From Versailles To Mers El-K{Acute}Ebir : The Promise Of Anglo-French Naval Cooperation, 1919-40

This is a ground-breaking study in Anglo-French naval relations after 1919 as they related to European diplomatic currents between the two World Wars, and to the balance of global naval power before World War II until the summer of 1940. The regional focus is on the Mediterranean, the only area where British and French naval power could be combined to support their diplomatic agenda and to restrain the weakest of the three Axis powers. In broader focus, the study suggests that shifting currents in the balance of global naval power left both the French and British fleets overextended in the late 1930's, so that their concluding an entente was their only option to redress the strategic imbalance. The book is a study of the troubled courtship between the two naval staffs leading to the conclusion in early 1939 of a naval Entente. The Entente enabled London and Paris to distribute their naval power in the Mediterranean to neutralize Italy and Japan and to combine their naval power in the Atlantic against the Kriegsmarine. But that alliance was not an altogether happy one, as the global defense imperatives of the Admiralty frustrated the regional ambitions of the Rue Royale intent upon unleashing combined Anglo-French naval power against Italy to seize control of the Mediterranean early in the war. The study concludes that the Entente enjoyed its greatest success in terms of naval operations in the Atlantic against German surface raiders and U-boats, and that the British attack upon the French squadron at Mers el-KEbir was more a product of the 1940 Franco-German-Italian armistices that of accumulated tensions in the Entente. Finally, the study concludes with the view that the attack upon the French fleet at Mers el-KEbir was a tactical failure and a strategic blunder that burdened the subsequent war effort and created a naval balance more hostile than that prior to the attack, and that the outcome of the operation demanded a carefully crafted cover-up that twisted the facts and concealed from the public the failure of the operation. Read more... Abstract: This is a ground-breaking study in Anglo-French naval relations after 1919 as they related to European diplomatic currents between the two World Wars, and to the balance of global naval power before World War II until the summer of 1940. The regional focus is on the Mediterranean, the only area where British and French naval power could be combined to support their diplomatic agenda and to restrain the weakest of the three Axis powers. In broader focus, the study suggests that shifting currents in the balance of global naval power left both the French and British fleets overextended in the late 1930's, so that their concluding an entente was their only option to redress the strategic imbalance. The book is a study of the troubled courtship between the two naval staffs leading to the conclusion in early 1939 of a naval Entente. The Entente enabled London and Paris to distribute their naval power in the Mediterranean to neutralize Italy and Japan and to combine their naval power in the Atlantic against the Kriegsmarine. But that alliance was not an altogether happy one, as the global defense imperatives of the Admiralty frustrated the regional ambitions of the Rue Royale intent upon unleashing combined Anglo-French naval power against Italy to seize control of the Mediterranean early in the war. The study concludes that the Entente enjoyed its greatest success in terms of naval operations in the Atlantic against German surface raiders and U-boats, and that the British attack upon the French squadron at Mers el-KEbir was more a product of the 1940 Franco-German-Italian armistices that of accumulated tensions in the Entente. Finally, the study concludes with the view that the attack upon the French fleet at Mers el-KEbir was a tactical failure and a strategic blunder that burdened the subsequent war effort and created a naval balance more hostile than that prior to the attack, and that the outcome of the operation demanded a carefully crafted cover-up that twisted the facts and concealed from the public the failure of the operation This is a ground-breaking study in Anglo-French naval relations after 1919 as they related to European diplomatic currents between the two World Wars, and to the balance of global naval power before World War II until the summer of 1940. The regional focus is on the Mediterranean, the only area where British and French naval power could be combined to support their diplomatic agenda and to restrain the weakest of the three Axis powers. In broader focus, the study suggests that shifting currents in the balance of global naval power left both the French and British fleets overextended in the late 1930’s, so that their concluding an entente was their only option to redress the strategic imbalance. The book is a study of the troubled courtship between the two naval staffs leading to the conclusion in early 1939 of a naval Entente. The Entente enabled London and Paris to distribute their naval power in the Mediterranean to neutralize Italy and Japan and to combine their naval power in the Atlantic against the Kriegsmarine. But that alliance was not an altogether happy one, as the global defense imperatives of the Admiralty frustrated the regional ambitions of the Rue Royale intent upon unleashing combined Anglo-French naval power against Italy to seize control of the Mediterranean early in the war. The study concludes that the Entente enjoyed its greatest success in terms of naval operations in the Atlantic against German surface raiders and U-boats, and that the British attack upon the French squadron at Mers el-Kébir was more a product of the 1940 Franco-German-Italian armistices that of accumulated tensions in the Entente. Finally, the study concludes with the view that the attack upon the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir was a tactical failure and a strategic blunder that burdened the subsequent war effort and created a naval balance more hostile than that prior to the attack, and that the outcome of the operation demanded a carefully crafted cover-up that twisted the facts and concealed from the public the failure of the operation. The two decades before World War II were some of the most unsettled in modern history. From Versailles to Mers el-Kébir examines one of the most unlikely—and perhaps least studied—relationships to form during that turbulent era: the alliance of the Royal Navy and the French fleet. Beginning from a global perspective and gradually narrowing, George E. Melton brings new insights to the diplomacy that led to this often strained cooperation and reinterprets some of the most important events of early World War II. By the mid-1930s the Royal Navy and French fleet had overextended themselves with global defense commitments, owing mainly to the collapse of the world war alliances and to an ominous shift in the balance of world naval power. To maximize their power, England and France combined their assets in a naval alliance. Successful in keeping both Italy and Japan neutral early in the war, that alliance brought the French and English success against German surface raiders and U-boat operations in the Atlantic. The two powers were on such good terms that in1939, during a joint operation to the north of Scotland, HMS Hood and its escorts served for a week under the command of Vice Admiral Marcel Gensoul, French commander of the Dunkerque. Afterward, the British seamen affectionately referred to the Dunkerque as "the friend of the Hood." Still, the union was not an altogether happy one. The global defense imperatives of the Admiralty frustrated the regional ambitions of the Rue Royale. The union ultimately came to a violent end when the British attacked the French squadron at Mers el-Kébir in the summer of 1940 after France had signed an armistice with Germany. What followed was a poorly constructed cover up to mask the operation as a regrettable but necessary action. Melton's study challenges this popular myth. Thoroughly researched and documented, From Versailles to Mers el-Kébir concludes that the operation was a disastrous failure. "This book concerns itself with one of the most unlikely relationships in the two decades before World War II: the alliance of the Royal Navy and the French fleet. By the mid 1930s, both fleets had overextended themselves with global defense commitments, owing mainly to the collapse of the world war alliances and to an ominous shift in the balance of world naval power. To maximize their power, England and France combined their assets in a naval alliance. The union was not an altogether happy one, but it survived in one form or another until the British attack upon the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir in 1940. George E. Melton brings new insights to the diplomacy that led to this often strained cooperation, and reinterprets some of the most important events of early World War II"-- Provided by publisher Preface Toward a global imbalance Fascist aggression in the Mediterranean Tensions in Spanish waters The road to Nyon Solving a Mediterranean problem An informal naval entente From Nyon to Munich An Anglo-French naval alliance War on the periphery Twilight of the Anglo-French Naval Alliance Toward a violent solution Blunder at Mers el-Kébir The cover-up and after Conclusions.