Epistemic Consequentialism

An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So, for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that it is a norm that beliefs should be consistent in virtue of the fact that holding consistent beliefs is the best way to achieve the epistemic value of accuracy. Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the familiar family of consequentialist views in ethics. Recently, philosophers from both formal epistemology and traditional epistemology have shown interest in such a view. In formal epistemology, there has been particular interest in thinking of epistemology as a kind of decision theory where instead of maximizing expected utility one maximizes expected epistemic utility. In traditional epistemology, there has been particular interest in various forms of reliabilism about justification and whether such views are analogous to—and so face similar problems to—versions of rule consequentialism in ethics. This volume presents some of the most recent work on these topics as well as others related to epistemic consequentialism, by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it. Contents 6 List of Contributors 8 Introduction: Epistemic Consequentialism 10 PART I Epistemic Consequentialism: The Right and the Good 30 1 The Right in the Good 32 2 Adaptive Misbeliefs, Value Trade-Offs, and Epistemic Responsibility 57 3 The Naturalistic Origins of Epistemic Consequentialism 79 4 Epistemic Teleology 94 5 The “Consequentialism” in “Epistemic Consequentialism” 122 6 Good Questions 132 PART II Accuracy-First Epistemology: For and Against 156 7 Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms? 158 8 A Problem for Credal Consequentialism 191 9 Making Things Right 229 10 Accuracy, Ratification, and the Scope of Epistemic Consequentialism 249 PART III Epistemic Consequentialism Applied 276 11 Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals 278 12 Epistemic Consequentialism and Epistemic Enkrasia 299 13 Epistemic Free Riding 319 Index 342 Epistemic,Consequentialism An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms that are conducive to epistemic value. This volume presents the latest work on epistemic consequentialism by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it.-- Source other than Library of Congress