Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy : economic and political origins

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization. What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal. Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association as the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the forthcoming text Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Harvard Faculty Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Researchs Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of the forthcoming book Natural Experiments in History. This Book Is The First To Use Modern Social Science Methodology Systematically To Explain Why Some Countries Are Democracies While Others Are Not. Why Does Democracy Sometimes Persist And Consolidate While Other Times It Collapses? The Treatment Shows That Whether Or Not A Society Becomes Democratic Depends On Several Factors. Questions And Answers -- Paths Of Political Development -- Our Argument -- What Do We Know About Democracy? -- Modeling Politics -- Democratic Politics -- Nondemocratic Politics -- The Creation And Consolidation Of Democracy -- Democratization -- Coups And Consolidation -- Putting The Models To Work -- The Role Of The Middle Class -- Economic Structure And Democracy -- Globalization And Democracy -- Conclusions And The Future Of Democracy. Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 381-399) And Index. The authors develop a framework for analysing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Dictatorship, nevertheless, is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution