Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Suny Series in Philosophy) (Suny Philosophy)

A comprehensive introduction to the theory of knowledge. Guided by the founding ideas of American pragmatism, Epistemology provides a clear example of the basic concepts involved in knowledge acquisition and explains the principles at work in the development of rational inquiry. It examines how these principles analyze the course of scientific progress and how the development of scientific inquiry inevitably encounters certain natural disasters. At the center of the book's deliberations there lies not only the potential for scientific progress but also the limit of science as well. This comprehensive introduction to the theory of knowledge addresses a myriad of topics, including the critique of skepticism, the nature of rationality, the possibility of science for extraterrestrial intelligences, and the prospect of insoluble issues in science. "This book covers a wide span of issues in epistemology and encapsulates complex debates with lucidity. It lives up to its goal of organizing research in contemporary theory of knowledge into a 'single systematic whole.'" Vrinda Dalmiya, University of Hawaii at Manoa Epistemology......Page 4 Contents......Page 6 PREFACE......Page 12 Introduction......Page 14 Part I: Knowledge and Its Problems......Page 20 IS KNOWLEDGE TRUE JUSTIFIED BELIEF?......Page 22 MODES OF (PROPOSITIONAL) KNOWLEDGE......Page 26 OTHER BASIC PRINCIPLES......Page 29 2. Fallibilism and Truth Estimation......Page 34 PROBLEMS OF METAKNOWLEDGE......Page 35 THE PREFACE PARADOX......Page 38 THE DIALLELUS......Page 41 AN APORY AND ITS RECONCILIATION: K-DESTABILIZATION......Page 42 COSTS AND BENEFITS......Page 45 MORE ON FALLIBILISM......Page 46 THE COMPARATIVE FRAGILITY OF SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS AS MERE ESTIMATES......Page 49 FALLIBILISM AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR (PUTATIVE) TRUTH AND THE REAL TRUTH......Page 53 THE SKEPTICS “NO CERTAINTY” ARGUMENT......Page 56 THE ROLE OF CERTAINTY......Page 58 THE CERTAINTY OF LOGIC VERSUS THE CERTAINLY OF LIFE......Page 60 PRAGMATIC INCONSISTENCY......Page 61 SKEPTICISM AND RISK......Page 64 RATIONALITY AND COGNITIVE RISK......Page 68 THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION: COSTS AND BENEFITS......Page 72 THE DEFICIENCY OF SKEPTICISM......Page 75 EXPERIENCE AND FACT......Page 80 PROBLEMS OF COMMON-CAUSE EPISTEMOLOGY......Page 81 MODES OF JUSTIFICATION......Page 83 THE EVOLUTIONARY ASPECT OF SENSORY EPISTEMOLOGY......Page 87 RATIONAL VERSUS NATURAL SELECTION......Page 88 AGAINST “PURE” INTELLECTUALISM......Page 93 THE PROBLEM OF ERROR......Page 95 CONCLUSION......Page 97 THE NEED FOR PRESUMPTIONS......Page 100 THE ROLE OF PRESUMPTION......Page 104 PLAUSIBILITY AND PRESUMPTION......Page 106 PRESUMPTION AND PROBABILITY......Page 109 PRESUMPTION AND SKEPTICISM......Page 111 HOW PRESUMPTION WORKS: WHAT JUSTIFIES PRESUMPTIONS......Page 115 THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF SHARING AND COOPERATING IN INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT......Page 120 THE ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION......Page 122 BUILDING UP TRUST: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH......Page 123 TRUST AND PRESUMPTION......Page 125 A COMMUNITY OF INQUIRERS......Page 127 Part II: Rational Inquiry and the Quest for Truth......Page 130 HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMIZATION: THE EUCLIDEAN MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE......Page 132 CYCLIC SYSTEMATIZATION: THE NETWORK— AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE EUCLIDEAN MODEL......Page 137 THE CONTRAST BETWEEN FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM......Page 142 PROBLEMS OF FOUNDATIONALISM......Page 147 THE COHERENTIST APPROACH TO INQUIRY......Page 150 THE CENTRAL ROLE OF DATA FOR A COHERENTIST TRUTH-CRITERIOLOGY......Page 154 ON VALIDATING THE COHERENCE APPROACH......Page 158 IDEAL COHERENCE......Page 164 TRUTH AS AN IDEALIZATION......Page 166 9. Cognitive Relativism and Contextualism......Page 170 COGNITIVE REALISM......Page 171 WHAT’SWRONG WITH RELATIVISM......Page 173 THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL CONTEXTUALISM OF REASON......Page 174 A FOOTHOLD OF ONE’S OWN: THE PRIMACY OF OUR OWN POSITION......Page 178 THE ARBITRAMENT OF EXPERIENCE......Page 180 AGAINST RELATIVISM......Page 184 CONTEXTUALISTIC PLURALISM IS COMPATIBLE WITH COMMITMENT ON PURSUING “THE TRUTH”......Page 187 THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF RELATIVISM......Page 189 OBJECTIVITY AND THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL UNIVERSALITY OF REASON......Page 192 THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVITY......Page 194 THE PROBLEM OF VALIDATING OBJECTIVITY......Page 196 WHAT IS RIGHT WITH OBJECTIVISM......Page 199 ABANDONING OBJECTIVITY IS PRAGMATICALLY SELF-DEFEATING......Page 201 STAGE-SETTING FOR THE PROBLEM......Page 206 OPTIMUM-INSTABILITY......Page 207 IDEAL VERSUS PRACTICAL RATIONALITY: THE PREDICAMENT OF REASON......Page 209 THE PROBLEM OF VALIDATING RATIONALITY......Page 212 THE PRAGMATIC TURN: EVEN COGNITIVE RATIONALITY HAS A PRAGMATIC RATIONALE......Page 215 ALTERNATIVE MODES OF RATIONALITY?......Page 217 THE SELF-RELIANCE OF RATIONALITY IS NOT VICIOUSLY CIRCULAR......Page 222 Part III: Cognitive Progress......Page 226 12. Scientific Progress......Page 228 THE EXPLORATION MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY......Page 229 THE DEMAND FOR DATA ENHANCEMENT......Page 230 TECHNOLOGICAL ESCALATION: AN ARMS RACE AGAINST NATURE......Page 231 THEORIZING AS INDUCTIVE PROJECTION......Page 234 LATER NEED NOT BE LESSER......Page 236 COGNITIVE COPERNICANISM......Page 240 THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS......Page 242 13. The Law of Logarithmic Returns and the Complexification of Natural Science......Page 248 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST EFFORT AND THE METHODOLOGICAL STATUS OF SIMPLICITY-PREFERENCE IN SCIENCE......Page 249 COMPLEXIFICATION......Page 253 THE EXPANSION OF SCIENCE......Page 258 THE LAW OF LOGARITHMIC RETURNS......Page 259 THE RATIONALE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW OF LOGARITHMIC RETURNS......Page 264 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE......Page 267 THE DECELERATION OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS......Page 270 PREDICTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION/KNOWLEDGE RELATIONSHIP......Page 272 THE CENTRALITY OF QUALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS......Page 273 CONDITIONS OF PERFECTED SCIENCE......Page 276 THEORETICAL ADEQUACY: ISSUES OF EROTETIC COMPLETENESS......Page 278 PRAGMATIC COMPLETENESS......Page 281 PREDICTIVE COMPLETENESS......Page 283 TEMPORAL FINALITY......Page 286 “PERFECTED SCIENCE” AS AN IDEALIZATION THAT AFFORDS A USEFUL CONTRAST CONCEPTION......Page 290 THE DISPENSABILITY OF PERFECTION......Page 293 Part IV: Cognitive Limits and the Quest for Truth......Page 296 EXPLAINING THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURAL SCIENCE......Page 298 “OUR” SIDE......Page 301 NATURE’S SIDE......Page 303 SYNTHESIS......Page 306 IMPLICATIONS......Page 308 THE POTENTIAL DIVERSITY OF “SCIENCE”......Page 312 THE ONE WORLD, ONE SCIENCE ARGUMENT......Page 316 A QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVE......Page 318 COMPARABILITY AND JUDGMENTS OF RELATIVE ADVANCEMENT OR BACKWARDNESS......Page 324 BASIC PRINCIPLES......Page 327 17. On Ignorance, Insolubilia, and the Limits of Knowledge......Page 334 CONCRETE VERSUS GENERIC KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE......Page 335 EROTETIC INCAPACITY......Page 336 DIVINE VERSUS MUNDANE KNOWLEDGE......Page 337 ISSUES OF TEMPORALIZED KNOWLEDGE......Page 338 KANT’S PRINCIPLE OF QUESTION EXFOLIATION......Page 340 COGNITIVE INCAPACITY......Page 342 INSOLUBILIA THEN AND NOW......Page 343 COGNITIVE LIMITS......Page 344 IDENTIFYING INSOLUBILIA......Page 346 RELATING KNOWLEDGE TO IGNORANCE......Page 348 POSTSCRIPT: A COGNITIVELY INDETERMINATE UNIVERSE......Page 349 18. Cognitive Realism......Page 352 EXISTENCE......Page 353 HOMO MENSURA?......Page 354 REALISM AND INCAPACITY......Page 356 THE COGNITIVE OPACITY OF REAL THINGS......Page 358 THE COGNITIVE INEXHAUSTIBILITY OF THINGS......Page 360 THE CORRIGIBILITY OF CONCEPTIONS......Page 362 COGNITIVE PROGRESS......Page 363 COGNITIVE DYNAMICS......Page 364 CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF REALISM AS A POSTULATE......Page 366 HIDDEN DEPTHS: THE IMPETUS TO REALISM......Page 371 THE PRAGMATIC FOUNDATION OF REALISM AS A BASIS FOR COMMUNICATION AND DISCOURSE......Page 374 THE IDEALISTIC ASPECT OF METAPHYSICAL REALISM......Page 379 SCIENCE AND REALITY......Page 380 CHAPTER 1......Page 388 CHAPTER 2......Page 389 CHAPTER 3......Page 391 CHAPTER 4......Page 394 CHAPTER 5......Page 395 CHAPTER 6......Page 398 CHAPTER 7......Page 400 CHAPTER 8......Page 401 CHAPTER 9......Page 403 CHAPTER 10......Page 404 CHAPTER 11......Page 405 CHAPTER 12......Page 406 CHAPTER 13......Page 409 CHAPTER 14......Page 413 CHAPTER 15......Page 414 CHAPTER 16......Page 415 CHAPTER 17......Page 416 CHAPTER 18......Page 417 D......Page 422 K......Page 423 R......Page 424 Z......Page 425 Epistemology 4 Contents 6 PREFACE 12 Introduction 14 Part I: Knowledge and Its Problems 20 1. Modes of Knowledge 22 IS KNOWLEDGE TRUE JUSTIFIED BELIEF? 22 MODES OF (PROPOSITIONAL) KNOWLEDGE 26 OTHER BASIC PRINCIPLES 29 2. Fallibilism and Truth Estimation 34 PROBLEMS OF METAKNOWLEDGE 35 THE PREFACE PARADOX 38 THE DIALLELUS 41 AN APORY AND ITS RECONCILIATION: K-DESTABILIZATION 42 COSTS AND BENEFITS 45 MORE ON FALLIBILISM 46 THE COMPARATIVE FRAGILITY OF SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS AS MERE ESTIMATES 49 FALLIBILISM AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR (PUTATIVE) TRUTH AND THE REAL TRUTH 53 3. Skepticism and Its Deficits 56 THE SKEPTICS “NO CERTAINTY” ARGUMENT 56 THE ROLE OF CERTAINTY 58 THE CERTAINTY OF LOGIC VERSUS THE CERTAINLY OF LIFE 60 PRAGMATIC INCONSISTENCY 61 SKEPTICISM AND RISK 64 RATIONALITY AND COGNITIVE RISK 68 THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION: COSTS AND BENEFITS 72 THE DEFICIENCY OF SKEPTICISM 75 4. Epistemic Justification in a Functionalistic and Naturalistic Perspective 80 EXPERIENCE AND FACT 80 PROBLEMS OF COMMON-CAUSE EPISTEMOLOGY 81 MODES OF JUSTIFICATION 83 THE EVOLUTIONARY ASPECT OF SENSORY EPISTEMOLOGY 87 RATIONAL VERSUS NATURAL SELECTION 88 AGAINST “PURE” INTELLECTUALISM 93 THE PROBLEM OF ERROR 95 CONCLUSION 97 5. Plausibility and Presumption 100 THE NEED FOR PRESUMPTIONS 100 THE ROLE OF PRESUMPTION 104 PLAUSIBILITY AND PRESUMPTION 106 PRESUMPTION AND PROBABILITY 109 PRESUMPTION AND SKEPTICISM 111 HOW PRESUMPTION WORKS: WHAT JUSTIFIES PRESUMPTIONS 115 6. Trust and Cooperation in Pragmatic Perspective 120 THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF SHARING AND COOPERATING IN INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT 120 THE ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION 122 BUILDING UP TRUST: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 123 TRUST AND PRESUMPTION 125 A COMMUNITY OF INQUIRERS 127 Part II: Rational Inquiry and the Quest for Truth 130 7. Foundationalism versus Coherentism 132 HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMIZATION: THE EUCLIDEAN MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE 132 CYCLIC SYSTEMATIZATION: THE NETWORK— AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE EUCLIDEAN MODEL 137 THE CONTRAST BETWEEN FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM 142 PROBLEMS OF FOUNDATIONALISM 147 8. The Pursuit of Truth: Coherentist Criteriology 150 THE COHERENTIST APPROACH TO INQUIRY 150 THE CENTRAL ROLE OF DATA FOR A COHERENTIST TRUTH-CRITERIOLOGY 154 ON VALIDATING THE COHERENCE APPROACH 158 IDEAL COHERENCE 164 TRUTH AS AN IDEALIZATION 166 9. Cognitive Relativism and Contextualism 170 COGNITIVE REALISM 171 WHAT’SWRONG WITH RELATIVISM 173 THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL CONTEXTUALISM OF REASON 174 A FOOTHOLD OF ONE’S OWN: THE PRIMACY OF OUR OWN POSITION 178 THE ARBITRAMENT OF EXPERIENCE 180 AGAINST RELATIVISM 184 CONTEXTUALISTIC PLURALISM IS COMPATIBLE WITH COMMITMENT ON PURSUING “THE TRUTH” 187 THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF RELATIVISM 189 10. The Pragmatic Rationale of Cognitive Objectivity 192 OBJECTIVITY AND THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL UNIVERSALITY OF REASON 192 THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVITY 194 THE PROBLEM OF VALIDATING OBJECTIVITY 196 WHAT IS RIGHT WITH OBJECTIVISM 199 ABANDONING OBJECTIVITY IS PRAGMATICALLY SELF-DEFEATING 201 11. Rationality 206 STAGE-SETTING FOR THE PROBLEM 206 OPTIMUM-INSTABILITY 207 IDEAL VERSUS PRACTICAL RATIONALITY: THE PREDICAMENT OF REASON 209 THE PROBLEM OF VALIDATING RATIONALITY 212 THE PRAGMATIC TURN: EVEN COGNITIVE RATIONALITY HAS A PRAGMATIC RATIONALE 215 ALTERNATIVE MODES OF RATIONALITY? 217 THE SELF-RELIANCE OF RATIONALITY IS NOT VICIOUSLY CIRCULAR 222 Part III: Cognitive Progress 226 12. Scientific Progress 228 THE EXPLORATION MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 229 THE DEMAND FOR DATA ENHANCEMENT 230 TECHNOLOGICAL ESCALATION: AN ARMS RACE AGAINST NATURE 231 THEORIZING AS INDUCTIVE PROJECTION 234 LATER NEED NOT BE LESSER 236 COGNITIVE COPERNICANISM 240 THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS 242 13. The Law of Logarithmic Returns and the Complexification of Natural Science 248 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST EFFORT AND THE METHODOLOGICAL STATUS OF SIMPLICITY-PREFERENCE IN SCIENCE 249 COMPLEXIFICATION 253 THE EXPANSION OF SCIENCE 258 THE LAW OF LOGARITHMIC RETURNS 259 THE RATIONALE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW OF LOGARITHMIC RETURNS 264 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 267 THE DECELERATION OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 270 PREDICTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION/KNOWLEDGE RELATIONSHIP 272 THE CENTRALITY OF QUALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 273 14. The Imperfectability of Knowledge (Knowledge as Boundless) 276 CONDITIONS OF PERFECTED SCIENCE 276 THEORETICAL ADEQUACY: ISSUES OF EROTETIC COMPLETENESS 278 PRAGMATIC COMPLETENESS 281 PREDICTIVE COMPLETENESS 283 TEMPORAL FINALITY 286 “PERFECTED SCIENCE” AS AN IDEALIZATION THAT AFFORDS A USEFUL CONTRAST CONCEPTION 290 THE DISPENSABILITY OF PERFECTION 293 Part IV: Cognitive Limits and the Quest for Truth 296 15. The Rational Intelligibility of Nature 298 EXPLAINING THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 298 “OUR” SIDE 301 NATURE’S SIDE 303 SYNTHESIS 306 IMPLICATIONS 308 16. Human Science as Characteristically Human 312 THE POTENTIAL DIVERSITY OF “SCIENCE” 312 THE ONE WORLD, ONE SCIENCE ARGUMENT 316 A QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVE 318 COMPARABILITY AND JUDGMENTS OF RELATIVE ADVANCEMENT OR BACKWARDNESS 324 BASIC PRINCIPLES 327 17. On Ignorance, Insolubilia, and the Limits of Knowledge 334 CONCRETE VERSUS GENERIC KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE 335 EROTETIC INCAPACITY 336 DIVINE VERSUS MUNDANE KNOWLEDGE 337 ISSUES OF TEMPORALIZED KNOWLEDGE 338 KANT’S PRINCIPLE OF QUESTION EXFOLIATION 340 COGNITIVE INCAPACITY 342 INSOLUBILIA THEN AND NOW 343 COGNITIVE LIMITS 344 IDENTIFYING INSOLUBILIA 346 RELATING KNOWLEDGE TO IGNORANCE 348 POSTSCRIPT: A COGNITIVELY INDETERMINATE UNIVERSE 349 18. Cognitive Realism 352 EXISTENCE 353 HOMO MENSURA? 354 REALISM AND INCAPACITY 356 THE COGNITIVE OPACITY OF REAL THINGS 358 THE COGNITIVE INEXHAUSTIBILITY OF THINGS 360 THE CORRIGIBILITY OF CONCEPTIONS 362 COGNITIVE PROGRESS 363 COGNITIVE DYNAMICS 364 CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF REALISM AS A POSTULATE 366 HIDDEN DEPTHS: THE IMPETUS TO REALISM 371 THE PRAGMATIC FOUNDATION OF REALISM AS A BASIS FOR COMMUNICATION AND DISCOURSE 374 THE IDEALISTIC ASPECT OF METAPHYSICAL REALISM 379 SCIENCE AND REALITY 380 Notes 388 INTRODUCTION 388 CHAPTER 1 388 CHAPTER 2 389 CHAPTER 3 391 CHAPTER 4 394 CHAPTER 5 395 CHAPTER 6 398 CHAPTER 7 400 CHAPTER 8 401 CHAPTER 9 403 CHAPTER 10 404 CHAPTER 11 405 CHAPTER 12 406 CHAPTER 13 409 CHAPTER 14 413 CHAPTER 15 414 CHAPTER 16 415 CHAPTER 17 416 CHAPTER 18 417 Index of Names 422 A 422 B 422 C 422 D 422 E 423 F 423 G 423 H 423 I 423 J 423 K 423 L 424 M 424 N 424 O 424 P 424 Q 424 R 424 S 425 T 425 U 425 V 425 W 425 Z 425 Annotation. A comprehensive introduction to the theory of knowledge. Guided by the founding ideas of American pragmatism, Epistemology provides a clear example of the basic concepts involved in knowledge acquisition and explains the principles at work in the development of rational inquiry. It examines how these principles analyze the course of scientific progress and how the development of scientific inquiry inevitably encounters certain natural disasters. At the center of the book's deliberations there lies not only the potential for scientific progress but also the limit of science as well. This comprehensive introduction to the theory of knowledge addresses a myriad of topics, including the critique of skepticism, the nature of rationality, the possibility of science for extraterrestrial intelligences, and the prospect of insoluble issues in science