Freedom As a Value : A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sarte

Acknowledgments; Contents; Introduction; Chapter 1: Freedom; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Sartre's Arguments for Freedom; 1.2.1 The First Argument: Consciousness is Not What it Is; 1.2.1.1 The rejection of the phenomenal reduction; 1.2.1.2 The transcendence of the ego; 1.2.1.3 Acts, Roles, Psychic States and Emotions; 1.2.2 The Second Argument: Consciousness Is What it is Not; 1.2.2.1 Imagination; 1.2.2.2 Doubt; 1.2.2.3 Destruction; 1.2.2.4 Interrogation; 1.2.2.5 Perception; 1.2.2.6 The experience of absence; 1.3 The Nature of Freedom; 1.3.1 The Omnipotence Objection; 1.3.1.1 Limitations to freedom.;This dramatic re-evaluation of Sartre's ethical theory establishes its author as a leading American exponent of phenomenology and wins many new followers for Sartre in the English-speaking world. Acknowledgments Contents Introduction Chapter 1: Freedom 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Sartre's Arguments for Freedom 1.2.1 The First Argument: Consciousness is Not What it Is 1.2.1.1 The rejection of the phenomenal reduction 1.2.1.2 The transcendence of the ego 1.2.1.3 Acts, Roles, Psychic States and Emotions 1.2.2 The Second Argument: Consciousness Is What it is Not 1.2.2.1 Imagination 1.2.2.2 Doubt 1.2.2.3 Destruction 1.2.2.4 Interrogation 1.2.2.5 Perception 1.2.2.6 The experience of absence 1.3 The Nature of Freedom 1.3.1 The Omnipotence Objection 1.3.1.1 Limitations to freedom. 1.3.1.1.1 Faticity1.3.1.1.2 Coefficient of adversity 1.3.1.1.3 Situation 1.3.1.1.4 Human condition 1.3.1.1.5 Practcio-inert 1.3.1.1.6 Counter-finality 1.3.1.1.7 My relations with others 1.3.1.2 The omnipotence objection answered 1.3.2 The Inconsistency Objection 1.3.2.1 Different senses of freedom 1.3.2.1.1 Dous Sartre recognize a need to distinguish between different senses of freedom? 1.3.2.1.2 Does Sartre in fact distinguish between different senses of freedom? 1.3.2.1.3 Are Sartre's distinctions between different senses of freedom relevant? 1.3.2.1.4 Ontological freedom and pratical freedom1.3.2.1.5 An objection to Sartre's ontological freedom 1.3.2.1.6 Some difficulties with Sartre's practical freedom 1.3.2.2 The inconsistency objection answered 1.3.2.2.1 Desan 1.3.2.2.2 Merleau-Ponty 1.3.3 The Radical Break Objection 1.3.3.1 Sartre's Testimony 1.3.3.2 Errors of the radical break theorists 1.3.3.3 Radical conversion 1.3.3.4 The radical break objection answered 1.4 Conclusion Chapter 2: Values 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Subjectivity of Values and the Subjectivity of Value-Judgments. 2.2.1 The Compatibility of the Subjectivity of Values and the Objectivity of Value-Judgments2.3 Sartre's Arguments for Ethical Subjectivism 2.3.1 The Experience of Values as Lacks -- 2.3.1.1 Criticism of the argument from the experience of values as lacks -- 2.3.2 The Distinction Between Facts and Values 2.3.2.1 Criticism of the argument from the distinction between facts and values 2.3.3 The Hierarchy of Projects 2.3.3.1 Criticism of the argument from the hierarchy of projects 2.3.4 The Nonexistence of God 2.3.4.1 Criticism of the argument from the nonexistence of God. 2.3.5 Irresolvable Moral Dilemmas2.3.5.1 Criticism of the argument from irresolvable moral dilemmas 2.4 General Crticisms of Sartre's Ethical Subjectivism 2.4.1 The Moral Equivalence of All Free Actions 2.4.2 The Authentic Torturer Problem 2.4.3 The Groundlessness of the Value of Authenticity 2.4.4 The Absurdity of Total Subjectivism 2.4.5 The Coefficient of Adversity in Our Value Experience 2.4.6 Responsibility 2.4.7 Anguish 2.4.8 Repentance 2.5 Conclusion Chapter 3: Freedom as a Value 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Sartre's Ethical Objectivism 3.2.1 Freedom and Needs. This dramatic re-evaluation of Sartre’s ethical theory establishes its author as a leading American exponent of phenomenology and wins many new followers for Sartre in the English-speaking world.