Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Recognition (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

This volume includes original essays that examine the underexplored relationship between recognition theory and key developments in critical social epistemology. Its aims are to explore how far certain kinds of epistemic injustice, epistemic oppression, and types of ignorance can be understood as distorted varieties of recognition and to determine whether contemporary work on epistemic injustice and critical social epistemology more generally have significant continuities with theories of recognition in the Frankfurt School tradition. Part I of the book focuses on bringing recognition theory and critical social epistemology into direct conversation. Part II is devoted to analysing a range of case studies that are evocative of contemporary social struggles. The essays in this volume propose answers to a number of thought-provoking questions at the intersection of these two robust philosophical subfields, such as the following: how well can different types of epistemic injustice be understood as types of recognition abuses? How useful is it to approach different forms of social oppression as recognition injustices and/or as involving epistemic injustice? What limitations do we discover in either or both recognition theory and the ever-expanding literature on epistemic injustice when we put them into conversation with each other? How does the conjunction of these two accounts bear on specific domains, such as questions of silencing? Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Recognition heralds new directions for future research that will appeal to scholars and students working in critical social epistemology, social and political theory, continental philosophy, and a wide range of critical social theories. This volume examines the relationship between recognition theory and key developments in critical social epistemology. It explores how far certain kinds of epistemic injustice, epistemic oppression, and types of ignorance can be understood as distorted varieties of recognition. Cover 1 Half Title 2 Series Page 5 Title Page 6 Copyright Page 7 Dedication 8 Table of Contents 10 Acknowledgements 12 List of Contributors 13 Preface: Toward a Sociology of Social Critiques 18 Introduction: Starting the Conversation 30 Part I: Recognition Theory and Critical Social Epistemology in Conversation 38 Chapter 1: Two Interpretations of Social Disrespect: A Comparison between Epistemic and Moral Recognition 40 Introduction 40 I 41 II 47 III 51 IV 56 Notes 60 References 62 Chapter 2: A Fourth Order of Recognition?: Accounting for Epistemic Injustice in Recognition Theory 65 Introduction 65 I 67 What Is Distinct about Epistemic Forms of Injustice? 67 II 69 A Role for Recognition in Theories of Epistemic Injustice 69 III 76 Recognition and Epistemic Injustice: Indigenous Australian Knowledges and Contestatory Hermeneutical Resources 76 IV 80 Accounting for Epistemic Recognition in Honneth’s Tripartite Schema 80 Notes 87 References 90 Chapter 3: Gadamer, Fricker, and Honneth: Testimonial Injustice, Prejudice, and Social Esteem 92 Introduction: Prejudice as Prejudgement 92 I 95 Hermeneutical Openness and Anticipatory Listening 95 II 98 Fricker on Various Types of Social Power and Their Operations 98 III 99 Identity Power and Stereotypes 99 IV 101 Systematic Testimonial Injustice and Identity-Prejudicial Credibility Deficit 101 V 105 Gadamer and Fricker: Differences, Tensions, and Complementary Advances 105 VI 108 Honneth on Recognition and Non-recognition 108 Notes 112 References 115 Chapter 4: Recognising Disempowerment: Taking the ‘Merely Experienced’ Seriously 117 Introduction 117 I 119 Recognising Disempowered Others 119 II 122 Fraser on the ‘Merely Experienced’ 122 III 126 The Privilege of Theory 126 IV 130 Judgement and Normativity 130 Notes 138 References 140 Chapter 5: Gaslighting: Pathologies of Recognition and the Colonisation of Psychic Space 143 Introduction 143 I 144 Gaslighting as Epistemic Injustice 144 II 150 Gaslighting as Affective Injustice 150 III 156 Rape Culture and Affective Gaslighting 156 IV 157 The Colonisation of Psychic Space and Pathologies of Recognition 157 Notes 162 References 164 Chapter 6: Epistemic Exploitation and Ideological Recognition 167 Introduction 167 I 169 Epistemic Vulnerability 169 II 170 Collins and Davis on Pathological Praise 170 III 178 Ideological Recognition and Explanatory Power 178 IV 183 Desobediencia Epistémica y Desprendimiento: Prolegomenon for Any Future Death of White Privilege 183 Notes 187 References 195 Chapter 7: Calling Recognition Bluffs: Structural Epistemic Injustice and Administrative Violence 200 Introduction 200 I 201 Structural Epistemic Injustice Investigations 201 II 206 Categorisation, Misrecognition, and Administrative Violence 206 III 211 Recognition Bluff: Gender and Social Group in Asylum 211 Conclusion 217 Notes 218 References 224 Chapter 8: Ideal Theory, Epistemologies of Ignorance, and (Mis)Recognition 228 Introduction 228 I 230 Recognition and Credibility 230 II 232 Mills on Ideal Theory and Ignorance 232 III 239 Ignorance and Recognition 239 Notes 241 References 243 Part II: Making Sense of Contemporary Social-Epistemic Struggles 246 Chapter 9: Commission to Inquire into Ireland’s Mother and Baby Homes: An Epistemology of Ignorance 248 Introduction 248 I 256 An Epistemology of Ignorance 256 II 266 The Knowing Perspective of Privilege: Blind Spots and Biases 266 Acknowledgements 278 Notes 278 References 281 Websites 284 Audio Visual 284 Newspaper Reports 284 Chapter 10: Constitutional Law and Epistemic Injustice: Hate Speech, Stereotyping, and Recognition Harm 285 Introduction 285 I 287 Race, Law, and Social Justice 287 II 289 The Constitutional Framework for Racial Hate Speech and Stereotyping 289 The First Amendment 291 Racial