Fearing the Worst: How Korea Transformed the Cold War (Woodrow Wilson Center Series)

After World War II, the escalating tensions of the Cold War shaped the international system. Fearing the Worst explains how the Korean War fundamentally changed postwar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union into a militarized confrontation that would last decades. Samuel F. Wells Jr. examines how military and political events interacted to escalate the conflict. Decisions made by the Truman administration in the first six months of the Korean War drove both superpowers to intensify their defense buildup. American leaders feared the worst-case scenario--that Stalin was prepared to start World War III--and raced to build up strategic arms, resulting in a struggle they did not seek out or intend. Their decisions stemmed from incomplete interpretations of Soviet and Chinese goals, especially the belief that China was a Kremlin puppet. Yet Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il-sung all had their own agendas, about which the United States lacked reliable intelligence. Drawing on newly available documents and memoirs--including previously restricted archives in Russia, China, and North Korea--Wells analyzes the key decision points that changed the course of the war. He also provides vivid profiles of the central actors as well as important but lesser known figures. Bringing together studies of military policy and diplomacy with the roles of technology, intelligence, and domestic politics in each of the principal nations, Fearing the Worst offers a new account of the Korean War and its lasting legacy. "The Worst Case considers how the Cold War and its shape as a strategic confrontation between two superpowers flowed from the Korean War. The book examines the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, each superpower's relations with its allies, and the roles of technology, intelligence, and domestic politics in the decisions of the key nations. The United States reluctantly funded massive increases in nuclear weapons, strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines because the leaders of the Truman administration concluded that Stalin was prepared to start World War III to advance his interests in Asia and Europe. In the absence of any reliable intelligence on Soviet or Chinese decision-making, the key people in the administration accepted the worst case as a real possibility, and prepared for it. What they did not know is that Stalin was working consistently to avoid war with the United States, that Mao was not a puppet of Moscow but had his own ambitious agenda in Asia, and that Kim Il-sung had convinced Stalin that he could produce a low-cost victory in Korea that would give the Soviet Union warm-water ports and a reliable client state strategically positioned to influence Japan and the states of Southeast Asia. Through materials from archives and previously restricted published materials in Russia, China, and North Korea that have become accessible in recent years, The Worst Case provides insights into the reasons behind choices made by leaders in the communist countries to add to the well-researched records on the Western side"-- Provided by publisher Table of Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Part I. The War 1. Stalin Endorses War in Asia 2. Kim Il-sung Plans an Attack 3. Truman Consolidates US Commitments 4. Joseph McCarthy Sells the Politics of Fear 5. Paul Nitze Sounds the Tocsin 6. North Korea Drives South 7. Truman Reverses Policy 8. Douglas MacArthur Gambles and Wins 9. Mao Zedong Intervenes Massively 10. Peng Dehuai and Matthew Ridgway Fight to a Stalemate Part II. The Transformation 11. George C. Marshall and Robert Lovett Guide a US Buildup 12. Dean Acheson Leads the Defense of Europe 13. Andrei Tupolev Creates a Strategic Bomber Force 14. Curtis LeMay Builds the Strategic Air Command 15. Igor Kurchatov Develops Soviet Nuclear Weapons 16. Walter Bedell Smith Reforms and Expands the CIA 17. Korea Transforms the Cold War Chronology Notes Selected Bibliography Index