Economic Sanctions And Presidential Decisions: Models Of Political Rationality (advances In Foreign Policy Analysis)

Foreign policy analysis offers rich theoretical perspectives and diverse methodological approaches. Scholars specializing in foreign policy analysis produce a vast output of research. Yet, there were only very few specialized outlets for publishing work in the field. Addressing this need is the purpose of Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis. The series bridges the gap between academic and policy approaches to foreign policy analysis, integrates across levels of analysis, span theoretical approaches to the field, and advances research utilizing decision theory, utility theory, and game theory. Members of the Board of Advisors Contents ## List of Tables viii Preface ix Preface My original interest in economic sanctions dates back to an international political economy seminar I took while working toward my master's degree at Michigan State University. Initially interested in effectiveness, I soon found that I was more puzzled by the difficulty scholars had explaining why economic coercion was used when it so often failed. This curiosity led me to study the conditions that led to the use of economic sanctions while working on my doctorate at Arizona State University. My dissertation provided me with a spring board for several articles on economic sanctions, but I had never brought together a comprehensive study of the use of economic coercion. With the encouragement of several colleagues, I returned to my dissertation to attempt writing such a study of the use of economic coercion. This book is the culmination of that effort. Like most scholarly enterprises, this one has benefited from the generous input of others over the years. Several colleagues have provided both direct and indirect input on this project. My conversations with Steve Chan about economic coercion have helped clarify and expand my thinking on the topic. Additionally, Steve's generous suggestions for this book have been extremely helpful. I am also indebted to Rich Olson for pushing me to turn my ideas into clear and more exact prose. My colleagues at the University of Missouri have also been very helpful with providing a sounding board and reality check. "This important contribution to the debate over the efficacy of economic sanctions skillfully integrates domestic and international factors into an explanation of why sanctions are chosen by political leaders. A. Cooper Drury develops a rational theory of why leaders choose sanctions, rather than another foreign policy tool, and to explain what type of sanctions are used, whether to sustain them, and when to terminate them." "Assessing presidential decision-making and coercion short of military force, the book shows that presidents use sanctions primarily for foreign policy purposes but make the decision in a domestic context while facing cognitive constraints. This increases our understanding of why presidents use sanctions even when they so often fail." "Breaking new ground with its innovative argument, thorough testing, and variety of data bases, Drury here advances the understanding of decision making and foreign policy."--Jacket Cover......Page 1 Contents......Page 8 List of Tables......Page 9 Preface......Page 10 1 Introduction......Page 12 2 Economic Coercion in Theory and Practice......Page 19 3 Evaluating Sanction Effectiveness......Page 43 4 Why Does the President Sanction? Beyond the Conventional Wisdom......Page 70 5 When Does the President Sanction? An Empirical Analysis......Page 101 6 Is There a Target Selection Bias?......Page 143 7 The Decision to Modify an Economic Sanction Policy......Page 154 8 What Kinds of Sanctions Does the President Use? Domestic Constraints and Incentives......Page 170 9 Conclusions and Implications......Page 186 Appendix......Page 201 Notes......Page 206 Bibliography......Page 220 D......Page 232 I......Page 233 N......Page 234 T......Page 235 Z......Page 236 Skilfully Integrating Domestic And International Factors, And Placing The Analysis Of Sanctions Directly Into The Mainstream Of Strategic Studies And Decision Theory, This Book Offers Innovative Argument And Testing Using A Variety Of Databases. Introduction -- The Conventional Wisdom -- International/dyadic Reasons To Sanction -- Domestic Political Reasons To Sanction -- Presidential Rationality And The Decision To Sanction -- Analysis Of The Decision To Initiate An Economic Sanction -- Analysis Of The Decision To Modify An Economic Sanction Policy -- Assessment Of A Target-selection Bias -- Selecting The Severity Of The Sanction Used -- Conclusions And Implications. A. Cooper Drury. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [209]-220) And Index. Annotation. Economic sanctions: panacea, symbolic but ineffectual, or useless and counterproductive? While these questions have framed much the existing debate, Drury digs deeper to why foreign policy leaders, and especially the president, choose sanctions, of which type, whether to sustain them, and when to terminate them. Skilfully integrating domestic and international factors, and placing the analysis of sanctions directly into the mainstream of strategic studies and decision theory, this book breaks new ground with its innovative argument and thorough testing using a variety of databases This important contribution to the debate over the efficacy of economic sanctions develops a rational theory of why leaders choose sanctions, rather than another foreign policy tool, what type, whether to sustain them, and when to terminate them. This book breaks new ground with its innovative argument and thorough testing using a variety of data bases.