Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

The aim of this book is to answer two important questions about the issue of normativity in epistemology: Why are epistemic reasons evidential and what makes epistemic reasons and rationality normative? Bondy's argument proceeds on the assumption that epistemic rationality goes hand in hand with basing beliefs on good evidence. The opening chapters defend a mental-state ontology of reasons, a deflationary account of how kinds of reasons are distinguished, and a deliberative guidance constraint on normative reasons. They also argue in favor of doxastic voluntarism--the view that beliefs are subject to our direct voluntary control--and embrace the controversial view that voluntarism bears directly on the question of what kinds of things count as reasons for believing. The final three chapters of the book feature a noteworthy critique of the instrumental conception of the nature of epistemic rationality, as well as a defense of the instrumental normativity of epistemic rationality. The final chapter defends the view that epistemic reasons and rationality are normative for us when we have normative reason to get to the truth with respect to some proposition, and it provides a response to the swamping problem for monistic accounts of value "The aim of this book is to answer two important questions about the issue of normativity in epistemology: Why are epistemic reasons evidential and what makes epistemic reasons and rationality normative? Bondy's argument proceeds on the assumption that epistemic rationality goes hand in hand with basing beliefs on good evidence. The opening chapters argue in favor of doxastic voluntarism and the basing relation--that beliefs are subject to our direct voluntary control--and embrace the controversial view that voluntarism bears directly on the question of what kinds of things count as reasons for believing. The next section of the book features a noteworthy critique of instrumental rationality and a defense of instrumental normativity. Bondy argues that all reasons are reasons for doing something or having some attitude, but not all reasons are reasons for doing something in order to achieve some further goal. The result is an instrumentalist account of epistemic normativity that avoids instrumentalism about epistemic rationality."--Provided by publisher Chapter 1 Introduction -- chapter 2 Kinds of Reasons -- chapter 3 Being Guided by Reasons -- chapter 4 Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism -- chapter 5 The Instrumental Conception of Epistemic Rationality -- chapter 6 Two Problems for the Instrumental Conception of Epistemic Rationality -- chapter 7 The Instrumental Normativity of Epistemic Rationality.