Feeding the German Eagle : Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941

The dramatic story of Hitler and Stalin's marriage of convenience has been recounted frequently over the past 60 years, but with remarkably little consensus. As the first English-language study to analyze the development, extent, and importance of the Nazi-Soviet economic relationship from Hitler's ascension to power to the launching of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, this book highlights the crucial role that Soviet economic aid played in Germany's early successes in World War II. When Hitler's rearmament efforts left Germany dangerously short of raw materials in 1939, Stalin was able to offer valuable supplies of oil, manganese, grain, and rubber. In exchange, the Soviet Union would gain territory and obtain the technology and equipment necessary for its own rearmament efforts.However, by the summer of 1941, Stalin's well-calculated plan had gone awry. Germany's continuing reliance on Soviet raw materials would, Stalin hoped, convince Hitler that he could not afford to invade the USSR. As a result, the Soviets continued to supply the Reich with the resources that would later carry the Wehrmacht to the gates of Moscow and nearly cost the Soviets the war. The extensive use in this study of neglected source material in the German archives helps resolve the long-standing debate over whether Stalin's foreign policy was one of expansionism or appeasement. Of Politics And War Economies -- Murphy's Law -- Traditional Interdependence -- World War I -- The Have-nots Have Each Other, 1919-27 -- The First Five-year Plan, 1928-32 -- Paying For The First Five-year Plan, 1933-34 -- The New Economic Order, April 9, 1935 -- Failed Economic Partnership -- First Failure: Schacht's Plan, April 29, 1936 -- Second Failure: Goring's Plan, December 24, 1936 -- Third Failure: The Purges, March 1, 1938 -- Fourth Failure: Schulenburg's Plan, December 19, 1938 -- Fifth Failure: Schnurre's Aborted Visit, January 28, 1939 -- Sixth Failure: Schulenburg In Moscow, March 11, 1939 -- Talking About Talking -- First Soundings, April 17 -- Molotov's Maybe, May 20 -- More Soundings, June 17 -- Talks Reopened, July 21 -- Restored Economic Partnership -- Dining Out, July 26 -- Economic End Game, August 12 -- The Final Go-ahead, August 19 -- Toward An Economic Alliance -- Political End Game, August 23 -- War Begins, September 1 -- Dividing Poland, September 17 -- Collusion In The Kremlin, September 28 -- The German Plan -- Ritter And Schnurre Fly To Moscow, October 7 -- The Soviet Slow And Steady, October 22 -- Ritter Returns, October 26 -- The Soviet Plan -- Men In Suits, November 7 -- The Soviet Offer, November 30 -- The Delegates Depart, December 13 -- The Final Plan: Part I -- First Moscow Economic Summit, December 31 -- Second Moscow Economic Summit, January 29, 1940 -- Third Moscow Economic Summit, February 8 -- Signing On The Dotted Line, February 11 -- Gas And Grain For Coal And Cruisers. Edward E. Ericson. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [241]-253) And Index. The dramatic story of Hitler and Stalin's marriage of convenience has been recounted frequently over the past 60 years, but with remarkably little consensus. As the first English-language study to analyze the development, extent, and importance of the Nazi-Soviet economic relationship from Hitler's ascension to power to the launching of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, this book highlights the crucial role that Soviet economic aid played in Germany's early successes in World War II. When Hitler's rearmament efforts left Germany dangerously short of raw materials in 1939, Stalin was able to offer valuable supplies of oil, manganese, grain, and rubber. In exchange, the Soviet Union would gain territory and obtain the technology and equipment necessary for its own rearmament efforts. However, by the summer of 1941, Stalin's well-calculated plan had gone awry. Germany's continuing reliance on Soviet raw materials would, Stalin hoped, convince Hitler that he could not afford to invade the USSR. As a result, the Soviets continued to supply the Reich with the resources that would later carry the Wehrmacht to the gates of Moscow and nearly cost the Soviets the war. The extensive use in this study of neglected source material in the German archives helps resolve the long-standing debate over whether Stalin's foreign policy was one of expansionism or appeasement.