Epistemology : contexts, values, disagreement : proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein symposium in Kirchberg, 2011

This volume collects papers that were presented at the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium 2011 in Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria. They focus on five key debates in contemporary epistemology: Does the term “to know” vary its meaning according to features of the contexts in which it is uttered? What role may “epistemic virtues” play in our cognitive activities? What is the surplus value of having knowledge instead of mere true belief? What is the structure and significance of testimonial knowledge and belief? And when is disagreement rational, especially if it occurs among “epistemic peers”? In addition, a section is devoted to novel discussions of the work of Wittgenstein. Papers by A. Beckermann, E. Brendel, W. Davis, C. Elgin, S. Goldberg, J. Greco, A. Kemmerling, H. Kornblith, M. Solomon, M. Williams, and many others. Contents Preface I. Contextualism and Invariantism Knowledge, Contextualism, and Moorean Paradox Context-Sensitivity without Indexicality? Non-Relativist Contextualism about Knowledge Knowing about Other Contexts Epistemic Variantism and the Factivity of Knowledge Explaining Variation in Knowledge by Full Belief The Contextualist Promise II. Epistemic Virtues Intellectual Virtues and Their Place in Philosophy Understanding’s Tethers Knowledge as Achievement and the Value Problem Apriority and Virtue: How Successful a Relationship? III. The Nature and Value of Knowledge Epistemology without the Concept of Knowledge Reliabilism as Explicating Knowledge: A Sketch of an Account How to Take Truth as a Goal? Knowledge as Achievement – Greco’s Double Mistake IV. Testimony Norms of Trust, De Re Trust, and the Epistemology of Testimony Jennifer Lackey on Non-Reductionism: A Critique V. Disagreement “A Troubled Area”. Understanding the Controversy over Screening Mammography for Women Aged 40-49 Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible? The Significance of Disagreement in Epistemology The Role of the Uniqueness Thesis in the Epistemology of Disagreement Counterfactual-Peer Disagreement Meta-Induction and the Problem of Fundamental Disagreement Rival Logics, Disagreement and Reflective Equilibrium VI. Wittgenstein The Builders First Person Authority without Glamorous Self-Knowledge Subjective and Objective Certainty as Regards Knowledge and Action Zu einigen Bemerkungen Wittgensteins über die Seele Conjecture, Proof, and Sense in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics Through Pictures to Problems: Cognitive Epistemology and Therapeutic Philosophy Werte und Vernunft in Wittgensteins Spätwerk Wittgenstein über Gedankenexperimente Wittgenstein, Ethics and Therapy Main description: This volume collects papers that were presented at the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium 2011 in Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria. They focus on five key debates in contemporary epistemology: Does the term "to know" vary its meaning according to features of the contexts in which it is uttered? What role may "epistemic virtues" play in our cognitive activities? What is the surplus value of having knowledge instead of mere true belief? What is the structure and significance of testimonial knowledge and belief? And when is disagreement rational, especially if it occurs among "epistemic peers"? In addition, a section is devoted to novel discussions of the work of Wittgenstein. Papers by A. Beckermann, E. Brendel, W. Davis, C. Elgin, S. Goldberg, J. Greco, A. Kemmerling, H. Kornblith, M. Solomon, M. Williams, and many others Publications of the series include the official proceedings of the ALWS-conferences and of their special workshops. The series is open also for other high-quality publications, especially on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and its influence on contemporary analytic philosophy.