Epistemic Value

## Abstract This book contains a collection of chapters on value in epistemology. Two themes loom large. One is about the value of knowledge. There are problems deriving from Plato's Meno concerning whether knowledge is more valuable than states implicating true belief but falling short of knowledge. The other theme is about epistemic value in a broad sense. Here the central issue is how to make sense of epistemic appraisal conceived broadly to include evaluation of beliefs with respect to whether they are, for instance, justified, or formed through methods or processes that reliably yield true beliefs. A common approach is to think of truth as the end for the sake of which we value a belief being justifiably or reliably formed. The themes are related. We might hope to explain why knowledge is valuable in terms of the value we place on truth. Yet an interest in epistemic appraisal can lead in other directions. For instance, it can prompt enquiry into why we should value truth, how the goal of truth should be conceived, and why, if at all, we should think of truth as the goal of enquiry. All of these issues are represented in this book. 0199231184......Page 1 Contents......Page 6 List of Contributors......Page 8 Acknowledgements......Page 9 Introduction......Page 10 I. THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE......Page 26 1. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge......Page 28 2. Is There a Value Problem?......Page 51 3. Testimony and the Value of Knowledge......Page 69 4. The Value of Understanding......Page 104 5. Ugly Analyses and Value......Page 121 6. The Goods and the Motivation of Believing......Page 148 7. Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge......Page 172 8. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value......Page 192 9. Luck, Knowledge, and Control......Page 213 II. TRUTH AND EPISTEMIC APPRAISAL......Page 232 10. The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values......Page 234 11. Epistemic Normativity......Page 252 12. Curiosity and the Value of Truth......Page 274 13. The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism, or, How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth......Page 293 APPENDIX. SYMPOSIUM ON JONATHAN KVANVIG’S: The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding......Page 316 A. Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding......Page 318 B. The Value Problem......Page 322 C. Is Understanding Factive?......Page 331 D. Understanding, Knowledge, and the Meno Requirement......Page 340 E. Responses to Critics......Page 348 C......Page 362 F......Page 363 J......Page 364 M......Page 365 R......Page 366 T......Page 367 V......Page 368 Z......Page 369 Oxford University Press, USA 0199231184 1 Contents 6 List of Contributors 8 Acknowledgements 9 Introduction 10 I. THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE 26 1. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge 28 2. Is There a Value Problem? 51 3. Testimony and the Value of Knowledge 69 4. The Value of Understanding 104 5. Ugly Analyses and Value 121 6. The Goods and the Motivation of Believing 148 7. Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge 172 8. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value 192 9. Luck, Knowledge, and Control 213 II. TRUTH AND EPISTEMIC APPRAISAL 232 10. The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values 234 11. Epistemic Normativity 252 12. Curiosity and the Value of Truth 274 13. The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism, or, How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth 293 APPENDIX. SYMPOSIUM ON JONATHAN KVANVIG’S: The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding 316 A. Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding 318 B. The Value Problem 322 C. Is Understanding Factive? 331 D. Understanding, Knowledge, and the Meno Requirement 340 E. Responses to Critics 348 Index 362 A 362 B 362 C 362 D 363 E 363 F 363 G 364 H 364 I 364 J 364 K 365 L 365 M 365 N 366 O 366 P 366 R 366 S 367 T 367 U 368 V 368 W 369 Y 369 Z 369 ISBN-13:,9780199231188

Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.

"Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture?"--Page 4 de la couverture