Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays On Moral Psychology And Meta-Ethics (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

Over the last fifteen years, Michael Smith has written a series of seminal essays about the nature of belief and desire, the status of normative judgment, and the relevance of the views we take on both these topics to the accounts we give of our nature as free and responsible agents. This long awaited collection comprises some of the most influential of Smith's essays. Among the topics covered are: the Humean theory of motivating reasons, the nature of normative reasons, Williams and Korsgaard on internal and external reasons, the nature of self-control, weakness of will, compulsion, freedom, responsibility, the analysis of our rational capacities, moral realism, the dispositional theory of value, the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, the error theory, rationalist treatments of moral judgment, the practicality requirement on moral judgment and non-cognivist. This collection will be of interest to students in philosophy and psychology. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 5 Dedication......Page 6 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Contents......Page 9 Preface......Page 11 Sources......Page 13 Introduction......Page 15 Part One Moral Psychology......Page 16 Part Two Meta-Ethics......Page 22 REFERENCES......Page 27 Part One Moral Psychology......Page 29 INTRODUCTION......Page 31 1. THE ADVICE MODEL VERSUS THE EXAMPLE MODEL......Page 32 2. THE INTERNALISM REQUIREMENT AND THE IDEA OF BEING FULLY RATIONAL......Page 34 3. THE ADVICE MODEL AND THE APPEAL OF THE INTERNALISM REQUIREMENT......Page 48 CONCLUSION......Page 52 REFERENCES......Page 53 NOTES......Page 54 1. DOES SCHAFER-LANDAU ADEQUATELY REPRESENT THE ARGUMENT?......Page 57 2. IS PREMISE (2) FALSE?......Page 60 3. IS PREMISE (4) UNSUPPORTED?......Page 61 4. DO CASES OF INDIRECTION CONSTITUTE A REDUCTIO OF THE INCOHERENCE ARGUMENT?......Page 63 5. IS THE ARGUMENT INVALID?......Page 65 NOTES......Page 68 3 Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will......Page 70 1. NORMATIVE REASONS VERSUS MOTIVATING REASONS......Page 73 2. NORMATIVE REASONS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DELIBERATION......Page 76 3. SELF-CONTROL......Page 80 4. HOW TO DISTINGUISH RECKLESSNESS, WEAKNESS, AND COMPULSION......Page 84 REFERENCES......Page 85 NOTES......Page 86 4 Frog and Toad Lose Control......Page 87 1. LOSING CONTROL AS INSTRUMENTAL IRRATIONALITY......Page 88 2. LOSING CONTROL AS A LACK OF ORTHONOMY......Page 89 3. HOW TO EXERCISE SELF-CONTROL......Page 92 4. INTERPRETING THE END OF THE STORY......Page 95 NOTE......Page 97 5 A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility......Page 98 1. RESPONSIBILITY FOR BELIEF......Page 99 2. RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVALUATIVE BELIEFS AND DESIRES......Page 106 (i) Brainwashed......Page 112 (ii) Kleptomaniac......Page 113 (iii) Pre-emptive Agent......Page 114 (iv) Willingly Addicted......Page 117 4. A COMPARISON......Page 119 5. CONCLUSION......Page 123 NOTES......Page 124 6 Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion......Page 128 1. RATIONAL CAPACITIES AND BELIEF......Page 130 2. RATIONAL CAPACITIES AND DESIRE......Page 142 CONCLUSION......Page 147 REFERENCES......Page 148 NOTE......Page 149 7 On Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation: A Reply to Pettit......Page 150 NOTES......Page 157 8 Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story......Page 160 1. HUMEANISM......Page 161 2. MOTIVATING REASONS......Page 164 3. THE NORMATIVE STORY......Page 166 REFERENCES......Page 167 9 The Possibility of Philosophy of Action......Page 169 1. ACTIONS EXPLAINED BY EMOTIONS......Page 172 2. ACTIONS EXPLAINED BY FEELINGS OF FRIENDSHIP......Page 175 3. ACTIONS EXPLAINED BY BELIEFS ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF ACTIONS......Page 177 4. ACTIONS EXPLAINED BY THE EXERCISE OF SELF-CONTROL......Page 184 5. ACTIONS EXPLAINED BY FACTS ABOUT WHAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO DO......Page 188 REFERENCES......Page 190 NOTE......Page 191 Part Two Meta-Ethics......Page 193 MORAL REALISM VERSUS NIHILISM VERSUS EXPRESSIVISM......Page 195 AN INITIAL DIFFICULTY......Page 196 MINIMALISM......Page 198 THE MAIN PROBLEM