Food and Power : Regime Type, Agricultural Policy, and Political Stability

"The relationship between development and democratization remains one of the most compelling topics of research in political science, yet many aspects of authoritarian regime behavior remain unexplained. This book explores how different types of governments take action to shape the course of economic development, focusing on agriculture, a sector that is of crucial importance in the developing world. It explains variation in agricultural and food policy across regime type, who the winners and losers of these policies are, and whether they influence the stability of authoritarian governments. The book pushes us to think differently about the process linking economic development to political change, and to consider growth as an inherently politicized process rather than an exogenous driver of moves towards democracy"--Provided by publisher Cover 1 Half-Title 3 Title Page 5 Copyright Information 6 Contents 7 Figures 9 Tables 11 Acknowledgments 13 1 Introduction 15 1.1 Questions and Answers: Agricultural Policy, Regime Type, and Political Stability 20 1.2 What Do We Learn? Toward a Social Conflict Theory of Authoritarianism 26 1.3 The Plan of the Book 31 2 Agricultural Policy, Regime Type, and Political Stability 36 2.1 Agricultural Policy and Agricultural Rents 37 2.2 Rural and Urban Interests 41 2.3 Regime Type 43 2.4 Policy under Authoritarianism: Grievances, Collective Action, and Threats to Political Stability 46 2.5 Policy under Democracy: Political Support and Political Stability 62 2.6 Conclusion 67 3 Political Regime Type and Agricultural Policy Outcomes 69 3.1 Previous Literature: Agricultural and Economic Policymaking under Democracy and Authoritarianism 71 3.2 Hypotheses, Model, and Data 74 3.3 Results 84 3.4 Conclusion 101 4 Food Policy and Urban Unrest: A Global Analysis 103 4.1 Previous Literature 104 4.2 Research Design 107 4.3 Data 115 4.4 Results 119 4.5 Conclusion 128 5 Agricultural Rents, Landholding Inequality, and Authoritarian Regime Durability 130 5.1 Previous Literature 132 5.2 Data: Measuring Agricultural Rents and Agricultural Producer Power 136 5.3 Models and Results 148 5.4 Conclusion 159 6 Agricultural Policy and Authoritarian Regime Durability in Germany, 1878–1890 161 6.1 Introduction 161 6.2 Previous Literature: Authoritarianism and Agricultural Protection in Nineteenth-Century Europe 163 6.3 Setting the Stage: Institutions and Political Threats to the Imperial German Regime 165 6.4 Socioeconomic Structures, Political Threats, and the Composition of the 1879 Reichstag 168 6.5 Policy Preferences of Rural and Urban Interests 177 6.6 Making Policy: Formulating and Passing the 1879 Tariff Bill 179 6.7 The Effects of Agricultural Protection after 1879 187 6.8 Conclusion 189 7 Agricultural Policy and Authoritarian Regime Durability in Malaysia, 1969–1980 191 7.1 Introduction 191 7.2 Previous Literature: Authoritarianism and Agricultural Policy in Malaysia 193 7.3 Setting the Stage: Institutions and Political Threats to the Malaysian Regime 195 7.4 Socioeconomic Structures, Political Threats, and the 1969 Parliamentary Election 201 7.5 Rural and Urban Interests and Rice Policy before 1971 208 7.6 Making Policy: The Breakdown of the Bargain, UMNO Hegemony, and Agriculture 211 7.7 The Effects of the NEP and Agricultural Support on Regime Durability 218 7.8 Conclusion 221 8 Conclusion 223 Bibliography 229 Index 251 "In this book I explore how authoritarian governments intervene in markets to secure their position in power, looking at a policy area which is of vital importance in developing autocracies: prices for agricultural produce and food. I argue that authoritarian governments intervene in agricultural markets to resolve distributional conflicts between the rural and urban sectors and co-opt threatening groups into supporting their regime. By manipulating the prices of agricultural commodities, they respond to political threats posed by farmers and food consumers, and make significant contributions to regime stability. Contrary to previous accounts which emphasize the need for authoritarian regimes to provide cheap food for urban consumers, I argue that when farmers are a well-organized and powerful group, regimes mitigate the risk of political instability by increasing food and farm produce prices. What emerges from my study is a powerful revision of our understanding of development and democratization. Food and agricultural policies are an unexplored source of authoritarian regime durability, but they also have consequences for development and the chances of democratization"-- Provided by publisher Using cross-national statistical analysis and detailed case studies, Thomson shows how different types of governments shape the development process through agricultural policy. This book will appeal to anyone interested in the political economy of development and the relationship between development and political change. Explains how economic development leads to democracy by exploring how authoritarian governments manipulate the agricultural sector