Gambling with Violence: State Outsourcing of War in Pakistan and India (Modern South Asia)

State outsourcing of violence to nonstate actors is a global practice that challenges our notions of legitimate warfare, statehood, and citizenship. It matters for counterinsurgency, civil war outcomes, the humane treatment of civilians and former combatants, and the prospects of post-conflict peace. In South Asia, the use of nonstate proxies is deeply entwined with questions of state fragility, the postcolonial social contract, and the rivalry between two nuclear powers. This book explains the origins of state-nonstate alliances in times of civil war. A new balance-of-interests framework is generated through systematic fine-grained analyses of violence outsourcing by Pakistan and India in Kashmir, East Pakistan/Bangladesh, and their respective tribal belts. Central to this framework are the distribution of power inside the theater of war and varied interests of both the state and the nonstate actors. The cases drawn from Pakistan and India demonstrate how different configurations of local power and actors’ priorities result in distinct alliance patterns. The potential applicability of the balance-of-interests approach beyond South Asia is then demonstrated with analyses of Russia’s counterinsurgencies in Chechnya and Turkey’s operations against Kurdish rebels. The book builds on and contributes to the existing scholarship on civil war and counterinsurgency, in particular the burgeoning literature on militias, alliances, and South Asian security. Cover 1 Series 3 Gambling with Violence 4 Copyright 5 Dedication 6 Contents 8 Acknowledgments 12 1 Introduction 20 Why Study State-​Nonstate Alliances in Civil War? 22 Why South Asia? 25 Existing Research and Book’s Contribution 26 State Alliances 27 Rebel Alliances 28 Militias 30 The Argument 30 Book Plan 31 2 State-​Nonstate Alliances in Civil War: A New Balance-​of-​Interests Theory 33 A Typology of Nonstate Allies 34 Auxiliary 39 Proxy 40 Freelancer 41 Potential Explanations Suggested in the Existing Literature 42 A New Balance-​of-​Interests Framework 43 Scope Conditions 49 Cases, Data, and Research Methods 51 Research Design and Case Selection 51 Data Collection 53 3 Saving the House of Islam: Pakistan’s “Volunteers” in the War of 1971 56 Pakistan Regains Control in East Pakistan, March–​May 1971 60 From State Control to Parity, May–​June 1971 66 Alliance between Pakistan and Razakar Opportunists 70 From Parity to Insurgent Dominance, June–​December 1971 73 Alliance between Pakistan and al-​Badr Activists 75 Conclusion 78 4 “Guns Plus Interest”: Renegades and Villagers in India’s Kashmir War 83 From Insurgent Control to Parity in Kashmir Valley, 1989–​1993 86 From Parity to India’s Control in Kashmir Valley, 1993–​1996 91 Alliance between India and Ikhwan-​ul-​Muslimoon Opportunists 92 Alliance between India and Muslim Mujahideen Opportunists 101 1996 Elections Mark a Turning Point 107 New Theater of War in Jammu 111 Alliance between India and Village Defense Committee Activists 111 Conclusion 113 5 Tribal “Awakenings” in Pakistan and India 116 Anti-​Taliban “Awakening” in Pakistan 119 Pakistan’s Interests in Context 120 Misalignment of Interests and Weak Alliance between Pakistan and Lashkars 125 Anti-​Naxalite “Awakening” in India 131 Background of Naxalite (a.k.a. Maoist) Insurgency 132 India’s Interests in Context 134 From India’s Weakness to Parity in Chhattisgarh 136 Alliance between India and Salwa Judum Opportunists 138 Conclusion 146 6 All the State’s Proxies in Turkey and Russia 148 Turkey’s War against Kurdish Rebels 152 Alliance between Turkey and Kurdish Clans 154 Alliance between Turkey and Kurdish Hizbullah 159 Russia’s First War in Chechnya 162 Russia’s Second War in Chechnya 168 Alliance between Russia and Gantamirovtsy 171 Alliance between Russia and Kadyrovtsy 172 Conclusion 174 7 Conclusion 176 Policy Recommendations 180 Directions for Future Research 184 Implications for South Asian Security 187 Notes 190 Index 228 In Gambling with Violence , Yelena Biberman tackles a global problem that is particularly consequential for Pakistan and India: state outsourcing of violence to ordinary civilians, criminals, and ex-insurgents. Why would these countries gamble with their own national security by outsourcing violence - arming nonstate actors inside their own borders? Drawing on over 200 interviews, archival research, and fieldwork conducted across Asia, Europe, and North America, Biberman introduces the "balance-of-interests" thesis to deepen our understanding of state-nonstate alliances in civil war. This framework centers on the distribution of power during war and shows how various combinations of interests result in distinct types of coalitions. Incorporating case studies of civil war and counterinsurgency, her book sheds light on how militias, alliances, and South Asian security connect today. Gambling with Violence tackles a global problem that is particularly consequential for Pakistan and India: state outsourcing of violence to ordinary civilians, criminals, and ex-insurgents. Drawing on over 200 interviews, archival research, and fieldwork conducted in Islamabad, Srinagar, New Delhi, Dhaka, Diyarbakir, Ankara, Moscow, London, and Washington, D.C., this book introduces the "balance-of-interests" thesis to deepen our understanding ofstate-nonstate alliances in civil war. Incorporating international case studies of previously underexplored conduct and little-known governmental alliances with criminals and ex-rebels, this book reveals configurations of local power and actors' interests that result in distinct alliance patterns and demonstrates theframework's applicability in South Asia and beyond Gambling with Violence tackles a global problem that is particularly consequential for Pakistan and India: state outsourcing of violence to ordinary civilians, criminals, and ex-insurgents. Drawing on over 200 interviews, archival research, and fieldwork conducted in Islamabad, Srinagar, New Delhi, Dhaka, Diyarbakir, Ankara, Moscow, London, and Washington, D.C., this book introduces the "balance-of-interests" thesis to deepen our understanding of state-nonstate alliances in civil war. Incorporating international case studies of previously underexplored conduct and little-known governmental a 'Gambling with Violence' tackles a global problem that is particularly consequential for Pakistan and India: state outsourcing of violence to ordinary civilians, criminals, and ex-insurgents. Drawing on over 200 interviews, archival research, and fieldwork conducted in Islamabad, Srinagar, New Delhi, Dhaka, Diyarbakir, Ankara, Moscow, London, and Washington, D.C., this text introduces the 'balance-of-interests' thesis to deepen our understanding of state-nonstate alliances in civil war