Franz Brentano And Austrian Philosophy (vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, 24) Hardcover

"The book discusses Franz Brentanos impact on Austrian philosophy. It contains both a critical reassessment of Brentanos place in the development of Austrian philosophy at the turn of the 20th century and a reevaluation of the impact and significance of his philosophy of mind or descriptive psychology which was Brentano's most important contribution to contemporary philosophy and to the philosophy in Vienna. In addition, the relation between Brentano, phenomenology, and the Vienna Circle is investigated, together with a related documentation of Brentano's disciple Alfred Kastil (in German). The general part deals with the ongoing discussion of Carnap's "Aufbau" (Vienna Circle Lecture by Alan Chalmers) and the philosophy of mind, with a focus on physicalism as discussed by Carnap and Wittgenstein (Gergely Ambrus). As usual, two reviews of recent publications in the philosophy of mathematics (Paolo Mancosu) and research on Otto Neurath's lifework (Jordi Cat/Adam Tuboly) are included as related research contributions. This book is of interest to students, historians, and philosophers dealing with the history of Austrian and German philosophy in the 19th and 20th century"-- Back cover Editorial Contents Part I: Brentano and Austrian Philosophy Chapter 1: Introduction: Franz Brentano in Vienna 1.1 Descriptive Psychology and Phenomenology: Brentano and Husserl 1.2 Brentano and the Vienna Circle 1.3 Brentano and the History of Philosophy Chapter 2: Brentano and Husserl on Intentionality 2.1 Ancient and Medieval Background 2.2 Husserl, Bolzano and Frege 2.3 Bolzano 2.4 The Tripartite Distinction Act-Noema-Object 2.5 Brentano and Husserl on Intentionality 2.6 Some Further Features of Husserl’s View 2.7 Object 2.8 Appendix 2.8.1 Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality and the Interpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy 2.8.1.1 Aristotle 2.8.1.2 Husserl 2.8.1.3 Conflicting Interpretations of Aristotle 2.8.1.4 Aristotle and Husserl References Chapter 3: Descriptive Psychology and Phenomenology: From Brentano to Husserl to the Logic of Consciousness 3.1 Introduction: Brentano’s Legacy in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind 3.2 Descriptive Psychology, Phenomenology, and the Structure of Consciousness: From Brentano to Husserl 3.3 From Psychology to Phenomenology: Ideal/Logical Content in Consciousness 3.4 The Logic of the Phenomena of Consciousness: Meaning and Modality 3.5 The Ontology of Contents: From Phenomena to Their Species to Their Meaning 3.6 “Intentional In-Existence”: A Modal Theory 3.7 “Inner Consciousness”: A Modal Theory 3.8 Coda: Phenomenal Consciousness in Recent Philosophy of Mind References Chapter 4: Brentano’s Concept of Descriptive Psychology 4.1 Franz Brentano’s Family Connection to Newman’s Catholic University 4.2 Brentano’s New Psychology 4.3 Husserl’s Conception of Descriptive Psychology (1891–1902) 4.4 Wilhelm Dilthey’s Concept of Descriptive Psychology 4.5 Brentano’s Mereological ‘ABC of Consciousness’ 4.6 The Priority of Descriptive Psychology as a Science 4.7 Introspection and Inner Perception 4.8 The Fundamental Class of Presentations 4.9 Brentano on Mental Content and Intentional Object 4.10 Husserl’s Emerging Concept of Phenomenology and His Rejection of Descriptive Psychology 4.11 Husserl’s Departure from Descriptive Psychology (c. 1902) Chapter 5: Brentano on Phenomenology and Philosophy as a Science 5.1 The Grand Project of Philosophy as a Science 5.2 Theoretical Exactness and Empirical Research in Psychology 5.3 The Complementarity of Descriptive and Genetic Psychology 5.4 Some Cases of Complementarity 5.5 Final Remarks References Archive Materials Chapter 6: Brentano’s Appointment to the University of Vienna 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Brentano’s Background 6.3 Brentano’s Call to Vienna 6.4 Brentano’s Inaugural Lecture: Its Content... 6.5 ... and Its Reception 6.6 A Brief Look at Brentano’s Work in Vienna Unpublished Sources Universitätsarchiv Wien (UAW) Haupstaatsarchiv Wien (HstAW) Franz Brentano-Archiv Graz References Chapter 7: Intentionality in the Vienna Circle 7.1 Cautionary Remarks About Two Received Views 7.2 Relations of First Vienna Circle Members to the Brentano School 7.3 Schlick on Intentionality 7.4 Carnap’s Aufbau on the Intentional Relation 7.5 Carnap’s “Behaviorism”: Its Precursors and Its Meaning 7.6 Carnap’s Later Position: Psychological Terms as Theoretical Terms 7.7 Neurath on Intentionality 7.8 Summary Appendix: Carnap, Intentionality and the Thesis of Extensionality References Chapter 8: (Dis-)Similarities: Remarks on “Austrian” and “German” Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century References Chapter 9: Learning from Lasaulx: The Origins of Brentano’s Four Phases Theory Chapter 10: Franz Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Contact Between Philosophers 10.3 Direct Influence 10.4 Indirect Influence 10.5 Identification of Influence 10.6 Brentano’s Contact with Other Philosophers 10.7 Twardowski’s Case 10.8 Direct and Indirect Successors of Brentano in Poland 10.9 Brentano’s Followers and Critics in the Lvov-Warsaw School 10.9.1 Conception of Philosophy: Various Interpretations 10.9.2 Analytic Method 10.9.3 Elements of Bretano’s Thought in the Logical Branch of the Lvov-Warsaw School 10.9.3.1 Idiogenic (or Existential) Conception of Judgments 10.9.3.2 Syllogistics 10.9.3.3 Theory of Truth and its Criteria 10.9.3.4 Definition vs Verdeutlichung 10.9.4 Brentanian Elements in the Psychological Branch of the Lvov-Warsaw School 10.9.4.1 Descriptive Versus Physiological Psychology 10.9.4.2 Psychic Phenomena: Their Specifics, Classification and Regularities 10.9.5 Ontology 10.9.5.1 Conception of Existence 10.9.5.2 Ontic Categories 10.9.6 Ethics 10.9.7 Historiosophy 10.10 Brentano in the Eyes of Representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School 10.10.1 General Rating of Brentanism 10.10.2 Awareness of the Novelty of Brentanism 10.11 The Scale of Brentano’s Influences in Poland References Chapter 11: How Many Terms Does a Judgement Have? Jerusalem Versus Brentano 11.1 Two Conceptions of Judgement 11.2 Jerusalem’s Circularity Argument Against Brentano’s Judgement Primitivism 11.3 The Token Complexity Thesis and the Linguistic Articulation Argument 11.4 The Argument from the Judgement Function 11.5 Responding to the Argument from the Judgement Function 11.6 Conclusion References Chapter 12: Brentano and J. Stuart Mill on Phenomenalism and Mental Monism 12.1 The Background of Brentano’s Relationship with Mill and Positivism 12.2 Mill’s Permanent Possibilities of Sensation 12.3 The Case of Pain in Psychology 12.4 Phenomenalism vs. Indirect Realism 12.5 Final Remarks on Intentional Correlation Chapter 13: Ist die Unterscheidung von Ganzheit und Summe eine sachliche? Bemerkungen zum Vortrage Prof. Schlicks „Über den Begriff der Ganzheit” 13.1 Editorial Note Chapter 14: Franz Brentanos Kritik der Antimetaphysiker 14.1 Editorial Note Chapter 15: Gestaltpsychologie 15.1 Editorische Vorbemerkung Part II: General Part Chapter 16: Carnap’s Second Aufbau and David Lewis’s Aufbau 16.1 Carnap’s Second Aufbau 16.2 The Construction Basis 16.3 The Construction Method 16.4 Is the Physicalist Aufbau Philosophically Viable? 16.5 Historical Questions References Chapter 17: Carnap and Wittgenstein on Psychological Sentences: 1928–1932. Some Further Aspects of the Priority-Dispute Over Physicalism 17.1 Introduction 17.2 Carnap’s Views on the Meaning of Psychological Sentences: 1928–1932 17.2.1 The Aufbau 17.2.2 Scheinprobleme 17.2.3 The ‘‘Universalsprache” and the ‘‘Psychologie” 17.2.3.1 The Arguments Against the Phenomenalistic Account of Physical Objects 17.2.3.2 Carnap’s Argument for the Physicalistic Account of Heteropsychological Sentences in the ‘‘Psychologie” Carnap’s Arguments for (Kc) Carnap’s Arguments for (Lc) 17.3 Wittgenstein’s Views on the Meaning of Autopsychological and Heteropsychological Sentences: 1929–1932 17.3.1 Wittgenstein’s Arguments 17.3.1.1 Wittgenstein’s Arguments for (Kw) 17.3.1.2 Wittgenstein’s Arguments for (Lw) 17.4 A Comparison of Carnap’s and Wittgenstein’s Views 17.4.1 The Arguments for (Kw) and (Kc) 17.4.2 The Arguments Grounding (Lw) and (Lc) 17.5 The Priority-Dispute Between Carnap and Wittgenstein 17.6 Conclusions References Chapter 18: Scientific Communities. A History of Theories and Concepts 18.1 Introduction 18.2 “The Republic of Science”: Defending Scientific Integrity 18.3 The Scientific Community: Institutionalized Norms and Systems of Reward 18.4 Thought Collectives: Teaching or the Relevance of Audiences 18.5 A Political Theory of Science: Conflicts as Unifying Mechanisms 18.6 Investing in the Market: The Scientific Profit of Credibility 18.7 Regimes of Truth: Political Technologies, Imaginaries, and Dispositifs 18.8 Actor-Networks: ANT’s Case Against Social Explanations 18.9 Epistemic Cultures – or Transepistemic Arenas of Research? 18.10 Scientific Fields: Habitus, Scientific Capital and Common Interests 18.11 Gender, Diversity, and Innovation: The Problem of Embeddedness 18.12 Conclusions References Part III: Reviews Chapter 19: Paolo Mancosu, Abstraction and Infinity. Oxford University Press, 2016 Chapter 20: Jordi Cat, Adam Tamas Tuboly (Ed.) Neurath Reconsidered: New Sources and Perspectives. Cham: Springer Nature, 2019 Index