Examining Schellenberg's Hiddenness Argument (Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion)

This book examines the so-called hiddenness argument of the Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg. ​The hiddenness of God is a topic evincing a rich tradition in the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Rather recently, an argument emerged claiming that the hiddenness of God reveals on closer inspection the non-existence of God. Some say that Schellenberg ́s hiddenness argument is likely as forceful as the argument from evil rendering theism rather implausible or even false. In this book, an account of the traditional theistic notion of divine hiddenness is presented, which contrasts sharply from Schellenberg ́s use of the term. Moreover, a well-needed detailed exposition of the premises of the hiddenness argument is offered, thereby preparing the ground for an even more in-depth future hiddenness debate. Furthermore, a reply to the argument is given which challenges the truth of one specific subpremise, according to which belief that God exists is necessary in order to personally relate to God. Even though a plausible case is made that the hiddenness argument is unsound, it is beyond dispute that the argument deserves more serious reflection by theists and atheists alike. Acknowledgements 7 Contents 9 Chapter 1 Introduction 11 Part I Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument 21 Chapter 2 Setting the Stage 22 2.1 Hiddenness in a Literal Sense 25 2.1.1 Missing His Presence—Hiddenness I 26 2.1.2 His Incomprehensible Essence—Hiddenness II 27 2.1.2.1 A Standard Issue 28 2.1.2.2 Apophaticism 30 (a) A Plea for Silence 30 (b) Or Maybe Not? 32 (c) The Mystical Path 33 2.1.2.3 What’s Next? 34 2.1.3 His Revelatory Works—Not That Hidden I 35 2.1.3.1 The Special Revelation of God 36 2.1.3.2 A Small Restriction 37 2.1.3.3 Three Models of Revelation 39 (d) Divine Epiphany 40 (da) The Revelatory Event 40 (db) The Content of Revelation 41 (e) Divine Instruction 41 (ea) The Revelatory Event 42 (eb) The Content of Revelation 43 (f) Divine Communion 45 (fa) The Revelatory Event 46 (fb) The Content of Revelation 49 2.1.4 His Existence in Evidence—Not That Hidden II 52 2.1.4.1 The General Revelation of God 53 (g) Biblical References 53 (h) Doctrinal Statements 54 (i) Systematic Classifications 55 (ia) A Natural Knowledge of God 55 (ib) The Twofold Model of Knowledge 57 2.1.4.2 To Sum up: General vs. Special Revelation 59 2.2 Hiddenness Taken Non-Literally 60 2.2.1 The Occurrence of Nonresistant Nonbelief 60 2.2.2 Two Final Notes 62 Chapter 3 Its Most Recent Statement 65 3.1 Preliminaria 66 3.1.1 Anti-Theistic 67 3.1.2 Deductive 72 3.1.3 Evidentialistic 73 3.1.3.1 There Is Only Weak Theistic Evidence 74 3.1.3.2 Weak Theistic Evidence Is Strong Atheistic Evidence 75 3.1.3.3 Belief That God Exists Needs Strong Theistic Evidence ... 76 3.1.3.4 ... And Is Reasonable If There Is Strong Theistic Evidence 78 3.1.4 Propositional and Experiential Hiddenness 81 3.1.4.1 Propositional Hiddenness (ph) 81 3.1.4.2 Experiential Hiddenness (eh) 82 3.1.4.3 Ph and eh Taken Together 83 3.1.5 Experiential and Propositional Evidence 85 3.1.5.1 Experiential Evidence (ee) 85 3.1.5.2 Propositional Evidence (pe) 86 3.1.5.3 Preventing Propositional Hiddenness (¬ph) 87 (a) The Ability but Lack of Sufficient ee 87 (aa) The Ability of Sufficient ee 87 (ab) The Lack of Sufficient ee 88 (b) The Ability but Lack of Sufficient pe 88 (ba) The Ability of Sufficient pe 88 (bb) The Lack of Sufficient pe 88 3.1.5.4 Preventing Experiential Hiddenness (¬eh) 89 (c) The Ability but Lack of Sufficient ee II 89 (ca) The Ability of Sufficient ee II 89 (cb) The Lack of Sufficient ee II 90 3.1.5.5 The Triple Ability of Sufficient ee 90 3.1.5.6 Schellenberg’s Focus on ¬ee and ph 91 3.1.6 The Hiddenness Argument and the Argument from Evil 94 3.2 The Argument Itself 99 3.2.1 Divine Love—Premises (1) and (2) 100 3.2.1.1 Premise (1) 100 (d) Subpremise (**1) 100 (e) Subpremise (*1) 101 (f) The Beneficiaries of Divine Love 102 3.2.1.2 Premise (2) 103 (g) Divine Relational-Personal Love 104 (h) Human Relational-Personal Love 104 (i) Theistic Biases 105 (j) A Personal Relationship 106 (k) Why God Is Always Open to Personal Relationship 110 (ka) Its Instrumental Value 111 (kb) Its Intrinsic Value 116 3.2.2 Conclusio (3) 118 3.2.3 No Nonresistant Nonbelief to Be Expected—Premise (4) 119 3.2.3.1 Subpremise (****4) 120 (l) In a Position 120 (la) Capable 123 (lb) Nonresistant 123 3.2.3.2 Subpremise (***4) 125 (m) Believing 126 (ma) Why bG Is Necessary 126 (mb) A Propositional Belief 130 (mc) What bG Is Like 136 (md) What Kind of bG Is Necessary 138 (me) What Sort of Evidence Is Necessary 139 3.2.3.3 Subpremise (**4) 142 (n) The Role of Experiential Evidence 143 (o) A Religious Experience 144 (oa) What te Is Like 145 (ob) Why te Is Not in Danger 148 (oc) Why Having bG Due to te Is Reasonable 150 3.2.3.4 Subpremise (*4) 152 3.2.4 Conclusio (5) 154 3.2.5 There Is at Least One Nonresistant Nonbeliever—Premise (6) 154 3.2.5.1 Four Types of Nonresistant Nonbelievers 155 3.2.5.2 Four Types of Hiddenness Arguments 157 (p) There is at Least One Former Believer 158 (q) There is at Least One Lifelong Seeker 158 (r) There is at Least One Convert to Nontheistic Religions 159 (s) There is at Least One Isolated Nontheist 159 3.2.6 Conclusio (7) 159 Part II Discussion of the Hiddenness Argument 161 Chapter 4 Where to Go from Here? 162 4.1 Making Travel Arrangements 162 4.2 A Very Short Overview of Various Routes to Take 164 4.2.1 Avoiding Misunderstandings 165 4.2.1.1 What Is at Issue Again? 165 4.2.1.2 Pyrotechnics, Star Formations, and Other Fancy Spectacles 167 4.2.2 Making Comparisons to the Argument from Evil 168 4.2.3 Challenging Schellenberg’s Premises 169 4.2.3.1 What Is Wrong with Nonbelievers? 169 4.2.3.2 What It Means to Say that God Loves Perfectly 171 4.2.3.3 What It Takes to Personally Relate to God 173 4.2.4 Introducing Further Propositions 174 4.2.4.1 The Unknown-Goods-Defense 175 4.2.4.2 The Self-Sacrificing-Love-Defense 176 4.2.4.3 The Cooperative-Investigation-Defense 176 4.2.4.4 The Good-Disposition-Defense 177 4.2.4.5 The Free-Will-Defense 179 (a) The Cognitive-Freedom-Defense 179 (b) The Moral-Freedom-Defense 180 4.2.4.6 A Rich Bouquet of Defenses 181 4.2.5 Thinking a Step Ahead 182 4.2.5.1 The God-of-Evangelism-Argument 182 4.2.5.2 The Demographics-of-Nonbelief-Argument 183 4.2.5.3 The Natural-Nonbelief-Argument 184 4.3 My Way 184 4.3.1 Reading the Road Map 186 4.3.2 Tidying up and Packing a Bag 189 4.3.2.1 The Extension of Faith 191 (a) The Extension of Faith-That 191 (b) The Extension of Faith-In 193 4.3.2.2 The Intension of Faith 195 (c) The Intension of Faith-That 195 (ca) What It Means to Believe That God Exists 195 (cb) What It Means to Assume That God Exists 204 (d) The Intension of Faith-In 213 (da) What It Means to Believe in God 217 (db) What It Means to Act on the Assumption That God Exists 219 4.3.3 Ready for Take-Off 222 4.3.3.1 Rebutting Schellenberg’s Argumentation 224 (e) Why bG Is Not Necessary for a Reciprocal Relationship 224 (f) Why bG Is Not Necessary for a Conscious Relationship 227 4.3.3.2 Counterexample 1: Mother Teresa 230 4.3.3.3 A Short Comment on How Schellenberg Speaks about God 236 4.3.3.4 Counterexample 2: Harry and Sally 238 4.3.3.5 Counterexample 3: Lou and Minu 245 Chapter 5 Conclusion 251 Bibliography 255 Index 271 This book examines the so-called hiddenness argument of the Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg. The hiddenness of God is a topic evincing a rich tradition in the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Rather