Econometrics, And Mathematical Economics)

Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions. Key Features * Explains many of the recent central developments in game theory * Highlights new research directions in economic theory which surpass the neoclassical paradigm * Includes game-theoretical analyses in economics, political science, and biology * Written by leading game theorists, economists, political scientists, and biologists Content: ECONOMIC THEORY, ECONOMETRICS, AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, Pages ii,iia Front Matter, Page iii Copyright, Page iv Contributors, Pages viii-x Preface, Page xi, TATSURO ICHIISHI, ABRAHAM NEYMAN, YAIR TAUMAN Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas, Pages 3-45, ELON KOHLBERG Supergames, Pages 46-63, SYLVAIN SORIN Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, Pages 64-76, FRANÇOISE FORGES Repeated Games, Pages 77-130, JEAN-FRANÇOIS MERTENS Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games, Pages 131-157, EHUD KALAI The Shapley Value, Pages 158-165, ROBERT AUMANN Advances in Value Theory, Pages 166-175, SERGIU HART Axiomatizations of the Core, the Nucleolus, and the Prekernel, Pages 176-182, BEZALEL PELEG Consistency, Pages 183-186, MICHAEL MASCHLER The Consistency Principle, Pages 187-215, WILLIAM THOMSON Discrete Concepts in n-Person Game Theory: Nondegeneracy and Homogeneity, Pages 216-231, JOACHIM ROSENMÜLLER Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence, Pages 232-251, ALVIN E. ROTH Strategic Market Game Models of Exchange Economies, Pages 252-272, MARTIN SHUBIK Information Transmission, Pages 273-281, SHMUEL ZAMIR, MORTON I. KAMIEN, YAIR TAUMAN Monotonic Surplus Sharing and the Utilization of Common Property Resources, Pages 282-299, HERVÉ MOULIN Developments in Stable Set Theory, Pages 300-316, WILLIAM F. LUCAS Game Theoretic Models of Voting in Multidimensional Issue Spaces, Pages 317-335, RICHARD D. MCKELVEY Israel and the PLO: A Game with Differential Information, Pages 336-357, SHAUL MISHAL, DAVID SCHMEIDLER, ITAI SENED A Survey of Some Results Closely Related to the Knaster–Kuratowski–Mazurkiewicz Theorem, Pages 358-370, KY FAN On the Core of the Assignment Game, Pages 373-374, MICHEL L. BALINSKI, DAVID GALE The Second Welfare Theorem in Nonconvex Economies, Pages 375-376, BERNARD CORNET An Evolutionary Game Theory Model for Risk-Taking, Pages 377-379, STEPHEN ELLNER, AVI SHMIDA Values of Nonatomic Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?, Page 380, SERGIU HART, ABRAHAM NEYMAN Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Discrete and Continuous Games: Does Discretization Matter?, Pages 381-382, MARTIN HELLWIG, WOLFGANG LEININGER To Vote or Not to Vote: What Is the Quota?, Page 383, RON HOLZMAN Some Bounds for the Banzhaf Index and Other Semivalues, Page 384, RON HOLZMAN, EHUD LEHRER, NATHAN LINIAL Comparative Cooperative Game Theory, Pages 385-387, TATSURO ICHIISHI Escalation and Cooperation in International Conflicts: The Dollar-Auction Revisited, Pages 388-389, WOLFGANG LEININGER An Axiomatization of the Nonsymmetric, Nontransferable Utility Value, Pages 390-391, ANAT LEVY, RICHARD P. MCLEAN A Milnor Condition for Nonatomic Lipschitz Games and Its Applications, Page 392, DOV MONDERER Zero-Sum Nonstationary Stochastic Games with General State Space, Pages 393-397, ANDRZEJ S. NOWAK Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination, Pages 398-400, AKIRA OKADA A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long Term Contracts, Pages 401-403, AKIRA OKADA Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences, Pages 404-406, HANS PETERS, PETER WAKKER The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study, Page 407, ROY RADNER, ANDREW SCHOTTER Rate of Convergence to Full Efficiency in the Buyers' Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large, Page 408, MARK A. SATTERTHWAITE, STEVEN R. WILLIAMS Stationary Strategies in Deterministic Games, Page 409, RASTISLAV TELGÁRSKY Big Boss Games, Clan Games, and Information Market Games, Pages 410-412, STEF H. TIJS Large Games and Economies with Near-Exhaustion of Gains to Coalition Formation, Pages 413-415, MYRNA HOLTZ WOODERS Values of Large Finite Games, Pages 416-417, MYRNA HOLTZ WOODERS, WILLIAM R. ZAME Index, Pages 419-435