Stereotyping 293 The Equal Protection Clause 294 III 295 Racial Hate Speech and Epistemic Injustice 295 Epistemic Violence and Practices of Silencing 297 CRT and Epistemic Injustice 298 IV 300 Racial Hate Speech and Recognition Theory 300 Conclusion 304 Notes 305 References 306 Chapter 11: Male Sexual Victimisation, Failures of Recognition, and Epistemic Injustice 308 Introduction 308 I 309 Failures of Recognition and Their Epistemic Impact 309 II 311 Failures in the Legal Recognition of Male Victimisation 311 III 315 Failures in the Social Recognition of Male Victimisation 315 IV 320 Failing to Recognise Male Sexual Victimisation as Epistemic Injustice 320 Notes 322 References 324 Chapter 12: The Problem of Recognition, Erasure, and Epistemic Injustice in Medicine: Harms to Transgender and Gender Non-Binary Patients – Why We Should Be Worried 326 Introduction 326 I 327 Obtaining Accurate Numbers of Transgender and Gender Non-Binary People 327 II 328 Forms of Erasure of Transgender and Non-binary Patients 328 III 330 Epistemic Harms of Erasure and Failure of Recognition of Transgender and Gender Non-binary Patients 330 Testimonial Injustice and Resulting Epistemic Harms 331 Hermeneutical Injustice and Resulting Harms 334 IV 338 Junctures of Erasure within Medical Contexts 338 Inadequate Sex/Gender Options on Patient Intake Forms and Resulting Harms 338 Deadnaming, Mispronouning, and Misgendering Patients and the Resulting Harms 340 Additional Harms Resulting from Failures of Recognition 342 Health-Related Consequences 342 Psychological Harms 344 Notes 346 References 351 Chapter 13: Epistemic Injustice and Misrecognition in the Sphere of Work: The Case of Women in Surgery 355 Introduction 355 I 356 Four Cases from Surgery, and the Limits of an Epistemic Injustice Lens 356 Concluding Remarks to I 364 II 364 Recognition and Esteem in the Workplace 364 III 370 The Experiences of Women Surgeons in Light of Recognition Theory 370 IV 374 Implications and Conclusion 374 Notes 376 References 378 Index 380 administrative,violence;,constitutional,law;,epistemic,injustice;,gender,non-binary,patients;,hate,speech;,ideal,theory;,ideological,recognition;,male,sexual,victimization;,moral,recognition;,psychic,space;,recognition,bluffs;,recognition,theory;,social,epistemology;,testimonial,injustice;,transgender,non-binary,patients administrative violence,constitutional law,epistemic injustice,gender non-binary patients,hate speech,ideal theory,ideological recognition,male sexual victimization,moral recognition,psychic space,recognition bluffs,recognition theory,social epistemology,testimonial injustice,transgender non-binary patients "This volume includes original essays that examine the underexplored relationship between recognition theory and key developments in critical social epistemology. Its aims are to explore how far certain kinds of epistemic injustice, epistemic oppression, and types of ignorance can be understood as distorted varieties of recognition, and to determine whether contemporary work on epistemic injustice and critical social epistemology more generally has significant continuities with theories of recognition in the Frankfurt School tradition. Part I of the book focuses on bringing recognition theory and critical social epistemology into direct conversation. Part II is devoted to analysing a range of case studies that are evocative of contemporary social struggles. The essays in this volume propose answers to a number of thought-provoking questions at the intersection of these two robust philosophical subfields, such as: How well can different types of epistemic injustice be understood as types of recognition abuses? How useful is it to approach different forms of social oppression as recognition injustices and/or as involving epistemic injustice? What limitations do we discover in either or both recognition theory and the ever-expanding literature on epistemic injustice when we put them into conversation with each other? How does the conjunction of these two accounts bear on specific domains, such as questions of silencing? Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Recognition promises to herald new directions for future research that will appeal to scholars and students working in critical social epistemology, social and political theory, Continental philosophy, and a wide range of critical social theories"-- Provided by publisher Preface / Lucius Turner Outlaw Jr. -- Introduction / Nicola McMillan -- Two interpretations of social disrespect : a comparison between epistemic and moral recognition / Axel Honneth -- A fourth order of recognition? accounting for epistemic injustice in recognition theory / Danielle Petherbridge -- Gadamer, Fricker, and Honneth : testimonial injustice, prejudice, and social Esteem / Cynthia R. Nielsen & David Utsler -- Recognising disempowerment : taking the 'merely experienced' seriously / Lois McNay -- Gaslighting : pathologies of recognition and the colonisation of psychic space / Kelly Oliver -- Epistemic exploitation and ideological recognition / Paul Giladi -- Calling recognition bluffs : structural epistemic injustice and administrative violence / Ezgi Sertler -- Ideal theory, epistemologies of ignorance, and (mis)recognition / Mari Mikkola -- Commission to Inquire into Ireland's Mother & Baby Homes : an epistemology of ignorance / Katherine O'Donnell -- Constitutional law and epistemic injustice : hate speech, stereotyping and recognition harm / Rebecca Tsosie -- Male sexual victimisation, failures of recognition, and epistemic injustice / Debra L. Jackson -- The problem of recognition, erasure, and epistemic injustice in medicine : Harms to Transgender and Gender non-binary patients - why we should be worried / Lauren Freeman & Heather Stewart -- Epistemic injustice and misrecognition in the sphere of work : the case of women in Surgery / Wendy Carlton & Katrina Hutchison