recently, an argument emerged claiming that the hiddenness of God reveals on closer inspection the non-existence of God. Some say that Schellenbergs hiddenness argument is likely as forceful as the argument from evil rendering theism rather implausible or even false. In this book, an account of the traditional theistic notion of divine hiddenness is presented, which contrasts sharply from Schellenbergs use of the term. Moreover, a well-needed detailed exposition of the premises of the hiddenness argument is offered, thereby preparing the ground for an even more in-depth future hiddenness debate. Furthermore, a reply to the argument is given which challenges the truth of one specific subpremise, according to which belief that God exists is necessary in order to personally relate to God. Even though a plausible case is made that the hiddenness argument is unsound, it is beyond dispute that the argument deserves more serious reflection by theists and atheists alike. Provided by the publisher "This book examines the so-called hiddenness argument of the Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg. The hiddenness of God is a topic evincing a rich tradition in the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Rather recently, an argument emerged claiming that the hiddenness of God reveals on closer inspection the non-existence of God. Some say that Schellenbergs hiddenness argument is likely as forceful as the argument from evil rendering theism rather implausible or even false. In this book, an account of the traditional theistic notion of divine hiddenness is presented, which contrasts sharply from Schellenbergs use of the term. Moreover, a well-needed detailed exposition of the premises of the hiddenness argument is offered, thereby preparing the ground for an even more in-depth future hiddenness debate. Furthermore, a reply to the argument is given which challenges the truth of one specific subpremise, according to which belief that God exists is necessary in order to personally relate to God. Even though a plausible case is made that the hiddenness argument is unsound, it is beyond dispute that the argument deserves more serious reflection by theists and atheists alike."-- Back cover This book examines the so-called hiddenness argument of the Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg. The hiddenness of God is a topic evincing a rich tradition in the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Rather recently, an argument emerged claiming that the hiddenness of God reveals on closer inspection the non-existence of God. Some say that Schellenberǵs hiddenness argument is likely as forceful as the argument from evil rendering theism rather implausible or even false. In this book, an account of the traditional theistic notion of divine hiddenness is presented, which contrasts sharply from Schellenberǵs use of the term. Moreover, a well-needed detailed exposition of the premises of the hiddenness argument is offered, thereby preparing the ground for an even more in-depth future hiddenness debate. Furthermore, a reply to the argument is given which challenges the truth of one specific subpremise, according to which belief that God exists is necessary in order to personally relate to God. Even though a plausible case is made that the hiddenness argument is unsound, it is beyond dispute that the argument deserves more serious reflection by theists and atheists alike Front Matter ....Pages i-x Introduction (Veronika Weidner)....Pages 1-10 Front Matter ....Pages 11-11 Setting the Stage (Veronika Weidner)....Pages 13-55 Its Most Recent Statement (Veronika Weidner)....Pages 57-152 Front Matter ....Pages 153-153 Where to Go from Here? (Veronika Weidner)....Pages 155-243 Conclusion (Veronika Weidner)....Pages 245-248 Back Matter ....Pages 249-267