Ernest Nagel: Philosophy of Science and the Fight for Clarity (Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, 53)

This volume is dedicated to the life and work of Ernest Nagel (1901-1985) counted among the influential twentieth-century philosophers of science. Forgotten by the history of philosophy of science community in recent years, this volume introduces Nagel’s philosophy to a new generation of readers and highlights the merits and originality of his works. Best known in the history of philosophy as a major American representative of logical empiricism with some pragmatist and naturalist leanings, Nagel’s interests and activities went beyond these limits. His career was marked with a strong and determined intention of harmonizing the European scientific worldview of logical empiricism and American naturalism/pragmatism. His most famous and systematic treatise on, The Structure of Science, appeared just one year before Thomas Kuhn’s even more renowned, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As a reflection of Nagel’s interdisciplinary work, the contributing authors’ articles are connected both historically and systematically. The volume will appeal to students mainly at the graduate level and academic scholars. Since the volume treats historical, philosophical, physical, social and general scientific questions, it will be of interest to historians and philosophers of science, epistemologists, social scientists, and anyone interested in the history of analytic philosophy and twentieth-century intellectual history. Contents 7 Contributors 9 1 Introduction: Ernest Nagel and the Making of Philosophy of Science a Profession 10 1.1 Ernest Nagel: Life and Work of an Immigrant 10 1.2 The Making of Analytic and Scientific Philosophy 21 1.3 The Essays in This Volume 31 References 33 Part I Nagel in the History of Philosophy 37 2 Ernest Nagel: A Biography 38 2.1 Ernest Nagel: A Biography 38 References 47 3 Nagel’s Philosophical Development 49 3.1 Introduction 49 3.2 Nagel’s Naturalism 50 3.3 The Logic of Inquiry 52 3.4 Philosophical Influences (1): John Dewey 53 3.5 Philosophical Influences (2): Morris R. Cohen 55 3.6 Nagel’s First Encounters with Logical Positivism 57 3.7 Prague 59 3.8 Cambridge 61 3.9 Impressions and Appraisals 63 3.10 Naturalism Reconsidered 64 References 68 4 The Emergence of Scientific Explanation as a Problem for Philosophy of Science: Aristotle, Nagel, and Hempel 72 4.1 Introduction 72 4.2 Ernest Nagel, Aristotle, and New York’s Philosophy 75 4.3 The Logic of Explanation: Hempel’s New Puzzle 80 4.4 The Emergence of the Debate on Scientific Explanation 85 4.5 Conclusion 90 References 90 5 From Cautious Enthusiasm to Profound Disenchantment: Ernest Nagel and Carnapian Logical Empiricism 93 5.1 Introduction 94 5.2 The Encounter of Logical Empiricism and American Pragmatism: A Potpourri of Narratives 96 5.3 Cautious Enthusiasm 98 5.4 Alienation and Disenchantment 103 5.5 A Role for the History of Science in the Philosophy of Science 106 5.6 Philosophy of Science—Who is the Audience? 108 5.7 Concluding Remarks 110 References 110 Part II The Method(s) of the Sciences 113 6 Nagel on Idealization in Science 114 6.1 Introduction 114 6.2 Nagel on Types of Idealization and Their Place in His Reconstruction of Scientific Theories 116 6.2.1 Abstraction 117 6.2.2 Falsehood 117 6.2.3 Inapplicability 117 6.2.4 Analogy 118 6.3 Nagel’s Explication of a Theory 119 6.4 Idealization in Theoretical Laws 121 6.5 Idealization in Empirical Laws 122 6.6 Familiarity, Analogy, and the Use of Scientific Models 125 6.6.1 Theory Construction 125 6.6.2 Theory Development and Experimental Laws 126 6.6.3 Acceptance 126 6.7 Idealization Within the Bigger Picture 127 6.8 ‘As if’ Constructions and Fictionalism 130 6.9 Conclusion 131 References 132 7 Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Ernest Nagel and the Uncertainty Principle 134 7.1 Introduction 134 7.2 Nagel’s Criticism of Heisenberg 135 7.3 Two Uncertainty Principles 138 7.4 Universally Valid Uncertainty Relation 142 7.5 Nagel’s Criticism Revisited 145 7.6 Conclusion 148 Appendices 149 References 150 8 Ernest Nagel on Determinism as a Guiding Principle and Its Compatibility with Quantum Mechanics 152 8.1 Introduction 152 8.2 The Supposed Violation of Determinism in Quantum Mechanics 155 8.3 Determinism as a Guiding Principle 157 8.4 Determinism as Relative to State Descriptions 160 8.5 Determinism in Quantum Mechanics 163 8.6 Determinism in the Social Sciences 167 8.7 Conclusion 170 References 172 Part III Issues in General Philosophy of Science 174 9 On Nagel’s Truth-Frequency Theory of Probability 175 9.1 The Meaning of Probability 175 9.2 Nagel’s Criticism of Other Interpretations of Probability 176 9.3 The Truth-Frequency Interpretation 183 9.4 Concluding Remarks 188 References 189 10 On Ernest Nagel on Teleology in Biology 191 10.1 Introduction 192 10.2 An Overview of Questions Concerning Teleology in Biology 193 10.3 Nagel’s View of Teleology in Biology: Articulation and Defense 196 10.3.1 Questions of Legitimacy and Uniqueness 196 10.3.2 Eliminativism 197 10.3.3 Teleological Terms as Anthropomorphic Vestiges 199 10.4 A Clarification of the Biological Function Debate 200 10.4.1 The Descriptive Dimension 201 10.4.2 The Prescriptive Dimension 202 10.4.3 Some Concrete Examples 203 10.5 On the Persistence of Teleology in Biology: From Nagel to Kant 205 10.6 Conclusion 208 References 210 Part IV The Social Sciences and the Social Role of Philosophy 214 11 Nagel on the Methodology of the Social Sciences 215 11.1 Introduction 215 11.2 Problems of a Clear-Cut Demarcation 217 11.3 The ‘Immaturity’ of the Social Sciences 220 11.4 Two Case Studies 222 11.4.1 The Case of Methodological Individualism 222 11.4.2 The Case of the Value-Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry 226 11.5 Concluding Remarks 230 References 230 12 Philosophy of Science as First Philosophy: The Liberal Polemics of Ernest Nagel 233 12.1 Introduction 233 12.2 Nagel and the Retreat to the Icy Slopes 235 12.3 The Tasks of the Philosopher of Science 237 12.4 Contextual Naturalism and Pluralism 242 12.5 Objections and Conclusion 247 References 251 Part V Previously Unpublished Papers 254 13 Interview with Ernest Nagel by Remmel Nunn 255 13.1 Editorial Introduction 255 13.2 The Interview 256 References 311 14 Ernest Nagel’s “The Philosophy of Science” Lecture at the Delaware Seminar 313 14.1 Editorial Introduction 313 14.2 Ernest Nagel: The Philosophy of Science 314 14.3 Discussion 330 References 336