Formal Theories Of Politics: Mathematical Modelling In Political Science (international Series In Modern Applied Mathematics And Computer Science)

__Formal Theories of Politics__ demonstrates the role of formal mathematical models in political science, and aims to convey a sense of the questions and methods which govern the political science research agenda. While there is still much interest in empirical patterns of voting behaviour and public opinion data, there has been substantial growth in emphasis on mathematical theory as a technique for the derivation of testable hypotheses. Topics discussed include: optimal candidate strategies and equilibria in competitive elections; voting agendas and parliamentary procedure in the multidimensional events; revolution, repression and inequality as outputs of dynamics systems. The mathematical techniques are widely varied, including game theory, functional analysis, differential equations, expert systems, stochastic processes and statistical models Content: MODERN APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE, Page ii Front Matter, Page iii Copyright, Page iv EDITORIAL FOREWORD, Page vii, ERVIN Y. RODIN FORMAL THEORIES OF POLITICS: THE SCOPE OF MATHEMATICAL MODELLING IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, Pages 397-404, PAUL E. JOHNSON LIMITS ON AGENDA CONTROL IN SPATIAL VOTING GAMES, Pages 405-416, SCOTT L. FELD, BERNARD GROFMAN, NICHOLAS R. MILLER SMOOTH SOCIAL CHOICE, Pages 417-435, NORMAN SCHOFIELD A MODEL OF PARTY CONSTRAINTS ON OPTIMAL CANDIDATE POSITIONS, Pages 437-450, JOHN H. ALDRICH, MICHAEL D. MCGINNIS UNDOMINATED CANDIDATE STRATEGIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE VOTING RULES, Pages 451-459, GARY W. COX THE LOCATION OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF A NEW SPATIAL MODEL OF ELECTIONS, Pages 461-470, JAMES M. ENELOW, MELVIN J. HINICH A MODEL OF CANDIDATE CONVERGENCE UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT VOTER PREFERENCES, Pages 471-478, AMIHAI GLAZER, BERNARD GROFMAN, GUILLERMO OWEN REPUTATIONAL DYNAMICS IN SPATIAL COMPETITION, Pages 479-496, DANIEL E. INGBERMAN POLITICAL DECISION MAKING WITH COSTLY AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION, Pages 497-509, RANDALL L. CALVERT ADVANTAGEOUS MULTIPLE RENT SEEKING, Pages 511-518, MARK GRADSTEIN, SHMUEL NITZAN THE GEOGRAPHICAL IMPERATIVES OF THE BALANCE OF POWER IN 3-COUNTRY SYSTEMS, Pages 519-531, EMERSON M.S. NIOU, PETER C. ORDESHOOK NONCOMPLIANCE AND THE LIMITS OF COERCION: THE PROBLEMATIC ENFORCEMENT OF UNPOPULAR LAWS, Pages 533-545, ROBERT HUCKFELDT COERCION AND REVOLUTION: VARIATIONS ON A PREDATOR–PREY MODEL, Pages 547-559, GEORGE TSEBELIS, JOHN SPRAGUE MATHEMATICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF WAR, Pages 561-575, CLAUDIO CIOFFI-REVILLA A DISTRIBUTION OF EXTREME INEQUALITY WITH APPLICATIONS TO CONFLICT BEHAVIOR: A GEOMETRIC DERIVATION OF THE PARETO DISTRIBUTION, Pages 577-587, MANUS I. MIDLARSKY SHORT-TERM PREDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR USING A HOLLAND CLASSIFIER, Pages 589-600, PHILIP A. SCHRODT