From Partisan Banking to Open Access: The Emergence of Free Banking in Early Nineteenth Century Massachusetts (Palgrave Studies in Economic History)

How did banking in early nineteenth-century Massachusetts evolve? Lu provides a compelling narrative about the connection between inclusive political systems and open access economies, hypothesizing that entry into banking was firstly made upon partisan grounds before later becoming open access/free entry. Lu investigates state level institutional change and studies the transition to open access from an economic perspective. What was the relationship between banking and political elites? Why were elites, who enjoyed privileges under dominant institutions, willing to dissolve these institutions and eliminate their privileges? The author provides new insights into American economic history, explaining how a society moves from limited access to one of openness.-- Provided by publisher Foreword I 7 Foreword II 10 Foreword III 13 Acknowledgements 14 Contents 17 List of Figures 19 List of Tables 23 1 Was the US Born Modern? 25 Abstract 25 1 Is Civil Society a Natural Outcome of Democracy? 26 2 Why did Americans Opened Access to Corporations? 28 3 Conceptual Framework: Impersonal Rules and Open Access for Organizations 31 4 Preview of the Book 33 Bibliography 36 2 The History of Partisan Banking 38 Abstract 38 1 Banking History, 1780–1810 39 2 From Deferential Politics to Partisan Politics 42 3 Partisan Banking, 1799–1810 45 4 Democratic-Republicans, Elbridge Gerry, and Political Reform of 1811 47 5 Banking Reform of 1811 50 6 Parties, Banks, and Laws, 1820–1850s 55 7 Conclusion 59 Bibliography 63 3 Empirical Studies on Bankers, Legislators, and Political Parties, 1790–1859 66 Abstract 66 1 Introduction 67 2 Data 68 2.1 Sample of All Bankers 75 2.2 Sample of Boston Bankers 80 3 Regimes of Party Competition 84 3.1 The First Party Regime: 1780–1821 84 3.2 The Non-party Regime: 1820–1830 93 3.3 The Second Party Regime: 1830–1860 94 4 Regression Studies on Parties and Legislators, 1797–1824 96 5 Bank Level Analysis 102 6 Conclusion 105 Bibliography 107 4 Empirical Studies on Political Connection of Suffolk Legislators, 1790–1859 108 Abstract 108 1 Introduction 108 2 Data and Empirical Tests 109 3 Conclusion 113 5 Empirical Studies on Bankers’ Wealth and Bank Balance Sheets 115 Abstract 115 1 Introduction 115 2 Bankers’ Wealth, 1829–1859 116 2.1 Introduction 116 2.2 Data 118 2.3 The Basic Results 122 2.4 Robustness Checks 131 3 Bank Balance Sheet 152 3.1 Introduction 152 3.2 Data 154 3.3 Empirical Results 159 4 Conclusion 176 Bibliography 178 6 An Intra-Elite Explanation of Open Access 179 Abstract 179 Bibliography 185 7 Conclusion: Democracy, Civil Society, Elites, and Impersonal Rules 186 Abstract 186 Bibliography 194 Appendix 195 Bibliography 200 Index 204 Front Matter ....Pages i-xxviii Was the US Born Modern? (Qian Lu)....Pages 1-13 The History of Partisan Banking (Qian Lu)....Pages 15-42 Empirical Studies on Bankers, Legislators, and Political Parties, 1790–1859 (Qian Lu)....Pages 43-84 Empirical Studies on Political Connection of Suffolk Legislators, 1790–1859 (Qian Lu)....Pages 85-91 Empirical Studies on Bankers’ Wealth and Bank Balance Sheets (Qian Lu)....Pages 93-156 An Intra-Elite Explanation of Open Access (Qian Lu)....Pages 157-163 Conclusion: Democracy, Civil Society, Elites, and Impersonal Rules (Qian Lu)....Pages 165-173 Back Matter ....Pages 175-189 Qian Lu. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 181-184) And Index.