Free Will and the Brain - Neuroscientific, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives

Neuroscientific Evidence Has Educated Us In The Ways In Which The Brain Mediates Our Thought And Behavior And, Therefore, Forced Us To Critically Examine How We Conceive Of Free Will. This Volume, Featuring Contributions From An International And Interdisciplinary Group Of Distinguished Researchers And Scholars, Explores How Our Increasing Knowledge Of The Brain Can Elucidate The Concept Of The Will And Whether Or To What Extent It Is Free. It Also Examines How Brain Science Can Inform Our Normative Judgments Of Moral And Criminal Responsibility For Our Actions. Some Chapters Point Out The Different Respects In Which Mental Disorders Can Compromise The Will And Others Show How Different Forms Of Neuromodulation Can Reveal The Neural Underpinning Of The Mental Capacities Associated With The Will And Can Restore Or Enhance Them When They Are Impaired--page [i]. Pat I: Introduction -- 1. Free Will In Light Of Neuroscience / Walter Glannon -- Part Ii: Conceptual Issues -- 2. Is Free Will And Observer-based Concept Rather Than A Brain-based One? A Critical Neuroepistemological Account / Georg Northoff -- 3. Evolution, Dissolution And The Neuroscience Of The Will / Grant Gillett -- 4. The Experience Of Free Will And The Experience Of Agency: An Error-prone, Reconstructive Process / Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau, And Axel Lindner -- Part Iii: Mental Capacities And Disorders Of The Will -- 5. Being Free By Losing Control: What Obsessive-compulsive Disorder Can Tell Us About Free Will / Sanneke De Haan, Erik Rietveld And Damiaan Denys -- 6. Psychopathy And Free Will From A Philosophical And Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective / Farah Focquaert, Andrea L. Glenn, And Adrian Raine -- 7. How Mental Disorders Can Compromise The Will / Gerben Meyen -- 8. Are Addicted Individuals Responsible For Their Behaviour? / Wayne Hall And Adrian Carter -- 9. Assessment And Modification Of Free Will Via Scientific Techniques: Two Challenges / Nicole A. Vincent -- Part Iv: Neural Circuitry And Modification Of The Will -- 10. Implications Of Functional Neurosurgery And Deep-brain Stimulation For Free Will And Decision-making / Nir Lipsman And Andreas M. Lozano -- 11. Reducing, Restoring, Or Enhancing Autonomy With Neuromodulation Techniques / Maartje Schermer -- Part V: Legal Implications Of Neuroscience -- 12. Neurobiology Collides With Moral And Criminal Responsibility: The Result Is Double Vision / Steven E. Hyman -- 13. Neuroscience, Free Will, And Criminal Responsibility / Stephen J. Morse -- Index Edited By Walter Glannon. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Half title 2 Title page 3 Imprints page 4 Contents 6 Preface 9 Contributors 11 Part I Introduction 14 1 Free will in light of neuroscience 15 Introduction 17 Neuroscientific determinism 20 Neuroscientific mechanism 25 The brain–mind relation and the will 32 Neuroscience, philosophy, and criminal law 37 References 45 Part II Conceptual issues 51 2 Is free will an observer-based concept rather than a brain-based one? A critical neuroepistemological account 52 Introduction 54 Neuroepistemological remark: distinction between brain- and observer-based concepts 57 Neuroepistemological remark: examples of observer-versus brain-based concepts 62 Neuroepistemological remark: extrinsic observer-related intrusions 68 Neuroepistemological remark: intrinsic observer-related intrusions 72 Conclusion: free will as observer-based concept and extrinsic observer-related intrusion 78 References 81 3 Evolution, dissolution and the neuroscience of the will 83 Introduction 85 John Hughlings Jackson: the evolved brain and consciousness 87 Coordination and the subjective brain 89 The role of speech 91 Akrasia (weakness of the will) 93 Social and moral thought 94 Disorders of the will 96 Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 97 Psychopathy (and ASPD) 99 Impulse disorders and addiction 101 Neurodeterminism and the will 102 A causal argument: the acts and intentions syllogism 105 Does reason cause a decision to act? 106 IE (independent existence) 110 Action explanation and the brain 112 Objection to Lm1 114 Objection to Lm2 117 Objection to Lm3 118 Action, neuroscience and the will 120 References 124 4 The experience of free will and the experience of agency: an error-prone, reconstructive process 129 The experience of free will: grounded in neural mechanisms, but a social phenomenon 131 Self-attribution of action and the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms 133 The comparator model as one cue for the self-attribution of actions 135 Optimal integration of agency cues might underlie self-attribution of actions 137 Self-attribution of actions in schizophrenia 140 The nature of free will and the self-attribution of free will 144 Conclusions 148 References 151 Part III Mental capacities and disorders of the will 156 5 