Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

What Is The Role Of Intelligence Agencies In Strategy And Policy? How Do Policymakers Use (or Misuse) Intelligence Estimates? When Do Intelligence-policy Relations Work Best? How Do Intelligence-policy Failures Influence Threat Assessment, Military Strategy, And Foreign Policy? These Questions Are At The Heart Of Recent National Security Controversies, Including The 9/11 Attacks And The War In Iraq. In Both Cases The Relationship Between Intelligence And Policy Broke Down-with Disastrous Consequences. In Fixing The Facts, Joshua Rovner Explores The Complex Interaction Between Intelligence And Policy And Shines A Spotlight On The Problem Of Politicization. Major Episodes In The History Of American Foreign Policy Have Been Closely Tied To The Manipulation Of Intelligence Estimates. Rovner Describes How The Johnson Administration Dealt With The Intelligence Community During The Vietnam War; How President Nixon And President Ford Politicized Estimates On The Soviet Union; And How Pressure From The George W. Bush Administration Contributed To Flawed Intelligence On Iraq. He Also Compares The U.s. Case With The British Experience Between 1998 And 2003, And Demonstrates That High-profile Government Inquiries In Both Countries Were Fundamentally Wrong About What Happened Before The War. -- Book Jacket. A Basic Problem : The Uncertain Role Of Intelligence In National Security -- Pathologies Of Intelligence-policy Relations -- Policy Oversell And Politicization -- The Johnson Administration And The Vietnam Estimates -- The Nixon Administration And The Soviet Strategic Threat -- The Ford Administration And The Team B Affair -- Intelligence, Policy, And The War In Iraq -- Politics, Politicization, And The Need For Secrecy. Joshua Rovner. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Rovner, (strategy and policy, U.S. Naval War College) examines the relationship between intelligence, policy, and politics taking as examples interactions between intelligence agencies and political players in recent historical situations including President Johnson's military escalation in Vietnam 1964-1967, the Nixon administration's attitude toward intelligence and the Soviet threat, the Ford administration and the Team B affair, and the Bush and Blair administrations' cherry-picking of intelligence supporting their case for military action in Iraq. Rovner finds that political conditions and pre-existing policy directions often dictate administrative responses to intelligence findings, and analyzes the pathology behind such politicization. Annotation ©2011 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com) CONTENTS......Page 5 PREFACE......Page 7 A BASIC PROBLEM......Page 13 PATHOLOGIES OF INTELLIGENCE-POLICY RELATIONS......Page 30 POLICY OVERSELL AND POLITICIZATION......Page 48 THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION AND THE VIETNAM ESTIMATES......Page 61 THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT......Page 101 THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND THE TEAM B AFFAIR......Page 125 INTELLIGENCE, POLICY, AND THE WAR IN IRAQ......Page 149 POLITICS, POLITICIZATION, AND THE NEED FOR SECRECY......Page 197 APPENDIX A......Page 217 APPENDIX B......Page 219 NOTES......Page 223 INDEX......Page 267