Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government (Executive Politics and Governance)

"Elite politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen hold the fortunes of societies in their hands not only because of their direct influence on politics, administration and economy but also since their behavior indirectly signals how things are done. How are elites persuaded not to use their privileged position to enrich themselves at the expense of the society at large? The answer from research, so far, is through formal and informal institutional constraints, which in different ways alter incentives at the top. This edited volume contributes to the knowledge of the interaction between elites, institutions and other constraints and how this affects corruption and other forms of bad government. It problematizes the incentives for elites and masses to fight grand and petty corruption, respectively, and demonstrates the importance of elite constraints for good societies, where infant mortality is low and life expectancy and satisfaction are high. It also explores the behavior of a largely unconstrained elite group, namely the diplomatic corps, and shows how corruption not only takes the form of money transfers but also of sexual exploitation. It reveals how even rather distant historical experiences incite elites to behave either in line with their immediate self-interests or with the interest of the society at large. Taking a step further, it considers different ways in which elites' preferences are more closely aligned with the general interest when, for example, monitoring mechanisms are introduced through interactions between recruitment regimes to the bureaucracy, or economic motivations and democratic accountability. Finally, it explores how political parties can be a positive force in the fight against corruption and bad government"-- Read more... "Elite politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen hold the fortunes of societies in their hands not only because of their direct influence on politics, administration and economy but also since their behavior indirectly signals how things are done. How are elites persuaded not to use their privileged position to enrich themselves at the expense of the society at large? The answer from research, so far, is through formal and informal institutional constraints, which in different ways alter incentives at the top. This edited volume contributes to the knowledge of the interaction between elites, institutions and other constraints and how this affects corruption and other forms of bad government. It problematizes the incentives for elites and masses to fight grand and petty corruption, respectively, and demonstrates the importance of elite constraints for good societies, where infant mortality is low and life expectancy and satisfaction are high. It also explores the behavior of a largely unconstrained elite group, namely the diplomatic corps, and shows how corruption not only takes the form of money transfers but also of sexual exploitation. It reveals how even rather distant historical experiences incite elites to behave either in line with their immediate self-interests or with the interest of the society at large. Taking a step further, it considers different ways in which elites' preferences are more closely aligned with the general interest when, for example, monitoring mechanisms are introduced through interactions between recruitment regimes to the bureaucracy, or economic motivations and democratic accountability. Finally, it explores how political parties can be a positive force in the fight against corruption and bad government"-- Provided by publisher Front Matter....Pages i-xix Front Matter....Pages 1-1 How Institutions Constrain Elites from Destructive Behavior....Pages 3-12 Good Societies Need Good Leaders on a Leash....Pages 13-32 Are Corrupt Elites Necessary for Corrupt Countries?....Pages 33-47 Prestige, Immunity and Diplomats: Understanding Sexual Corruption....Pages 49-65 Front Matter....Pages 67-67 The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior....Pages 69-92 Political Leadership and Quality of Government: Restraining Elites at Nascent Statehood....Pages 93-109 Rulers and Their Elite Rivals: How Democratization Has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa....Pages 111-127 Stability and Stagnation....Pages 129-146 Front Matter....Pages 147-147 Democratic and Professional Accountability....Pages 149-166 Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites’ Rotation and Asset Ownership....Pages 167-186 Dynamic Economic Growth as a Constraint on Elite Behavior....Pages 187-203 Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Party Behavior....Pages 205-223 Front Matter....Pages 225-225 Political Parties and the Politics of the Quality of Government....Pages 227-244 Why Women in Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Parties....Pages 245-262 Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Government....Pages 263-282 Can Elections Combat Corruption? Accountability and Partisanship....Pages 283-304 Back Matter....Pages 305-311 To a large extent, elite politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen hold the fortunes of their societies in their hands. This edited volume describes how formal and informal institutions affect elite behaviour, which in turn affects corruption and the quality of government.