From Value to Rightness: Consequentialism, Action-Guidance, and the Perspective-Dependence of Moral Duties (Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory)

This book develops an original version of act-consequentialism. It argues that act-consequentialists should adopt a subjective criterion of rightness. The book develops new arguments which strongly suggest that, according to the best version of act-consequentialism, the rightness of actions depends on expected rather than actual value. Its findings go beyond the debate about consequentialism and touch on important debates in normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction between criterion of rightness and decision procedures addresses how, why, and in which sense moral theories must be implemented by ordinary persons. The discussion of the rationales of "ought" implies "can" leads to the discovery of a hitherto overlooked moral principle, "ought" implies "evidence", which can be used to show that most prominent moral theories are false. Finally, in the context of discussing cases that are supposed to reveal intuitions that favour either objective or subjective consequentialism, the book argues that which cases are relevant for the discussion of objectivism and subjectivism depends on the type of moral theory we are concerned with (consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, etc.). __From Value to Rightness__ will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in normative ethics and metaethics. This book develops an original version of act-consequentialism. It argues that act-consequentialists should adopt a subjective criterion of rightness. The book develops new arguments which strongly suggest that, according to the best version of act-consequentialism, the rightness of actions depends on expected rather than actual value. Its findings go beyond the debate about consequentialism and touch on important debates in normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction between criterion of rightness and decision procedures addresses how, why, and in which sense moral theories must be implemented by ordinary persons. The discussion of the rationales of “ought” implies “can” leads to the discovery of a hitherto overlooked moral principle, “ought” implies “evidence”, which can be used to show that most prominent moral theories are false. Finally, in the context of discussing cases that are supposed to reveal intuitions that favour either objective or subjective consequentialism, the book argues that which cases are relevant for the discussion of objectivism and subjectivism depends on the type of moral theory we are concerned with (consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, etc.). From Value to Rightness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in normative ethics and metaethics. Cover 1 Half Title 2 Series Page 3 Title Page 4 Copyright Page 5 Dedication Page 6 Contents 8 Lists of Figures and Tables 10 Acknowledgements 11 Introduction 14 Part 1 Decision-Guidance 26 1 The Problem of Decision-Guidance 28 2 DP and Objective Consequentialism’s Travesty of Decision-Guidance 40 Part 2 “Ought” Implies “Can” 56 3 In Defence of “Ought” Implies “Can” 58 4 Objective Consequentialism and Ignorance-Induced Inability 75 5 Four Arguments Against Objective Consequentialism Related to “Ought” Implies “Can” 90 6 “Ought” Implies “Evidence” 104 7 Is Subjective Consequentialism Compatible With “Ought” Implies “Can” ? 117 Part 3 Intuitions About Perspective-Dependence 128 8 A New Perspective on the Perspective-Dependence of Moral Duties 130 9 Objective Consequentialism’s Licensing Dilemma 153 Conclusion 172 References 175 Index 182 Vuko,Andrić;,consequentialism;,act-consequentialism;,objective,consequentialism;,subjective,consequentialism;,factualism;,prospectivism;,ought,implies,can;,action-guidance;,implementation,of,moral,theories Vuko Andrić,consequentialism,act-consequentialism,objective consequentialism,subjective consequentialism,factualism,prospectivism,ought implies can,action-guidance,implementation of moral theories