Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law [recurso electrónico] Volume I Basic Concepts and Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct

This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent, lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4) defines price competition and quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment) competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately, (5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and across-the-board-pricing sellers price minus marginal cost gaps and analyses eachs determinants, (6) defines the determinants of the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U. courts, (9) explains that a firms economic (market) power or dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined non-arbitrarily, a firms economic power could not be predicted from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of oligopolistic conduct that some economists have implicitly usedconduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability depended critically on the perpetrators belief that its rivals responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to their responses, distinguishes two types of such conductcontrived and naturalby whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind of oligopolistic conduct, examines these analyses implications for eachs antitrust legality, and criticizes related U.S. and E.U. case-law and doctrine and scholarly positions (e.g., on the evidence that establishes the illegal oligopolistic character of pricing), and (11) executes parallel analyses of predatory conduct--e.g., criticizes various arguments for the inevitable unprofitability of predatory pricing, the various tests that economists/U.S. courts advocate using/use to determine whether pricing is predatory, and two analyses by economists of the conditions under which QV investment and systems rivalry are predatory and examines the conditions under which production-process research, plant-modernization, and long-term full-requirements contracts are predatory.-- Provided by Publisher Volume I. Basic Concepts And Economics-based Legal Analyses Of Oligopolistic And Predatory Conduct -- Volume Ii. Economics-based Legal Analyses Of Mergers, Vertical Practices, And Joint Ventures. Volume I. Basic Concepts And Economics-based Legal Analyses Of Oligopolistic And Predatory Conduct -- Part I. Introduction To Part I: Basic Concepts And Approaches -- Chapter 1. The Correct Definition Of The Impact Of A Choice On Economic Efficiency -- Chapter 2. The Components Of The Difference Between A Firm's Price And Conventional Marginal Costs And The Intermediate Determinants Of The Intensity Of Quality-and-variety-increasing-investment Competition -- Chapter 3. How Monopolizing Conduct, Attempts To Monopolize, And Exclusionary Or Foreclosing Conduct Should Be Defined By Economists -- Chapter 4. The Actor-coverage Of, Conduct-coverage Of, Tests Of Illegality Promulgated By, And Defenses Recognized By U.s. Antitrust Law And E.c./e.u. Competition Law -- Chapter 5. Categories Of Economic-efficiency Gains That Are And Are Not Relevant To Conduct's Antitrust Legality -- Chapter 6. The Inevitable Arbitrariness Of Market Definitions And The Unjustifiability Of Market-oriented Antitrust Analyses -- Chapter 7. Economic (classical) And Antitrust Markets: Official And Scholarly Proposals -- Chapter 8. The Operational Definition Of A Firm's Monopoly, Oligopoly, And Total Economic (market) Power In A Given Ardepps -- Chapter 9. The Need To Analyze Separately The Monopolizing Character, Abusiveness, Competitive Impact, And Economic Efficiency Of Business Choices -- Conclusion To Part I -- Part Ii. Introduction To Part Ii: Applications -- Chapter 10. Oligopolistic Conduct -- Chapter 11. Predatory Conduct. Volume Ii. Economics-based Legal Analyses Of Mergers, Vertical Practices, And Joint Ventures -- Chapter 12. Horizontal Mergers And Acquisitions. (1) The Ways That Horizontal Mergers Can Generate Sherman-act-licit And Sherman-act-illicit Profits; (2) Possible Clayton-act-relevant Impacts Of Horizontal Mergers And These Impacts' Magnitudes' Determinants; (3) The Legality Of Horizontal Mergers Under U.s. Antitrust Law And E.c./e.u. Competition Law, Correctly Interpreted And Applied; (4) The U.s. Courts' Traditional Market Share/market-concentration Approach To Horizontal Mergers And The Various Doj/ftc Approaches To Horizontal Mergers; (5) Contemporary Ec Positions And The E.c./e.u. Case-law On Horizontal Concentrations -- Chapter 13. Conglomerate Mergers And Acquisitions. (1) The Sherman And Clayton Act Tests For The Illegality Of Conglomerate Mergers; (2) The Sherman-act-licit And Sherman-act-illicit Ways In Which Conglomerate Mergers That Do Not Eliminate An Effective Potential Competitor Can Increase Their Participants' Profits And The Appropriate Structure Of Trials About The Legality Of Such Conglomerate Mergers Under The Sherman Act; (3) The Various Ways In Which Conglomerate Mergers That Do Not Eliminate An Effective Potential Competitor Can Decrease And Increase Competition In The Clayton Act Sense And The Appropriate Structure Of Trials About The Legality Of Such Conglomerate Mergers Under The Clayton Act; (4) The U.s. Case-law And Doj/ftc Positions On The Economic Consequences And Antitrust Legality Of Conglomerate Mergers That Do Not Eliminate An Effective Potential Competitor; (5) The Conditions Under Which Competition Will Be Effective And The Economic Effects Of The Fact That A Conglomerate Merger Has Eliminated Or Would Eliminate An Effective Potential Competitor; (6) The Reasons Why It May Be More Profitable To Prevent Entry By Merging With The Potential Competitor Than By Bribing It Not To Enter And/or Threatening To Retaliate Against Its Entry, The Relevance Of The Fact That A Conglomerate Merger Eliminates An Effective Potential Competitor To Its Legality Under The Sherman And Clayton Acts, Correctly Interpreted, And The U.s. Courts' And The Antitrust-enforcement Agencies' Positions On This Legal Issue; (7) The Legality Of Conglomerate Mergers Under E.c./e.u. Competition Law, Both As Correctly And As Actually Interpreted And Applied -- Chapter 14. Vertical Mergers And The Pricing-techniques, Contract-of-sale Provisions, And Sales/consignment Policies That Are Surrogates For Vertical Integration. (1) The Spillover Effects That Perfectly-coordinated Vertical Integration Will Prevent And That Surrogates For Vertical Integration Are Designed To Combat; (2) The Functions Of The Various Surrogates For Vertical Integration; (3) The Legality Of The Various Surrogates For Vertical Integration Under U.s. And E.c./e.u. Antitrust Law Both As Properly Interpreted And Applied And As Actually Applied; (4) The Functions And Possible Competitive Impact Of Vertical Mergers And Acquisitions; (5) The Legality Of Vertical Mergers And Acquisitions Under U.s. And E.c./e.u. Antitrust Law, Both As Correctly Applied And As Actually Applied; (6) The Economic Functions And Competitive Consequences Of Vertical Integration By Internal Growth; (7) The Legality Of Vertical Internal Growth Under U.s. Antitrust Law And E.c./e.u. Competition Law, Both As Correctly Interpreted And As Actually Applied -- Chapter 15. Joint Ventures And Other Types Of Functionally-analogous Collaborative Arrangements. (1) The Sherman-act-licit And Sherman-act-illicit Functions Of Joint Ventures And Other Types Of Functionally-analogous Collaborative Arrangements; (2) The Ways In Which Joint Ventures And/or The Restraints That Joint-venture Agreements Impose On The Joint Venture And/or Its Parents Can Confer Equivalent-dollar Gains And Inflict Equivalent-dollar Losses On Clayton-act-relevant Buyers; (3) The Difficulty Of Determining Whether A Joint Venture And/or The Restraints A Joint-venture Agreement Imposes On The Joint Venture And/or Its Parents Violate The Specific-anticompetitive-intent Test And/or The Lessening-competition Test Of Illegality; (4) The Legality Of Joint Ventures And Any Restrictive Provisions That Joint-venture Agreements Contain Under U.s. Antitrust Law, Correctly Interpreted And Applied; (5) The U.s. Case-law And Antitrust-enforcement-agency Positions On Joint Ventures And Any Restrictive Provisions That Joint-venture Agreements Contain Restrictive Provisions That Joint-venture Agreements Contain; (6) The Legality Of Joint Ventures Under E.c./e.u. Competition Law, Correctly Interpreted And Applied; (7) The Legality Of Joint Ventures Under E.c./e.u. Law As Actually Interpreted And Applied -- Conclusion. Richard S. Markovits. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Volume 2 uses the economic and legal concepts/theories of Volume 1 to (1) analyze the U.S. and E.U. antitrust legality of mergers, joint ventures, and the pricing-technique and contractual/sales-policy distributor-control surrogates for vertical integration and (2) assess related positions of scholars and U.S.and E.U. antitrust officials. Its analysis of horizontal mergers (1) delineates non-market-oriented protocols for determining whether they manifest specific anticompetitive intent, would lessen competition, or are rendered lawful by the efficiencies they would generate, (2) criticizes the U.S. courts traditional market-share/market-concentration protocol, the HHI-oriented protocols of the 1992 U.S. DOJ/FTC Guidelines and the European Commission (EC) Guidelines, and the various non-market-oriented protocols the DOJ/FTC have increasingly been using, (3) argues that, although the 2010 U.S. Guidelines and DOJ/FTC officials discuss market definition as if it matters, those Guidelines actually reject market-oriented approaches, and (4) reviews the relevant U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its analysis of conglomerate mergers (1) shows that they can perform the same legitimate and competition-increasing functions as horizontal mergers and can yield illegitimate profits and lessen competition by increasing contrived oligopolistic pricing and retaliation barriers to investment, (2) analyzes the determinants of all these effects, and (3) assesses limit-price theory, the toe-hold-merger doctrine, and U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its analysis of vertical conduct (1) examines the legitimate functions of each type of such conduct, (2) delineates the conditions under which each manifests specific anticompetitive intent and/or lessens competition, and (3) assesses related U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. Its analysis of joint ventures (1) explains that they violate U.S. law only when they manifest specific anticompetitive intent while they violate E.U. law either for this reason or because they lessen competition, (2) discusses the meaning of an ancillary restraint and demonstrates that whether a joint-venture agreement would be illegal if it imposed no restraints and whether any restraints imposed are ancillary can be determined only through case-by-case analysis, (3) explains why scholars and officials overestimate the economic efficiency of R & D joint ventures, and (4) discusses related U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. The studys Conclusion (1) reviews how its analyses justify its innovative conceptual systems and (2) compares U.S. and E.U. antitrust law as written and as applied Front Matter....Pages i-xlv Front Matter....Pages 1-5 Chapter 1 The “Correct” Definition of “the Impact of a Choice on Economic Efficiency”....Pages 7-14 Chapter 2 The Components of the Difference Between a Firm’s Price and Conventional Marginal Costs and the Intermediate Determinants of the Intensity of Quality-and-Variety-Increasing-Investment Competition....Pages 15-68 Chapter 3 How “Monopolizing Conduct,” “Attempts to Monopolize,” and “Exclusionary or Foreclosing Conduct” Should Be Defined by Economists....Pages 69-71 Chapter 4 The Actor-Coverage of, Conduct-Coverage of, Tests of Illegality Promulgated by, and Defenses Recognized by U.S. Antitrust Law and E.C./E.U. Competition Law....Pages 73-153 Chapter 5 Categories of Economic-Efficiency Gains That Are and Are Not Relevant to Conduct’s Antitrust Legality....Pages 155-163 Chapter 6 The Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions and the Unjustifiability of Market-Oriented Antitrust Analyses....Pages 165-181 Chapter 7 Economic (Classical) and Antitrust Markets: Official and Scholarly Proposals....Pages 183-247 Chapter 8 The Operational Definition of a Firm’s Monopoly, Oligopoly, and Total Economic (Market) Power in a Given ARDEPPS....Pages 249-299 Chapter 9 The Need to Analyze Separately the Monopolizing Character, “Abusiveness,” Competitive Impact, and Economic Efficiency of Business Choices....Pages 301-307 Back Matter....Pages 309-310 Front Matter....Pages 311-342 Chapter 10 Oligopolistic Conduct....Pages 343-500 Chapter 11 Predatory Conduct....Pages 501-722 Back Matter....Pages 723-761 This book (1) delineates operational definitions of (A) the key concepts in the U.S.'/E.U.'s respective tests of antitrust illegality and (B) such other antitrust-law-related economic concepts as ""oligopolistic"" and ""predatory"" conduct, (2) analyzes the profitability of oligopolistic and predatory conduct and the evidence that can and cannot establish that they have been practiced, (3) explains why market definitions are inherently arbitrary and criticizes the market-oriented approaches that U.S. and E.U. antitrust-enforcement officials have used to predict the competitive impact of horizo