Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing (Soochow University Lectures in Philosophy (5))

Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism--the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us. Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting. The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology. Epistemic Angst Offers A Completely New Solution To The Ancient Philosophical Problem Of Radical Skepticism--the Challenge Of Explaining How It Is Possible To Have Knowledge Of A World External To Us. Duncan Pritchard Argues That The Key To Resolving This Puzzle Is To Realize That It Is Composed Of Two Logically Distinct Problems, Each Requiring Its Own Solution. He Then Puts Forward Solutions To Both Problems. To That End, He Offers A New Reading Of Wittgenstien's Account Of The Structure Of Rational Evaluation And Demonstrates How This Provides An Elegant Solution To One Aspect Of The Skeptical Problem. Pritchard Also Revisits The Epistemological Disjunctivist Proposal That He Developed In Previous Work And Shows How It Can Effectively Handle The Other Aspect Of The Problem. Finally, He Argues That These Two Antiskeptical Positions, While Superficially In Tension With Each Other, Are Not Only Compatible But Also Mutually Supporting. The Result Is A Comprehensive And Distinctive Resoution To The Problem Of Radical Skepticism, One That Challenges Many Assumptions In Contemporary Epistemology--jacket. Machine Generated Contents Note: Pt. 1 Epistemic Angst -- Ch. 1 Radical Skepticism And Closure -- 1.the Contemporary Radical Skeptical Paradox -- 2.undercutting Versus Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategies -- 3.an Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy (i): Nonclosure -- 4.an Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy (ii): Epistemic Externalism -- 5.radical Skepticism About Rationally Grounded Knowledge -- 6.an Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy (iii): Abductivism -- 7.concluding Remarks -- Ch. 2 Radical Skepticism And Underdetermination -- 0.introductory Remarks -- 1.radical Skepticism And The Underdetermination Principle -- 2.an Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy: Epistemic Externalism -- 3.attributer Contextualism As An Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy -- 4.attributer Contextualism As An Undercutting Anti-skeptical Strategy -- 5.comparing The Two Forms Of Radical Skepticism -- 6.the Source Of Underdetermination-based Radical Skepticism -- 7.two Sources Of Radical Skepticism --^ 8.anti-skeptical Desiderata -- Pt. 2 Wittgenstein And The Groundlessness Of Our Believing -- Ch. 3 Wittgenstein On The Structure Of Rational Evaluation -- 0.introductory Remarks -- 1.wittgenstein On The Structure Of Rational Evaluation -- 2.wittgenstein Contra The Skeptical Paradox -- 3.a Core Problem For The Wittgensteinian Account Of The Structure Of Rational Evaluation -- 4.epistemic Ways Of Developing The Wittgensteinian Account Of The Structure Of Rational Evaluation (i): The Externalist Reading -- 5.epistemic Ways Of Developing The Wittgensteinian Account Of The Structure Of Rational Evaluation (ii): The Entitlement Reading -- 6.a Nonepistemic Way Of Developing The Wittgensteinian Account Of The Structure Of Rational Evaluation: The Nonpropositional Reading -- 7.concluding Remarks -- Ch. 4 Hinge Commitments -- 0.introductory Remarks -- 1.the Nonbelief Reading -- 2.hinge Commitments -- 3.anti-skeptical Contrasts (i): Inferential Contextualism --^ 4.anti-skeptical Contrasts (ii): Strawsonian Naturalism -- 5.anti-skeptical Contrasts (iii): Davidsonian Content Externalism -- 6.wittgensteinian Anti-skepticism And Underdetermination-based Radical Skepticism -- 7.epistemic Priority And Underdetermination-based Radical Skepticism -- 8.concluding Remarks -- Pt. 3 Epistemological Disjunctivism -- Ch. 5 Epistemological Disjunctivism And The Factivity Of Reasons -- 0.introductory Remarks -- 1.epistemological Disjunctivism In Outline -- 2.three Core Problems For Epistemological Disjunctivism -- 3.epistemological Disjunctivism Qua Anti-skeptical Strategy -- 4.radical Skepticism And Favoring/discriminating Epistemic Support -- 5.concluding Remarks -- Ch. 6 Epistemological Disjunctivism And Closure-based Radical Skepticism -- 0.introductory Remarks -- 1.anti-skeptical Contrasts (i): Rational Support Contextualism -- 2.anti-skeptical Contrasts (ii): Contrastivism -- 3.anti-skeptical Contrasts (iii): Dogmatism --^ 4.a Weakness In Epistemological Disjunctivism -- 5.epistemological Disjunctivism And Its Competitors -- 6.concluding Remarks -- Pt. 4 Farewell To Epistemic Angst -- Ch. 7 Farewell To Epistemic Angst -- 0.introductory Remarks -- 1.recap: The Problem Of Radical Skepticism -- 2.the Biscopic Proposal: Epistemic Angst Avoided -- 3.some Anti-skeptical Contrasts -- 4.concluding Postscript: Epistemic Vertigo. Duncan Pritchard. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. This is an outstanding book on issues of philosophical skepticism central to epistemology throughout its history. Writing lucidly and engagingly, Duncan Pritchard tackles these issues in the context of recent philosophy, going back to Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Pritchard also lays out and defends an original proposal in dialectic with well-known rivals, such as relativist contextualism, attributor contextualism, contrastivism, dogmatism, and others.—Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University"Epistemic Angst will be a must-read for anyone interested in epistemology or Wittgenstein. I don’t think there is anything about Wittgenstein’s contribution to current epistemological debates that comes anywhere near this book. It provides a helpful survey of these debates and a very clear introduction to Wittgenstein’s epistemology. Pritchard is an excellent writer with a gift for summarizing complicated debates, and his book will have a tremendous impact on the field."—Clayton Littlejohn, King’s College London __Epistemic Angst__ offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism--the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us. The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology.