Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

This volume is great reading for any philosopher or student of philosophy who, like me, firmly believes that (1) a systematic inquiry into how we ought to live and what we owe to each other should be integrated with (2) an understanding of ourselves as thoroughly natural, social creatures whose behavior is explainable using standard scientific methods. More concretely, Railton gives a great account of how to understand (1) the explanations we give for the patterns of change within societies' moral attitudes concerning different kinds of behavior, character traits, and/or public institutions as (2a) objective, natural explanations of the historical developments in question, rather than (2b)the product of subjective "projections" of value onto bare, valueless factual descriptions of how societies' moral norms evolve. For example, we explain (1) the fact that widespread intellectual opposition to slavery first appeared within the 18th Century empires of Britain and France as the product of (2a) the fact that slavery was "morally worse" in these countries' colonies during that period than in any other place or time in history and (2b) the fact people's moral sensibilities evolved in causal response to this natural moral fact (this is a crude schema, but Railton puts a quite a bit more meat on the causal mechanisms in question). Railton's essays are much different than most ventures in "naturalized ethics," which read like a catalogue of inelegant applications of the data and explanatory models of the behavioral sciences to ethical questions. In contrast, Railton's own essays are concerned with elucidating deep philosophical questions about (1) how to live and what we owe to each other within (2) an intellectual framework that is systematic and continuous with the natural sciences, while nevertheless alive to the detail and complexities of real moral practice, moral discourse, and human value. Railton shows how facts about what is morally right and wrong can interact with natural facts about the interests and capacities we have as animals with peculiar forms of sociability. Among the highlights of volume are: (1) The development in the essay "Moral Realism" of a "wants/interests mechanism" that sketches how individuals and societies can get causal feedback from the world in a way that regulates their moral views and reliably steers their "subjective wants" towards a state of equilibrium with their "objective interests." (2)An analysis of classicallly Marxist-Humanist themes like "alienation" and "ideological critique" within the context of a very sophisticated view of practical rationality, human well-being, and consequentialist ethical theory. Railton develops a version of consequentialist ethics that takes into account the formation of non-alienated desires and principles as the most efficient means for a achieving pluralistic vision of well-being (where well-being is a weighted mix of things like knowledge, experiences of beauty, meaningful personal relationships, socioeconomic security, health, etc.). Whereas Leftists of a certain stripe often take instrumental rationality and consequentialist thought itself to be the cause of modernist alientation or mere ideological superstructures of bourgeois society, Railton shows how the analytical separation of the deliberative and affective aspects of practical reason on which these critiques depend is already a symptom of alienated thinking (a theme that actually echoes some of the work by Frankfurt School theorists on social rationality, as well as other Continental philosophers). Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 5 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Dedication......Page 9 Contents......Page 11 Foreword......Page 13 PART I: REALISM ABOUT VALUE AND MORALITY......Page 15 PART II: NORMATIVE MORAL THEORY......Page 17 PART III: THE AUTHORITY OF ETHICS AND VALUE – THE PROBLEM OF NORMATIVITY......Page 19 NOTE......Page 22 Part I Realism about Value and Morality......Page 23 1 Moral Realism......Page 25 I. SPECIES OF MORAL REALISM......Page 26 II. THE FACT/VALUE DISTINCTION......Page 27 III. VALUE REALISM......Page 31 IV. NORMATIVE REALISM......Page 39 Patterns of Variation......Page 49 V. LIMITATIONS......Page 51 VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION......Page 54 NOTES......Page 57 II......Page 65 Rational Determinability......Page 66 Internalism......Page 67 Queerness......Page 77 III......Page 78 Determinateness......Page 79 Naturalness......Page 84 NOTES......Page 88 3 Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative......Page 91 I......Page 92 II......Page 98 NOTES......Page 103 INTRODUCTION......Page 107 THE OBJECTIVITY OF SUBJECTS......Page 111 HUME’S ACCOUNT......Page 113 VALUE’S INFRASTRUCTURE......Page 115 THE THIRST FOR TASTE......Page 117 Scenario 1......Page 120 Scenario 2......Page 121 A DIVISION OF LABOR......Page 122 VALUE-BASED EXPLANATIONS......Page 128 MAD (NO, ECCENTRIC) AESTHETICS AND MARTIAN AESTHETICS......Page 131 AN EXAMPLE?......Page 134 SOME FEATURES OF AESTHETIC VALUE, ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT ACCOUNT......Page 135 MORAL VALUE......Page 139 NONHYPOTHETICALNESS......Page 142 CONCLUSION......Page 145 NOTES......Page 148 I......Page 153 II......Page 155 III......Page 160 IV......Page 162 V......Page 163 VI......Page 165 NOTES......Page 166 Part II Normative Moral Theory......Page 171 INTRODUCTION......Page 173 II. WHAT’S MISSING?......Page 174 III. THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW......Page 176 IV. THE ‘‘PARADOX OF HEDONISM’’......Page 178 V. THE PLACE OF NON-ALIENATION AMONG HUMAN VALUES......Page 182 VI. REDUCING ALIENATION IN MORALITY......Page 184 VII. CONTRASTING APPROACHES......Page 190 VIII. DEMANDS AND DISRUPTIONS......Page 193 IX. ALIENATION FROM MORALITY......Page 196 NOTES......Page 201 INTRODUCTION......Page 209 POLLUTION AND BOUNDARY CROSSING......Page 212 DISPOSITIONAL HARMS AND RISK......Page 214 COMMON PROPERTY......Page 216 RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY......Page 222 Self-defense......Page 225 Reciprocal Risk......Page 229 Acceptable Risk and Tacit Consent......Page 230 Causal Proximity and Complexity......Page 233 Consent, Hypothetical Consent, and Compensation......Page 234 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION......Page 240 NOTES......Page 242 I......Page 248 II......Page 249 III......Page 250 IV......Page 253 V......Page 256 VI......Page 261 NOTES......Page 267 INTRODUCTION......Page 271 I. KANTIAN PLURALISM?......Page 274 Bemis and Benchley......Page 282 Coventry......Page 286 The Forum......Page 290 Violin Lessons......Page 291 Sartre’s Student......Page 294 The Governor......Page 297 Overbooking......Page 298 Ruth’s Choice......Page 301 V. CONCLUSION: THE STATUS OF MORALITY......Page 304 NOTES......Page 307 Part III The Authority of Ethics and Value – The Problem of Normativity......Page 313 10 On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action......Page 315 I. REASONING ABOUT BELIEF......Page 316 II. REASONING ABOUT ACTION......Page 321 III. STOCKTAKING......Page 331 NOTES......Page 341 INTRODUCTION......Page 344 NORMATIVE AUTHORITY......Page 346 REASON AND NORMATIVITY......Page 348 NORMATIVE AUTHORITY FOR BELIEF......Page 350 NORMATIVE AUTHORITY AND APPRECIATION......Page 353 THE NORMATIVE AUTHORITY OF MORAL RULES......Page 361 THE RULE-BREAKING CONSIDERATIONS......Page 366 NOTES......Page 371 I......Page 375 II......Page 377 III......Page 378 IV......Page 380 V......Page 385 VI......Page 389 VII......Page 393 VIII......Page 397 IX......Page 399 NOTES......Page 403 Index......Page 407 Cover 1 Half-title 3 Series-title 5 Title 7 Copyright 8 Dedication 9 Contents 11 Foreword 13 PART I: REALISM ABOUT VALUE AND MORALITY 15 PART II: NORMATIVE MORAL THEORY 17 PART III: THE AUTHORITY OF ETHICS AND VALUE – THE PROBLEM OF NORMATIVITY 19 NOTE 22 Part I Realism about Value and Morality 23 1 Moral Realism 25 I. SPECIES OF MORAL REALISM 26 II. THE FACT/VALUE DISTINCTION 27 III. VALUE REALISM 31 IV. NORMATIVE REALISM 39 Generality 49 Humanization 49 Patterns of Variation 49 V. LIMITATIONS 51 VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 54 NOTES 57 2 Facts and Values 65 I 65 II 65 Rational Determinability 66 Internalism 67 Queerness 77 III 78 Determinateness 79 Naturalness 84 NOTES 88 3 Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative 91 I 92 II 98 NOTES 103 4 Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism 107 INTRODUCTION 107 THE OBJECTIVITY OF SUBJECTS 111 HUME’S ACCOUNT 113 VALUE’S INFRASTRUCTURE 115 THE THIRST FOR TASTE 117 THE COMMONALITY ASSUMPTION 120 Scenario 1 120 Scenario 2 121 A DIVISION OF LABOR 122 VALUE-BASED EXPLANATIONS 128 MAD (NO, ECCENTRIC) AESTHETICS AND MARTIAN AESTHETICS 131 AN EXAMPLE? 134 SOME FEATURES OF AESTHETIC VALUE, ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT ACCOUNT 135 MORAL VALUE 139 NONHYPOTHETICALNESS 142 CONCLUSION 145 NOTES 148 5 Red, Bitter, Good 153 I 153 II 155 III 160 IV 162 V 163 VI 165 NOTES 166 Part II Normative Moral Theory 171 6 Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality 173 INTRODUCTION 173 I. JOHN AND ANNE AND LISA AND HELEN 174 II. WHAT’S MISSING? 174 III. THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW 176 IV. THE ‘‘PARADOX OF HEDONISM’’ 178 V. THE PLACE OF NON-ALIENATION AMONG HUMAN VALUES 182 VI. REDUCING ALIENATION IN MORALITY 184 VII. CONTRASTING APPROACHES 190 VIII. DEMANDS AND DISRUPTIONS 193 IX. ALIENATION FROM MORALITY 196 NOTES 201 7 Locke, Stock, and Peril: Natural Property Rights, Pollution, and Risk 209 INTRODUCTION 209 POLLUTION AND BOUNDARY CROSSING 212 DISPOSITIONAL HARMS AND RISK 214 COMMON PROPERTY 216 RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 222 REVISIONIST LOCKEANISM 225 Self-defense 225 Reciprocal Risk 229 Acceptable Risk and Tacit Consent 230 Causal Proximity and Complexity 233 Consent, Hypothetical Consent, and Compensation 234 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 240 NOTES 242 8 How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism 248 I 248 II 249 III 250 IV 253 V 256 VI 261 VII 267 NOTES 267 9 Pluralism, Dilemma, and the Expression of Moral Conflict 271 INTRODUCTION 271 I. KANTIAN PLURALISM? 274 II. KANTIAN DILEMMA? 282 Bemis and Benchley 282 III. UTILITARIAN PLURALISM AND DILEMMA? 286 Coventry 286 IV. MORAL EXPRESSION 290 The Forum 290 Violin Lessons 291 Sartre’s Student 294 The Governor 297 Overbooking 298 Sophie’s Choice 301 Ruth’s Choice 301 V. CONCLUSION: THE STATUS OF MORALITY 304 NOTES 307 Part III The Authority of Ethics and Value – The Problem of Normativity 313 10 On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action 315 I. REASONING ABOUT BELIEF 316 II. REASONING ABOUT ACTION 321 III. STOCKTAKING 331 NOTES 341 11 Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, but Not Hume Versus Kant 344 INTRODUCTION 344 NORMATIVE AUTHORITY 346 REASON AND NORMATIVITY 348 NORMATIVE AUTHORITY FOR BELIEF 350 NORMATIVE AUTHORITY AND APPRECIATION 353 THE NORMATIVE AUTHORITY OF MORAL RULES 361 THE RULE-BREAKING CONSIDERATIONS 366 NOTES 371 12 Morality, Ideology, and Reflection; or, The Duck Sits Yet 375 I 375 II 377 III 378 IV 380 V 385 VI 389 VII 393 VIII 397 IX 399 NOTES 403 Index 407 We Struggle Daily With The Notions Of Why We Do What We Do And Of Assigning Values To Our Actions, Although It Seems Possible Through Experience To Gain Knowledge And Understanding Of Such Matters. In Contrast To The World Of Facts, Values And Morality Seem Insecure, Easily Influenced By Illusion Or Ideology. How Can Objectivity And Accuracy Be Applied To Values And Morality? Peter Railton's Study Reveals How A Naturalistically Informed View Of The World Might Incorporate Objective Values And Moral Knowledge. Moral Realism -- Facts And Values -- Noncognitivism About Rationality -- Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, And The Ambitions Of Naturalism -- Red, Bitter, Good -- Alienation, Consequentialism, And The Demands Of Morality -- Locke, Stock, And Peril -- How Thinking About Character And Utilitarianism Might Lead To Rethinking The Character Of Utilitarianism -- Pluralism, Dilemma, And The Expression Of Moral Conflict -- On The Hypothetical And Non-hypothetical In Reasoning About Thought And Action -- Normative Force And Normative Freedom -- Morality, Ideology, And Reflection, Or, The Duck Sits Yet. Peter Railton. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. In our everyday lives we struggle with the notions of why we do what we do and the need to assign values to our actions. Somehow, it seems possible through experience and life to gain knowledge and understanding of such matters. Yet once we start delving deeper into the concepts that underwrite these domains of thought and actions, we face a philosophical disappointment. In contrast to the world of facts, values and morality seem insecure, uncomfortably situated, easily influenced by illusion or ideology. How can we apply this same objectivity and accuracy to the spheres of value and morality? In the essays included in this collection, Peter Railton shows how a fairly sober, naturalistically informed view of the world might nonetheless incorporate objective values and moral knowledge. This book will be of interest to professionals and students working in philosophy and ethics. In contrast to facts, values and morality seem insecure, influenced by illusion or ideology. How can we apply this same objectivity and accuracy to values and morality? In this collection, Peter Railton shows how a fairly sober, naturalistically informed view of the world might incorporate objective values and moral knowledge Among contemporary philosophers, even those who have not found skepticism about empirical science at all compelling have tended to find skepticism about morality irresistible.