Being free by losing control: what obsessive-compulsive disorder can tell us about free will 157 Introduction 159 The lack of freedom in OCD 161 The paradoxical role of conscious control 163 Freedom of will versus freedom in action 165 A phenomenological account of action 167 The role of deliberation in the experience of freedom in action 169 Too much control is counter-productive: three mechanisms 172 The pink-elephant effect 174 The self-sustaining prophecy 177 The hyper-reflectivity trap 178 Solving the paradox: being free by losing control 181 Being free by losing control: implications for the neuroscientific debate on free will 183 Conclusion 186 References 189 6 Psychopathy and free will from a philosophical and cognitive neuroscience perspective 194 Introduction 197 Incompatibilist and compatibilist accounts of free will 200 Reasons-responsive compatibilism 205 Empirical research on psychopaths 210 The inability to take the perspective of another and feel concern for his or her suffering 211 A lack of fear of the negative consequences of immoral behaviors 214 The ability to shift behavior away from reward-seeking and attend to peripheral cues (e.g., the suffering of others or the threat of being caught) that signal that the behavior should be discontinued 216 Discussion and future directions 219 References 226 7 How mental disorders can compromise the will 236 Introduction 238 Various mental disorders and the will 242 Dementia and delirium 243 Psychosis 245 Mood disorders 248 Anxiety disorders and obsessive-compulsive disorder 251 Drug-related disorders 253 Tourette's syndrome 255 Impulse-control disorders 257 Personality disorders 259 Types of influence 260 Free will 261 Implications 266 Life, law, treatment 267 Research 269 Conclusion 271 References 272 8 Are addicted individuals responsible for their behaviour? 278 What is addiction? 281 The case for a brain disease model of addiction (BDMA) 284 Animal models of addiction 285 Human neuroimaging studies 287 Human genetics of addiction 288 Drug-induced compulsive behaviour in patients with Parkinson's disease 289 Criticisms of the brain disease model of addiction 290 Reconciling these competing views of addiction 292 Are addicted persons responsible for their behaviour? 294 Addiction as involuntary behaviour 295 Moral views of addiction 297 Addiction as impaired control 299 Criminal courts and the responsibility of addicted offenders 301 Involuntary or compulsory treatment of addiction 304 The case for involuntary psychiatric treatment 305 The case for involuntary treatment of addiction 307 Conclusions 311 References 313 9 Assessment and modification of free will via scientific techniques: two challenges 321 The shifting conceptual foundations of neurolaw 323 Hard determinism 324 Compatibilism and its capacitarian core 327 The two challenges 329 Mental capacity, you say? 331 Why not character flaws? 337 Discussion 346 References 355 Part IV Neural circuitry and modification of the will 360 10 Implications of functional neurosurgery and deep-brain stimulation for free will and decision-making 361 Introduction 363 Anatomy and circuitry of decision-making 365 Functional neurosurgery and deep-brain stimulation 372 Modulating decision-making pathology 373 Motor circuit 375 Mood and anxiety circuits 377 Probing decision-making circuitry 379 DBS as a “third party” 381 Conclusion 382 References 383 11 Reducing, restoring, or enhancing autonomy with neuromodulation techniques 388 Introduction 390 The concept of autonomy 392 Autonomy and neuroscience 396 Neuromodulation: influencing the mind by manipulating the brain 398 Invasive neurostimulation 399 Non-invasive brain stimulation 400 Neurofeedback 402 Reducing, restoring, and enhancing autonomy 404 Reducing autonomy 405 Restoring autonomy 410 Enhancing autonomy 413 How differences between techniques matter 416 Direct or indirect 417 Active or passive 419 Using or bypassing reason 421 Conclusion 423 References 425 Part V Legal implications of neuroscience 432 12 Neurobiology collides with moral and criminal responsibility: the result is double vision 433 Introduction: resurgent concerns about free will and responsibility 436 The alluring pitfalls of introspection 441 Moral responsibility and punishment 446 Neurobiology in the courts 449 References 460 13 Neuroscience, free will, and criminal responsibility 467 Introduction 469 The source of neuroexuberance 473 The law's psychology and concept of the person 475 Criminal responsibility doctrines 478 Lost in translation? Legal relevance and the need for translation 481 Dangerous distractions concerning neuroscience and criminal responsibility 483 The limits of neurolaw: the present limits of neuroscience 490 The radical neurochallenge: are we victims of neuronal circumstances? 499 The case for cautious neurolaw optimism 502 Responses to other chapters 505 De Haan et al. 506 Foquaert et al. 509 Meynen 511 Hall & Carter 514 Hyman 517 Conclusion 522 References 523 Index 531