[Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science] From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Volume 20 (Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy) ||

This book combines modern evolutionary economics and classical political economy. Modern evolutionary economics with its pluralistic and contingent view of reproduction does not presuppose equilibrium or harmonious reproduction. A society that consists of multiple agents needs to establish an order from the interactions of those agents. The book introduces a normative and a practical dimension where mutual justification occurs through the act of exchange. Mutual justification ultimately leads to the emergence of social and economic order, an approach that the author dubs “approval theory.” The division of labor proceeds alongside the emergence of money and capital, and the book discusses the dual structure of the real and financial economy that is the consequence. It then interprets collective action using the twin concept of voice and exit and proposes the concept of evolutionary governance to explain the politico-economic aspects of the social economy. As such, this book shows the promising direction in which the modern political economy is now proceeding, in accordance with the contingent process of evolutionary reproduction. Further, two collaborating authors supply a game-theoretical interpretation of approval theory and an exploration of the evolution of dynamical systems, respectively. Preface Contents Editor and Contributors About the Editor About the Contributors List of Figures List of Tables Part I: Political Economy Chapter 1: From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance 1.1 Individuals in a Society 1.2 Reproduction View in Economics 1.2.1 Main Features of Reproduction 1.2.1.1 Trend Embedded in the Present and the Possibility of Change Based on It 1.2.1.2 Depersonalization of Interdependent Relations, Their Emergence as Macroeconomic Factors 1.2.1.3 Reproduction of Actors and Their Social Relations 1.2.1.4 Rationality That Corresponds to the Reproduction 1.2.1.5 Historical Path Dependence and Evolutionary Development 1.3 Evolutionary View of Social Change 1.4 Formation and Evolution of Governance References Chapter 2: Approval Theory and Social Contract 2.1 The Debate on Property and Civil Society 2.2 Approval Theory of Social Order 2.2.1 The Stable State of Civil Order 2.2.2 Autonomous Approval and Synchronous Approval on the Normative Domain 2.2.3 Solidarity and Generality of the Interest in the Substantial Domain 2.3 Range and Depth of Social Contract Reconsidered 2.3.1 Modern Questions for the Revival of Social Contract Theory 2.3.2 Introduction of the Dialectic of Master and Servant 2.3.3 Hidden Domain of the Sentiment 2.4 Discourse Ethics and Naturalized Social Contract 2.4.1 Discourse Ethics and the Kantian Imperative 2.4.2 Naturalized Social Contracts 2.4.3 Preliminary Conclusion References Chapter 3: Economic Exchange and Social Exchange 3.1 Social Exchange Reconsidered 3.2 Approval as the Precondition of Exchange 3.3 Micro and Macro in the Social Exchange 3.4 Market and Organization as the Complex of the Micro–Macro Linkage 3.5 Complex System of Exchange and Its Governance References Chapter 4: Institutional Dynamics of the Capitalist Market Economy 4.1 Division of Labor Generates Money and Capital 4.1.1 Division of Labor as the Source of Evolution 4.1.2 Emergence of Money as an Unintended Consequence 4.2 Transactions Under Capitalism 4.3 Voice, Exit, and Loyalty in the Industrial Relations References Chapter 5: Evolution of Commercial and Financial Structures of Capitalism 5.1 Merchants and Commercial Society 5.2 Money and Time in Commerce and Finance 5.2.1 Money Is Time? 5.2.2 Financial Market 5.3 Evolution and Governance of the Financial Structure: Japanese Experience 5.3.1 Japanese Financial System Under the Structural Change 5.3.2 Institutional Reforms 5.3.3 Structural Changes 5.3.4 The Governance of National Economy 5.3.5 The Shift in FSA’s Governance References Chapter 6: System Transition and the Institutional Political Economy 6.1 “Transition” Theory of Socialists Before the Fall of the Berlin Wall 6.2 From Institutional Economics to the Institutional Political Economy 6.3 Endogeneity and Exogeneity in the Transition References Part I: Appendices Road to Evolutionary and Institutional Economics in Japan: A Personal Memoire of the Decade of Founding the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics Appendix 1: Foundation of the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics Appendix 2: Personal Recollections Appendix 3: General Judgment in the Early Twenty-First Century Part II: Further Explorations Chapter 7: Interpretation of Approval Theory Related to Norms and Interests: Interpretation by Image Score Model and Reputation Dynamics 7.1 Introduction 7.1.1 Approval Theory on Norms and Interests 7.1.2 Normative Domain 7.1.3 Practical Domain 7.1.4 Social State 7.2 Image Score as a Norm: “Individual Norm = General Norm” Model 7.2.1 Image Score Model 7.2.2 The Region of General Norm in the Image Score Model 7.3 Individual Norm Dynamics 7.3.1 Reputation and Norm 7.3.2 Gap Between General Norms and Individual Norms 7.3.3 “Leading Eight” as a General Norm and Its Region 7.3.3.1 Maintain a Cooperative Relationship 7.3.3.2 Identification of Deviant 7.3.3.3 Punishment and Justification for Punishment 7.3.3.4 Apologies and Acceptance 7.4 Conclusion References Chapter 8: On the Relatedness Between R. A. Fisher’s FTNS and J. S. Metcalfe’s Construction 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Rediscovery of FTNS by Fisher-Price-Frank 8.2.1 Examination of FTNS by G. Price 8.2.2 Construction by Frank 8.2.3 Natural Selection as an Agent Applying Statistical Inference 8.2.4 Into the Market 8.2.5 Comparison Between Biological System and Market 8.3 Metcalfe’s Theory 8.3.1 Metcalfe’s Key Concepts and Construction 8.3.2 ‘Fisher’s Principle’ as Reinterpretation of FTNS by Metcalfe 8.3.3 The Case of Interference 8.3.4 Postscript to Metcalfe’s Construction 8.4 Discussion: Search for Dynamic Efficiency and for Evolutionary Market Analysis 8.4.1 Implication of ‘Fisher’s Principle’ 8.4.2 FTNS and Two Frames of Reference for the Dynamical System 8.4.3 On the Several Norms of Efficiency 8.5 Conclusion References Modern Evolutionary Economics And Classical Political Economy Are Combined In This Book On The Basis Of The Reproduction Of Agents And Their Relations In The Social Economy. However, Modern Evolutionary Economics With Its Pluralistic And Contingent View Of Reproduction Does Not Presuppose Equilibrium Or Harmonious Reproduction. A Society That Consists Of Multiple Agents Needs To Develop Its Order Out Of The Interactions Of Those Agents. The Author Introduces The Struggle For Recognition That Proceeds With The Act Of Exchange To Conceive The Emergence Of Social And Economic Order. The Dual Structure Of The Real And Financial Economy Is Discussed As Its Consequence. There Follows An Interpretation Of Collective Action Using The Twin Concept Of Voice And Exit. Finally, The Concept Of Evolutionary Governance Is Proposed To Grasp The Politico-economic Aspect Of The Social Economy. Thus, This Book Shows The Promising Direction In Which The Modern Political Economy Proceeds In Accordance With The Contingent Process Of Evolutionary Reproduction.