Ethical Constructivism (Elements in Ethics)

Ethical constructivism holds that truths about the relation between rationality, morality, and agency are best understood as constructed by correct reasoning, rather than discovered or invented. Unlike other metaphors used in metaethics, construction brings to light the generative and dynamic dimension of practical reason. On the resultant picture, practical reasoning is not only productive but also self-transforming, and socially empowering. The main task of this volume is to illustrate how constructivism has substantially modified and expanded the agenda of metaethics by refocusing on rational agency and its constitutive principles. In particular, this volume identifies, compares and discusses the prospects and failures of the main strands of constructivism regarding the powers of reason in responding to the challenges of contingency. While Kantian, Humean, Aristotelian, and Hegelian theories sharply differ in their constructivist strategies, they provide compelling accounts of the rational articulation required for an inclusive and unified ethical community. Cover Title page Copyright page Ethical Constructivism Contents Introduction 1 Objectivity as a Practical Task 1.1 Ethical Methods and the Standards of Objectivity 1.2 Kant’s Constructivism 1.2.1 Constructions of Reason 1.2.2 The Nodes of Construction 1.2.3 Heteronomy as Moral Skepticism 1.2.4 The Appeal to Moral Experience 1.2.5 The Sovereignty of Practical Reason 2 The Inescapability of Moral Reasons 2.1 The Criteria of the Inquiry 2.2 Constructivism as Procedural Realism 2.3 The Normative Question 2.4 The Argument from Practical Identity 2.5 The Reflective Stance and the Stance of Agency 2.6 The Constitutivist Strategy against Moral Skepticism 2.7 Conclusion 3 The Contingency of Moral Agreement 3.1 The Evaluative Standpoint 3.2 The Contingency of Moral Values 3.3 Categorical Practical Reasons and Moral Judgment 3.4 The Appeal to Human Nature 3.5 A Humean Perfectionist Strategy 3.6 Humean Constructivism as a Hybrid Theory 3.7 Conclusion 4 Practices of Rational Deliberation 4.1 The Need for Abstract Principles 4.2 Constructivism through Practical Wisdom 4.3 The Historicity of Practical Reason 4.3.1 Social Artifacts 4.3.2 Construction as Sublation 4.3.3 The Metaphysics of Actuality 4.4 The Problem of Normative Revision 4.5 Toward an Open-Ended Moral Community 5 A Balancing Act References "Ethical constructivism holds that truths about the relation between rationality, morality, and agency are best understood as constructed by correct reasoning, rather than discovered or invented. Unlike other metaphors used in metaethics, construction brings to light the generative and dynamic dimension of practical reason. On the resultant picture, practical reasoning is not only productive but also self-transforming and socially empowering. The main task of this Element is to illustrate how constructivism has substantially modified and expanded the agenda of metaethics by refocusing on rational agency and its constitutive principles. In particular, this Element identifies, compares, and discusses the prospects and failures of the main strands of constructivism regarding the powers of reason in responding to the challenges of contingency. While Kantian, Humean, Aristotelian, and Hegelian theories sharply differ in their constructivist strategies, they provide compelling accounts of the rational articulation required for an inclusive and unified ethical community"--Back cover