Foundations of Logico-Linguistics: A Unified Theory of Information, Language, and Logic (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, 2)

In 1962 a mimeographed sheet of paper fell into my possession. It had been prepared by Ernest Adams of the Philosophy Department at Berkeley as a handout for a colloquim. Headed 'SOME FALLACIES OF FORMAL LOGIC' it simply listed eleven little pieces of reasoning, all in ordinary English, and all absurd. I still have the sheet, and quote a couple of the arguments here to give the idea. • If you throw switch S and switch T, the motor will start. There­ fore, either if you throw switch S the motor will start, or, if you throw switch T the motor will start . • It is not the case that if John passes history he will graduate. Therefore, John will pass history. The disconcerting thing about these inferences is, of course, that under the customary truth-functional interpretation of and, or, not, and if-then, they are supposed to be valid. What, if anything, is wrong? At first I was not disturbed by the examples. Having at that time consider­ able personal commitment to rationality in general and formal logic in par­ ticular, I felt it my duty and found myself easily able (or so I thought) to explain away most of them. But on reflection I had to admit that my expla­ nations had an ad hoc character, varying suspiciously from example to example. In 1962 a mimeographed sheet of paper fell into my possession. It had been prepared by Ernest Adams of the Philosophy Department at Berkeley as a handout for a colloquim. Headed 'SOME FALLACIES OF FORMAL LOGIC' it simply listed eleven little pieces of reasoning, all in ordinary English, and all absurd. I still have the sheet, and quote a couple of the arguments here to give the idea." If you throw switch S and switch T, the motor will start. ThereƯ fore, either if you throw switch S the motor will start, or, if you throw switch T the motor will start ." It is not the case that if John passes history he will graduate. Therefore, John will pass history. The disconcerting thing about these inferences is, of course, that under the customary truth-functional interpretation of and, or, not, and if-then, they are supposed to be valid. What, if anything, is wrong? At first I was not disturbed by the examples. Having at that time considerƯ able personal commitment to rationality in general and formal logic in parƯ ticular, I felt it my duty and found myself easily able (or so I thought) to explain away most of them. But on reflection I had to admit that my explaƯ nations had an ad hoc character, varying suspiciously from example to example Front Matter....Pages i-xvi Introduction....Pages 1-12 Information and Language....Pages 13-46 On Describing Languages....Pages 47-67 Language and Deductive Logic....Pages 68-89 Semantics, Axiomatics....Pages 90-123 Meaning....Pages 124-131 Language and Inductive Logic....Pages 132-157 ‘If-Then’: A Case Study in Logico-Linguistic Analysis....Pages 158-211 Problem Areas and Computer Applications....Pages 212-241 Back Matter....Pages 242-249