Evolutionary Intuitionism : A Theory of the Origin and Nature of Moral Facts

It seems impossible that organisms selected to maximize their genetic legacy could also be moral agents in a world in which taking risks for strangers is sometimes morally laudable. Brian Zamulinski argues that it is possible if morality is an evolutionary by-product rather than an adaptation. Evolutionary Intuitionism presents a new evolutionary theory of human morality. Zamulinski explains the evolution of foundational attitudes, whose relationships to acts constitute moral facts. With foundational attitudes and the resulting moral facts in place, he shows how they ground a plausible normative morality, give answers to meta-ethical questions, and provide an account of moral motivation. He explains the nature of moral intuitions and, thus, of our access to the moral facts. He shows that the theory makes confirmed empirical predictions, including the observable variation in moral views. The combination of intuitionism and evolutionary ethics enables Zamulinski to overcome the standard objections to both. Contents Acknowledgments Introduction 1 Rejecting Adaptationism in Ethics 2 The Design of Intuitionistic Organisms 3 The Evolution of Intuitionistic Organisms 4 The Moral Facts according to Evolutionary Intuitionism 5 Motivation, Evasion, and Variation 6 The Meta-Ethics of Evolutionary Intuitionism 7 Evaluating Evolutionary Intuitionism Notes Bibliography Index A B C D E F G H I K M N O P R S T U V W A marriage of ethical intuitionism and evolutionary ethics that explains the origin of morality in a previously value-free world.