Empathy, Embodiment, and the Person: Husserlian Investigations of Social Experience and the Self (Phaenomenologica, 233)

"This text explores how self-consciousness and self-understanding differ phenomenologically from the experience and comprehension of others, and the extent to which such relations are constitutively interdependent. Jardine argues that Husserl's analyses of selfhood and intersubjectivity are animated by the question of what's at stake in recognising an agent's engagement as the situated response of a person, rather than simply as the comportment of an animal or living body. Drawing centrally from the freshly excavated Ideas II drafts and manuscripts, the author develops Husserl's often fragmentary investigations of attention, habit, emotion, freedom, the common world, and action, and considers their implications for subjectivity and the experience of others. Empathy, Embodiment, and the Person also brings Husserlian phenomenology into dialogue with twenty-first century philosophical concerns, from accounts of selfhood and agency from analytic philosophy to the treatment of social experience in critical theory. The book shows the reader that transcendental phenomenology can be rejuvenated by engaging with a broader philosophical landscape and will appeal to researchers, students, and instructors in the field." -- pàgina 4 de la coberta Contents About the Author Chapter 1: Introduction References Chapter 2: The Pure Ego: Self-Consciousness, Attention, and Emotion 2.1 The Pure Ego and Transcendental Phenomenology 2.2 Self-Affection, Time-Consciousness, and Experiential Subjectivity 2.3 The Pure Ego as Pole of Engagement (I): Spontaneity in Attention 2.4 The Pure Ego as Pole of Engagement (II): Spontaneity in Emotion 2.5 Conclusion References Chapter 3: The Distinctive Phenomenology of Empathy 3.1 Empathy: A (Very) Brief Historical Overview 3.2 Empathy in Husserl and Stein 3.2.1 Empathy as Perceptual (or Perception-Like) Experience 3.2.2 Empathy as Explication of Foreign Intentionality 3.2.3 Theunissen on Empathy 3.3 Conclusion References Chapter 4: Nature and Perception 4.1 Regional Ontology and Constitutive Analysis 4.2 The Naturalistic and Personalistic Attitudes 4.3 Nature as a Perceptual, Theoretical, and Scientific Theme 4.4 Nature as Motivational Ground for Emotion and Action 4.5 Perception and the Material Thing 4.6 Animate Empathy: A Preliminary Take References Chapter 5: Animate Empathy and Intercorporeal Nature 5.1 Animals and Things: Ontological Considerations 5.2 Intersubjective Nature and Living Bodies 5.2.1 Perception and Solipsism 5.2.2 Common Nature and Intercorporeal Concordance 5.2.3 Reciprocity and Communication 5.3 Animate Empathy 5.3.1 Animate Empathy and the Animal of Intuition 5.3.2 Animate Abnormality and the Commonality of Nature 5.3.3 Animate Empathy and Natural-Scientific Thinking 5.4 The Animate Other and the Animate Self 5.4.1 The Institutive Experience of the Animate Other: Bodily Similarity and Localisation 5.4.2 Reciprocal Animate Empathy 5.5 Summary References Chapter 6: The Personal Self: A First-Personal Approach 6.1 The Embodiment of the Person 6.1.1 Bodily Freedom and Perception 6.1.2 Voluntary Movement, Agentive Subjectivity, and Affection 6.1.3 Freedom as Bodily, Personal, and Pure 6.2 From Personal Agency to Personal Selfhood 6.2.1 Freedom and Personal Selfhood 6.2.2 Person, Motivation, and Surrounding World 6.3 Position-Taking, Habituality, and Self-Acquaintance: Husserl and Moran 6.3.1 Convictions and Self-Awareness 6.3.2 Detectivism, Deliberation, and Habituality 6.3.3 Personal Depth, Memory, and Self-Consciousness 6.4 Concluding Remarks References Chapter 7: Interpersonal Empathy and Levels of Personal Self-constitution 7.1 Personal Self-constitution: Life, Style, and Narrative 7.1.1 The Pure Ego, the Personal Ego, and Self-apprehension 7.1.2 Personal Style and Self-consciousness: Association, Induction, and Envisaging 7.1.3 Narrative Self-understanding 7.1.4 Summary 7.2 The Person as Interpersonal 7.2.1 Self-understanding and Interpersonal Relations 7.2.2 Personal Agency and the Interpersonal Nexus 7.2.3 Summary 7.3 Interpersonal Empathy as Recognition 7.3.1 Honneth on Social Visibility and Recognition 7.3.2 Empathy as Elementary Recognition 7.3.3 Summary 7.4 Interpersonal Empathy as Personal Understanding References Chapter 8: Conclusion Bibliography Husserliana Husserliana Materialien Cited Unpublished Manuscript Other Cited Translations of Husserl’s Writings List of Additional Works Referred to in the Text Author Index Subject Index "This text explores how self-consciousness and self-understanding differ phenomenologically from the experience and comprehension of others, and the extent to which such relations are constitutively interdependent. Jardine argues that Husserl's analyses of selfhood and intersubjectivity are animated by the question of what's at stake in recognising an agent's engagement as the situated response of a person, rather than simply as the comportment of an animal or living body. Drawing centrally from the freshly excavated Ideas II drafts and manuscripts, the author develops Husserl's often fragmentary investigations of attention, habit, emotion, freedom, the common world, and action, and considers their implications for subjectivity and the experience of others. Empathy, Embodiment, and the Person also brings Husserlian phenomenology into dialogue with twenty-first century philosophical concerns, from accounts of selfhood and agency from analytic philosophy to the treatment of social experience in critical theory. The book shows the reader that transcendental phenomenology can be rejuvenated by engaging with a broader philosophical landscape and will appeal to researchers, students, and instructors in the field." -- pàgina 4 de la coberta