Fission and Fusion of Allies : The ROK Nuclear Quest and U. S. -France Competition and Cooperation

This book traces the development of U.S-led global nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy during the three decades since the Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” in 1953. The U.S. non-proliferation efforts had diverse obstacles. It had to prevent nuclear states’ export of nuclear technology while dissuading non-nuclear states from developing nuclear weapons. In addition, building non-proliferation regime was not always its top foreign policy priority. To understand the complex process of non-proliferation, the book examines the relations among three different actors in the nuclear field: a global non-proliferation regime builder (U.S.), a potential nuclear proliferator (France) and a would-be nuclear state (Republic of Korea). In tracing how they developed nuclear strategies, conflicting and compromising with one another, the book pays special attention to how the transforming Cold War structure in the 1970s not only affected foreign policies of the involved countries but also complicated their relationship. The exploration ultimately highlights the multidimensional nature of international discussion on nuclear non-proliferation as the ROK’s nuclear development attempts, U.S. non-proliferation efforts, and the U.S.-France nuclear technology cooperation in the 1970s were all deeply connected. Preface 5 Acknowledgments 8 Contents 9 About the Authors 10 1 Prologue 11 Puzzle in the Birth and Demise of the ROK Nuclear Program Behind the U.S.–France Diplomacy Scenes 11 References 21 2 The Origin of the ROK Nuclear Program 23 Designing a Nuclear Weapons Program in the ROK 23 Atoms for Peace and the Introduction of Nuclear Science in the ROK 24 Redesigning ROK’s Nuclear Development with Efforts from Technocrats and the Scientific Community in the 1960s 26 Re-Birth of the Nuclear Weapons Plan 29 CANDU–NRX Negotiation Between the ROK and Canada 31 The ROK–French Negotiations for Reprocessing Facilities 34 References 36 3 The U.S. and the Emerging Threat of Proliferation: Opportunities and Risks for the Non-proliferation Regimes Created in the Changing Context of the Cold War Order, 1960–1974 38 Intrinsic Problems of the Atoms for Peace Program 39 The Kennedy–Johnson Era: Stabilizing the Superpower Nuclear Game and Road to Non-proliferation Treaty 41 The Kennedy Era: Tightening the Non-proliferation Policy 42 The Johnson Era: The U.S.–Soviet Union Agreement on the NPT and the U.S.–France Split 44 Johnson’s Failure to Stabilize East Asia: Rebirth of the Nuclear Weapons Program in the ROK 45 The Nixon Era 47 Strategic Shift from Confrontation to Cooperation: Nixon–Pompidou Talks for Strategic Nuclear Cooperation 48 Deepening Alliance Dilemma in East Asia: The Nixon Doctrine and Rebirth of the Nuclear Weapons Program in the ROK 50 Conclusion 51 References 53 4 The Rise and Downfall of Gaullism and France’s Nuclear Deals with Third World States, 1945–1974 57 Rise of Technonationalism in Post-war France and Turmoil in the U.S.–France Relations 59 The Impact of Changes in Domestic Politics and Franco–U.S. Strategic Nuclear Talks on France’s Nuclear Export Policy 60 The France–U.S. Strategic Nuclear Talks (1969–1974) 62 France–Pakistan Nuclear Cooperation and Deal for the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant (RPP) 65 France–Iran Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (1974) 66 France–ROK Reprocessing and Ballistic Missile Deal (1974) 68 References 72 5 The Coexistence of the ROK–France–IAEA Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and the ROK–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 1975 74 The ROK–U.S. Alliance Dilemma and Nuclear Diplomacy After the Indian Nuclear Test 76 Construction of Non-Proliferation Coalition: The U.S.–France Talks for Strategic Nuclear Cooperation and Building of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 81 Conclusion 87 References 88 6 The Fall of the Gaullist Technocrats and End of the ROK Nuclear Weapons Program, 1976–1979 91 The ROK-U.S. Nuclear Committee Talks and Inter-Korean Military Conflict 92 The Fall of the Gaullists and the CEA Setback 95 ROK Missile Development, 1971–1976 96 The Rise of Jimmy Carter and the ROK Nuclear-Hedging Strategy 97 The Carter-Park Conflict and Cooperation Between Carter and d’Estaing: the Missile Showdown and the Indigenous Nuclear Program, 1977–1978 99 The Summit Meeting, End of the U.S. Pullout Plan, ROK–U.S. Missile Guidelines, and the End of the ROK Nuclear Weapons Program Following Park’s Demise, 1979–1980 102 Conclusion 103 References 104 Epilogue 107 Nuclear Latency and Hedging Issue in the ROK 109 Political Discussion of ROK Nuclear Latency in the 2010s and 2020s 111 Conclusion 113 References 114