WITH MINIMALISM......Page 199 EXPRESSIVISM AND INTERNALISM......Page 202 NATURALISTIC MORAL REALISM......Page 204 THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT......Page 206 NON-NATURALISTIC MORAL REALISM......Page 207 THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT, NIHILISM, AND EXPRESSIVISM......Page 208 THE NATURALISTIC MORAL REALIST’S FIRST RESPONSE TO THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT......Page 210 THE NATURALISTIC MORAL REALIST’S SECOND RESPONSE TO THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT......Page 213 EXTERNALIST NATURALISTIC MORAL REALISM......Page 215 INTERNALIST NATURALISTIC MORAL REALISM......Page 216 SHOULD AN INTERNALIST NATURALISTIC MORAL REALIST BE A RELATIVIST?......Page 218 REFERENCES......Page 220 11 Does the Evaluative Supervene on the Natural?......Page 222 1. A TRIVIALIZING DEFINITION OF “NATURAL”......Page 223 2. A BETTER DEFINITION OF “NATURAL”......Page 224 3. A FURTHER RESTRICTION ON THE CLASS OF NATURAL PROPERTIES......Page 227 4. DO WE NEED TO ADD A FURTHER RESTRICTION ON THE CLASS OF NATURAL PROPERTIES?......Page 232 5. THE SUPERVENIENCE THESIS AND THE FACT/VALUE GAP......Page 236 6. SUPERVENIENCE AS THE DENIAL THAT EVALUATIVE CLAIMS CAN BE BARELY TRUE......Page 239 7. METAPHYSICS VERSUS EPISTEMOLOGY......Page 243 NOTES......Page 245 1. MACKIE’S ERROR THEORY......Page 248 2. MCDOWELL’S REJECTION OF THE ERROR THEORY......Page 249 3. MCDOWELL ON THE OBJECTIVITY OF COLOUR......Page 251 4. ARE VALUES OBJECTIVE IN MCDOWELL’S SENSE?......Page 257 5. MACKIE ON THE OBJECTIVITY OF VALUE......Page 263 6. MACKIE’S ERROR THEORY AGAIN......Page 267 NOTES......Page 269 13 In Defence of The Moral Problem: A Reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-McCord......Page 273 I. WHAT IS THE MORAL PROBLEM?......Page 274 II. TWO KINDS OF REASON......Page 276 III. THE ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE REASONS......Page 277 IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE REASONS......Page 279 V. USING THE ANALYSIS TO EXPLAIN THE PRACTICALITY OF BELIEFS ABOUT NORMATIVE REASONS......Page 287 VI. OBJECTIONS TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE PRACTICALITY OF BELIEFS ABOUT NORMATIVE REASONS......Page 288 VII. USING THE ANALYSIS TO EXPLAIN THE OBJECTIVITY OF NORMATIVE REASONS......Page 293 VIII. USING THE ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE REASONS TO EXPLAIN THE NATURE OF MORAL REQUIREMENTS......Page 294 IX. OBJECTIONS TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE NATURE OF MORAL REQUIREMENTS......Page 295 X. CONCLUSION......Page 305 NOTES......Page 307 14 Exploring the Implications of the Dispositional Theory of Value......Page 311 1. THE DISPOSITIONAL THEORY AND COGNITIVISM......Page 312 2. THE DISPOSITIONAL THEORY AND RELATIVISM......Page 319 3. THE DISPOSITIONAL THEORY AND REALISM......Page 326 NOTES......Page 329 15 Internalism’s Wheel......Page 332 I. EXPRESSIVISM......Page 333 II. SPEAKER RELATIVISM......Page 336 III. HARMAN’S MORAL RELATIVISM......Page 340 IV. THE NON-RELATIVE VERSION OF THE DISPOSITIONAL THEORY OF VALUE......Page 345 V. MORAL PLATONISM......Page 348 VI. REASSESSMENT......Page 351 NOTES......Page 353 16 Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation......Page 357 1. THREE FEATURES OF EVALUATIVE JUDGEMENT......Page 358 2. THE ROLE OF THE THREE FEATURES IN THE EXPLANATION OF ACTION ON THE BASIS OF VALUES......Page 361 3. HOW A COGNITIVIST CAN MAKE ROOM FOR THE THREE FEATURES OF EVALUATIVE JUDGEMENT AND ACCOMMODATE THE DIFFERENT ROLES THAT THEY PLAY IN THE EXPLANATION OF ACTION......Page 363 4. CAN A NON-COGNITIVIST MAKE ROOM FOR THE THREE FEATURES OF EVALUATIVE JUDGEMENT AND ACCOMMODATE THE DIFFERENT ROLES THAT THEY PLAY IN THE EXPLANATION OF ACTION?......Page 368 CONCLUSION......Page 371 NOTE......Page 372 17 Ethics and the A Priori: A Modern Parable......Page 373 NOTE......Page 394 Index......Page 395 This volume includes a series of essays about the nature of belief and desire, the status of normative judgment, and the relevance of the views we take on both these topics to the accounts we give of our nature as free and responsible agents. The long awaited collection comprises some of the most influential of Michael Smith's essays written over a period of fifteen years and will be of interest to students in philosophy and psychology.