Fixing Reference (Context & Content)

Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles. The first connects aboutness and truth: a belief is about the object upon whose properties its truth or falsity depends. The second connects truth and justification: justification is truth conducive; in general and allowing exceptions, a subject whose beliefs are justified will be unlucky if they are not true, and not merely lucky if they are. These principles--one connecting aboutness and truth; the other truth and justification--combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification: a body of beliefs is about the object upon which its associated means of justification converges; the object whose properties a subject justifying beliefs in this way will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely luck to get right. The first part of the book proves a precise version of this principle. Its remaining chapters use the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them--perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions--do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness. Cover 1 Fixing Reference 4 Copyright 5 Dedication 6 Contents 8 Acknowledgements 10 1: Introduction 12 1.1 The Question and Basic Componentsof the Answer 12 1.2 Preliminaries 19 1.2.1 Language and thought 19 1.2.2 Naturalism vs non-naturalism 23 1.2.3 Justification 25 1.2.4 The status of examples 30 1.2.5 Explanatory ambitions 33 1.2.6 The notion of an ordinary object and the ‘problem of the many’ 38 Note 45 2: In Which a Precise Version of the Connection Between Aboutness and Justification Is Derived From More Basic Principles 48 Introduction 48 2.1 TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION 49 2.2 From TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION to REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION 58 2.3 The Objection from Potential Counter examples 71 APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2 76 Appendix A: Proof of the Uniqueness Lemma 76 Appendix B: Not About Nothing 84 3: The Mind Has a Basic Need to Represent Things Outside Itself 90 Introduction 90 3.1 Anscombe’s Distinction Between Practical and Speculative Knowledge 97 3.2 From Anscombian Practical Knowledge to Justification by Intention 102 3.3 The Need to Represent 110 3.4 The Need to Represent and the NormativeStatus of Direct Coordination 113 3.5 Reference, Justification, and Orders of 119 4: Perceptual Demonstratives 125 Introduction 125 4.1 An Empirical Component 126 4.2 Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing (I)—Structure 133 4.3 Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing (II)—Normativity 136 Interim Conclusion 141 4.4 Three Puzzles about Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing 142 4.4.1 First puzzle: Classification 142 4.4.2 Second puzzle: Comprehension 147 4.4.3 Third puzzle: Directness 149 4.5 The Problem of Empty Perceptual Demonstrative Thought 152 4.6 Perceptual Demonstrative Thought and the Nature of Perception 159 5: Proper Names 162 Introduction 162 5.1 Descriptivisms vs Causalisms: The Traditional Debate 163 5.2 Evans on Proper Names 171 Interim Conclusion 181 5.3 Proper Names in the REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION Framework 182 5.4 Varieties of Deference 196 APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 5 205 Appendix A: Additional Intricacies 205 Appendix B: The Context-Dependence of Proper-Name-Based Aboutness 210 6: The Delicate Question of Reference by Description 223 Introduction 223 6.1 Russell 227 6.2 (Mere) Descriptive Thought vs Description-Based Thought (I)—Truth Conditions 230 6.3 (Mere) Descriptive Thought vs Description-Based Thought (II)—Justification 242 Conclusion 256 7: Descriptions and Singular Thought 258 Introduction 258 7.1 The Boundaries of Description-Based Singular Thought 259 7.2 Object Dependence 265 7.3 Comparison with Extant Proposals: Extended Acquaintance and Modified Semantic Instrumentalism 275 7.3.1 Extended acquaintance 276 7.3.2 Modified semantic instrumentalism 280 8: Thought and Consciousness 284 Introduction 284 8.1 Naturalism in the REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION Framework 290 8.2 Putting Consciousness Back In 295 8.3 What Is Missing If Consciousness Is Missing (I)—The Role of Motivational Phenomenology 304 Interim Conclusion 313 8.4 What Is Missing If Consciousness Is Missing (II)—Thought Without Perceptual Awareness? 314 8.4.1 The question of role 317 8.4.2 The question of essence 322 Appendix: Key to Notation 326 References 328 Index 340 This book develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this part of meta-semantics tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles. The first connects aboutness and truth: a belief is about the object upon whose properties its truth or falsity depends. The second connects truth and justification: justification is truth-conducive; in general and allowing exceptions, a subject whose beliefs are justified will be unlucky if they are not true, and not merely lucky if they are. These principles—one connecting aboutness and truth; the other truth and justification—combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification: a body of beliefs is about the object upon which its associated means of justification converges; the object whose properties a subject justifying beliefs in this way will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely lucky to get right. The first part of the book proves a precise version of this principle. Its remaining chapters use the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them—perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions—do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness "Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles. The first connects aboutness and truth: a belief is about the object upon whose properties its truth or falsity depends. The second connects truth and justification: justification is truth conducive; in general and allowing exceptions, a subject whose beliefs are justified will be unlucky if they are not true, and not merely lucky if they are. These principles--one connecting aboutness and truth; the other truth and justificaion--combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification: a body of beliefs is about the object upon which its associated means of justification converges; the object whose properties a subject justifying beliefs in this way will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely lucky to get right. The first part of the book proves a precise version of this principle. Its remaining chapters use the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them--perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions--do their aboutness-fixing and thought enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness"--Jacket Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles, the first of which connects aboutness and truth,and the second of which connects truth and justification. These principles combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification. Dickie uses the principle to explain how therelations to objects that enable us to think about them--perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions--do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness. Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. She explains how relations to objects including perceptual attention, understanding of proper names, and grasp of descriptions do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness - fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference - fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness