Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy : economic and political origins

What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal. Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association as the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the forthcoming text Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Harvard Faculty Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of the forthcoming book Natural Experiments in History. Cambridge University Press Contents 8 Preface 12 Part One. Questions And Answers 18 1 Paths of Political Development 18 1. Britain 19 2. Argentina 22 3. Singapore 25 4. South Africa 27 5. The Agenda 31 2 Our Argument 32 1. Democracy versus Nondemocracy 33 2. Building Blocks of Our Approach 36 3. Toward Our Basic Story 39 4. Our Theory of Democratization 40 5. Democratic Consolidation 47 6. Determinants of Democracy 48 6.1 48 6.2 48 6.3 49 6.4 50 6.5 52 6.6 55 6.7 57 7. Political Identities and the Nature of Con.ict 59 8. Democracy in a Picture 60 9. Overview of the Book 63 3 What Do We Know about Democracy? 65 1. Measuring Democracy 65 2. Patterns of Democracy 68 3. Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution 75 4. Crises and Democracy 82 5. Social Unrest and Democratization 82 5.1 84 5.2 85 5.3 88 6. The Literature 92 7. Our Contribution 97 Part Two. Modeling Politics 106 4 Democratic Politics 106 1. Introduction 106 2. Aggregating Individual Preferences 108 3. Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem 3.1 109 3.2 111 3.3 112 4. Our Workhorse Models 116 4.1 116 4.2 121 4.3 124 4.4 126 5. Democracy and Political Equality 130 6. Conclusion 134 5 Nondemocratic Politics 135 1. Introduction 135 2. Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics 2.1 137 2.2 137 2.3 140 2.4 143 3. Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies 145 4. Commitment Problems 4.1 150 4.2 153 4.3 159 5. A Simple Game of Promises 161 6. A Dynamic Model 168 7. Incentive-Compatible Promises 178 8. Conclusion 188 Part Three. The Creation And Consolidation Of Democracy 190 6 Democratization 190 1. Introduction 190 2. The Role of Political Institutions 190 3. Preferences over Political Institutions 193 4. Political Power and Institutions 4.1 194 4.2 196 4.3 196 5. A Static Model of Democratization 198 6. Democratization or Repression? 203 6.1 206 7. A Dynamic Model of Democratization 210 8. Subgame Perfect Equilibria 218 9. Alternative Political Identities 220 10. Targeted Transfers 224 11. Power of the Elites in Democracy 224 12. Ideological Preferences over Regimes 228 13. Democratization in a Picture 231 14. Equilibrium Revolutions 232 15. Conclusion 235 7 Coups and Consolidation 238 1. Introduction 238 2. Incentives for Coups 241 3. A Static Model of Coups 242 4. A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy 248 5. Alternative Political Identities 263 6. Targeted Transfers 263 7. Power in Democracy and Coups 264 8. Consolidation in a Picture 266 9. Defensive Coups 268 10. Conclusion 270 Part Four. Putting The Models To Work 272 8 The Role of the Middle Class 272 1. Introduction 272 2. The Three-Class Model 276 3. Emergence of Partial Democracy 279 4. From Partial to Full Democracy 284 4.1 284 4.2 287 5. Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer 290 6. Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners 295 7. The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy 300 8. Conclusion 302 9 Economic Structure and Democracy 304 1. Introduction 304 2. Economic Structure and Income Distribution 307 3. Political Con.ict 309 4. Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy 310 5. Costs of Coup on Capital and Land 313 6. Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy 317 7. Con.ict between Landowners and Industrialists 324 8. Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice 329 9. Economic Institutions 330 10. Human Capital 333 11. Conjectures about Political Development 334 12. Conclusion 336 10 Globalization and Democracy 338 1. Introduction 338 2. A Model of an Open Economy 342 2.1 345 3.PoliticalCon.ict–DemocraticConsolidation 348 4. Political Con.ict – Transition to Democracy 351 4.1 354 5. Financial Integration 355 5.1 355 5.2 357 6. Increased Political Integration 360 7. Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade 361 8. Conclusion 364 Part Five. Conclusions And The Future Of Democracy 366 11 Conclusions and the Future of Democracy 366 1. Paths of Political Development Revisited 366 1.1 366 1.2 369 1.3 370 1.4 371 2. Extensions and Areas for Future Research 372 3. The Future of Democracy 375 Part Six. Appendix 378 12 Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power 378 1. Introduction 378 2. Probabilistic Voting Models 2.1 378 2.2 380 3. Lobbying 384 4. Partisan Politics and Political Capture 390 4.1 390 4.2 393 4.3 395 ISBN-13:,9780521855266 "This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization."--Publisher description. This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization. This Book Is The First To Use Modern Social Science Methodology Systematically To Explain Why Some Countries Are Democracies While Others Are Not. Why Does Democracy Sometimes Persist And Consolidate While Other Times It Collapses? The Treatment Shows That Whether Or Not A Society Becomes Democratic Depends On Several Factors. Questions And Answers -- Paths Of Political Development -- Our Argument -- What Do We Know About Democracy? -- Modeling Politics -- Democratic Politics -- Nondemocratic Politics -- The Creation And Consolidation Of Democracy -- Democratization -- Coups And Consolidation -- Putting The Models To Work -- The Role Of The Middle Class -- Economic Structure And Democracy -- Globalization And Democracy -- Conclusions And The Future Of Democracy. Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 381-399) And Index. The authors develop a framework for analysing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Dictatorship, nevertheless, is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution