Epistemic Uses of Imagination (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

This book explores a topic that has recently become the subject of increased philosophical interest: how can imagination be put to epistemic use? Though imagination has long been invoked in contexts of modal knowledge, in recent years philosophers have begun to explore its capacity to play an epistemic role in a variety of other contexts as well. In this collection, the contributors address an assortment of issues relating to epistemic uses of imagination, and in particular, they take up the ways in which our imaginings must be constrained so as to justify beliefs and give rise to knowledge. These constraints are explored across several different contexts in which imagination is appealed to for justification, namely reasoning, modality and modal knowledge, thought experiments, and knowledge of self and others. Taken as a whole, the contributions in this volume break new ground in explicating when and how imagination can be epistemically useful. __Epistemic Uses of Imagination__ will be of interest to scholars and advanced students who are working on imagination, as well as those working more broadly in epistemology, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind. Chapters 6 and 12 of this book are freely available as downloadable Open Access PDFs at under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license. This book explores how imagination can be put to epistemic use. More specifically, the contributors address ways in which our imaginings must be constrained so as to justify beliefs and give rise to knowledge. Cover 1 Half Title 2 Series Page 3 Title Page 4 Copyright Page 5 Table of Contents 6 Introduction: The Epistemic Role of Imagination 8 SECTION I: Modality and Modal Knowledge 28 1 Why We Need Something Like Imagery 30 2 An Imaginative Person’s Guide to Objective Modality 51 3 Crossing Rivers: Imagination and Real Possibilities 70 4 Imagination, Metaphysical Modality, and Modal Psychology 86 SECTION II: Reasoning 108 5 Reasoning with Imagination 110 6 Equivalence in Imagination 129 7 How Imagination Can Justify 148 8 Imagination, Inference, and Apriority 167 SECTION III: Thought Experiments 188 9 Narratives and Thought Experiments: Restoring the Role of Imagination 190 10 Two Ways of Imagining Galileo’s Experiment 209 11 Attention to Details: Imagination, Attention, and Epistemic Significance 225 SECTION IV: Understanding Self and Others 242 12 Bridging the Divide: Imagining Across Experiential Perspectives 244 13 On Imagining Being Someone Else 267 14 “Imagine If They Did That to You!”: The Complexity of Empathy 286 15 Imagination, Selves, and Knowledge of Self: Pessoa’s Dreams in The Book of Disquiet 305 Notes on Contributors 326 Index 330 Untitled 125 Amy,Kind;,Christopher,Badura;,Franz,Berto;,Joshua,Myers;,Deb,Marber;,Margherita,Arcangeli;,Eric,Peterson;,Margot,Strohminger;,Derek,Lam;,Antonella,Mallozzi;,Peter,Kung;,Michael,Omoge;,Rebecca,Hanrahan;,Bence,Nanay;,Nick,Wiltsher;,Julia,Langkau;,Luke,Roelofs;,philosophy,of,imagination;,thought,experiments;,epistemology;,self,knowledge;,knowledge,of,others;,modal,epistemology;,reasoning;,equivalence;,practical,reasoning;,decision-making;,counterfactual,reasoning;,conditional,belief;,narratives;,attention;,modal,justification;,apriority;,modality;,conceptual,possibility;,perception;,experiential,perspective Amy Kind,Christopher Badura,Franz Berto,Joshua Myers,Deb Marber,Margherita Arcangeli,Eric Peterson,Margot Strohminger,Derek Lam,Antonella Mallozzi,Peter Kung,Michael Omoge,Rebecca Hanrahan,Bence Nanay,Nick Wiltsher,Julia Langkau,Luke Roelofs,philosophy of imagination,thought experiments,epistemology,self knowledge,knowledge of others,modal epistemology,reasoning,equivalence,practical reasoning,decision-making,counterfactual reasoning,conditional belief,narratives,attention,modal justification,apriority,modality,conceptual possibility,perception,experiential perspective This book explores a topic that has recently become the subject of increased philosophical interest: how can imagination be put to epistemic use? Though imagination has long been invoked in contexts of modal knowledge, in recent years philosophers have begun to explore its capacity to play an epistemic role in a variety of other contexts as well.In this collection, the contributors address an assortment of issues relating to epistemic uses of imagination, and in particular, they take up the ways in which our imaginings must be constrained so as to justify beliefs and give rise to knowledge. These constraints are explored across several different contexts in which imagination is appealed to for justification, namely reasoning, modality and modal knowledge, thought experiments, and knowledge of self and others. Taken as a whole, the contributions in this volume break new ground in explicating when and how imagination can be epistemically useful.Epistemic Uses of Imagination will be of interest to scholars and advanced students who are working on imagination, as well as those working more broadly in epistemology, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind.Chapters 6 and 12 of this book are freely available as downloadable Open Access PDFs at http://www.taylorfrancis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license. Ch. 12 Can one have imaginative access to experiential perspectives vastly different from one s own? Can one successfully imagine what it s like to live a life very different from one s own? These questions are particularly pressing in contemporary society as we try to bridge racial, ethnic, and gender divides. Yet philosophers have often expressed considerable pessimism in this regard. It is often thought that the gulf between vastly different experiential perspectives cannot be bridged. This chapter explores the case for this pessimism. Though the case is often less implicit, the chapter identifies two different arguments that can be found in the literature: the Epistemic Arrogance argument and the Too Big a Gulf argument. Both arguments are found to be considerably weaker than is usually thought. But even if the case for pessimism is unsuccessful, discussion of that case suggests the importance of treading carefully in taking up imaginative explorations of different experiential perspectives. The chapter thus concludes with a cautionary note in this regard "This book explores how imagination can be put to epistemic use. More specifically, the contributors address ways in which our imaginings must be constrained so as to justify beliefs and give rise to knowledge. Imagination can be constrained in at least two ways. One concerns the contents we might entertain in a certain imaginative episode. The other concerns the appropriate ways to manipulate the content within the imagination. The essays in this volume explore several different contexts in which imagination is appealed to for justification, namely reasoning, modal epistemology, thought experiments, and knowledge of self and others. Together, they explain when and how imagination can be epistemically useful, and outline certain contexts where imagination is used epistemically. Epistemic Uses of Imagination will be of interest to scholars and advanced students who are working on imagination, as well as those working more broadly in epistemology, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind"-- Provided by publisher