Ending 'East of Suez': The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore 1964-1968 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

## Abstract In 1964, Britain's defence presence in Malaysia and Singapore was the largest and most expensive component of the country's world‐wide role. Yet within three and a half years, the Wilson Government had announced that Britain would be withdrawing from its major Southeast Asian bases and abandoning any special military role ‘East of Suez’. The purpose of this book is to document and explain the British policy process leading to the decisions to withdraw. The book argues that the Wilson Government faced two fundamental dilemmas regarding its defence policy. The first was a conflict between Britain's limited economic means, which compelled cuts to the country's defence role, and its need to maintain its relations with its major allies, especially the Johnson Administration in the United States, all of whom wanted Britain to maintain a significant military presence in Southeast Asia. This conflict was fundamentally resolved after the Labour Party revolted over defence policy in early 1967, when the Government decided to withdraw from the bases in Singapore and Malaysia. Thereafter, the Wilson Government faced a second dilemma over whether to minimise the political and symbolic impact of its decisions for the sake of its international allies, or to maximise it for domestic political advantage. This conflict was not fully settled until January 1968, when the Government announced a faster withdrawal and complete abandonment of Britain's ‘East of Suez’ role, as a means of gaining acceptance for the social cuts it was implementing in the aftermath of the devaluation of the Pound.

In 1964 Britain's defence presence in Malaysia and Singapore was the largest and most expensive component of the country's world-wide role. Yet within three and a half years the Wilson Government had announced that Britain would be withdrawing from its major Southeast Asian bases and abandoning any special military role 'East of Suez'. Drawing upon previously classified government records P.L. Pham examines and explains how the Wilson Government came to this conclusion, one of the most significant decisions in the decline of British global power after the Second World War.

Substantially revising earlier accounts, Pham exposes the inner workings of government, the close but strained relations between the United Kingdom and the United States in the midst of Cold War tensions, and how politicians and policy makers managed the decline of British power, providing an in-depth and comprehensive study of British policy processes of the era.

In 1964 Britain's defence presence in Malaysia and Singapore was the largest and most expensive component of the country's world-wide role. Yet within three and a half years the Wilson Government had announced that Britain would be withdrawing from its major Southeast Asian bases and abandoning any special military role 'East of Suez'. Drawing upon previously classified government records P.L. Pham examines and explains how the Wilson Government came to this conclusion, one of the most significant decisions in the decline of British global power after the Second World War. Substantially revising earlier accounts, Pham exposes the inner workings of government, the close but strained relations between the United Kingdom and the United States in the midst of Cold War tensions, and how politicians and policy makers managed the decline of British power, providing an in-depth and comprehensive study of British policy processes of the era. Contents......Page 6 Acknowledgements......Page 8 Abbreviations & Conventions......Page 10 Introduction......Page 12 PART I. COMPROMISE......Page 22 Introduction to Part I......Page 24 1. Beginning the Defence Review: October 1964–June 1965......Page 26 2. The Perils of Alliance: June–September 1965......Page 45 3. A Dubious Compromise: October 1965–February 1966......Page 69 Conclusion to Part I......Page 99 PART II. CONFLICT......Page 104 Introduction to Part II......Page 106 4. The End of Consensus: March–October 1966......Page 109 5. From Dissent to Revolt: October 1966–April 1967......Page 141 6. The Battle for Withdrawal: April–July 1967......Page 161 Conclusion to Part II......Page 206 PART III. BREAKDOWN......Page 210 7. A Symbolic Sacrifice: July 1967–January 1968......Page 212 Conclusion......Page 248 Appendix: Personae......Page 254 Bibliography......Page 261 F......Page 272 R......Page 273 W......Page 274 Compromise. Beginning the defence review: October 1964-June 1965 -- The perils of alliance: June--September 1965 -- A dubious compromise: October 1965-February 1966 -- Conflict. The end of consensus: March-October 1966 -- From dissent to revolt: October 1966-April 1967 -- The battle for withdrawal: April-July 1967 -- Conflict. A symbolic sacrifice: July 1967-January 1968 Compromise. Beginning the defence review: October 1964-June 1965 The perils of alliance: June September 1965 A dubious compromise: October 1965-February 1966 Conflict. The end of consensus: March-October 1966 From dissent to revolt: October 1966-April 1967 The battle for withdrawal: April-July 1967 Conflict. A symbolic sacrifice: July 1967-January 1968. P.L. Pham examines the reasons for the Wilson government's decision to withdraw from 'East of Suez'. Drawing upon previously classified records in the UK, USA, and Australia, Pham provides a detailed and comprehensive examination of the British policy process leading up to the final decision to withdraw