Evidence, explanation, and realism : essays in the philosophy of science

""During the years I have studied Achinstein's essays and books in some detail. I have always learned from them and have found them Solid argument, historical sensitivity, and conceptual novelty. He is clearly one of the few philosophers whose work is not (and cannot be) missed by philosophers of science of all generations."-Stathis Psillos, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens" "The essays in this volume address three fundamental questions in the philosophy of science: What is required for some fact to be evidence for a scientific hypothesis? What does it mean to say that a scientist or a theory explains a phenomenon? Should scientific theories that postulate "unobservable" entities such as electrons be construed realistically as aiming to correctly describe a world underlying what is directly observable, or should such theories be understood as aiming to correctly describe only the observable world?" "Distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein provides answers to each of these questions in essays written over a period of more than 40 years. The present volume brings together 15 of his important previously published essays, allowing the reader to confront some of the most basic and challenging issues in the philosophy of science, and to consider Achinstein's many influential contributions to the solution of these issues. He presents a theory of evidence that relates this concept to probability and explanation; a theory of explanation that relates this concept to an explaining act as well as to the different ways in which explanations are to be evaluated; and an empirical defense of scientific realism that invokes both the concept of evidence and that of explanation."--BOOK JACKET Part I: Evidence And Induction. Concepts Of Evidence -- Why Philosophical Theories Of Evidence Are (and Ought To Be) Ignored By Scientests -- The Grue Paradox -- The War On Induction : Whewill Takes On Newton And Mill (norton Takes On Everyone) -- Waves And The Scientific Method -- Part Ii: Explanation. An Illocutionary Theory Of Explanation -- The Pragmatic Character Of Explanation -- Can There Be A Model Of Explanation? -- Explanation Versus Prediction : Which Carries More Weight? -- Function Statements -- Part Iii: Realism, Molecules, And Electrons. Is There A Valid Experimental Argument For Scientific Realism? -- Jean Perrin And Molecular Reality -- The Problem Of Theoretical Terms -- What To Do If You Want To Defend A Theory You Can't Prove : A Method Of Physical Speculation -- Who Really Discovered The Electron? Peter Achinstein. Includes Bibliographical References. Introduction -- Part I: Evidence and induction -- Concepts of evidence -- Why philosophical theories of evidence are (and ought to be) ignored by scientests -- The grue paradox -- The war on induction -- Waves and the scientific method -- Part II: Explanation -- An illocutionary theory of explanation -- The pragmatic character of explanation -- Can there be a model of explanation? -- Explanation vs. prediction : which carries more weight? -- Function statements -- Part III: Realism, molecules, and electrons -- Is there a valid experimental argument for scientific realism? -- Jean Perrin and molecular reality -- The problem of theoretical terms -- What to do if you want to defend a theory you can't prove : a method of physical speculation -- Who really discovered the electron? The 15 essays in this volume by the distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein address three fundamental questions: What is required for a fact to be evidence for a scientific hypothesis? What is involved in giving a scientific explanation of a phenomenon? And should scientific theories be construed as aiming to correctly describe the entire world or only the observable parts of it?.