Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes : Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective

why Do Some Authoritarian Regimes Topple During Financial Crises, While Others Steer Through Financial Crises Relatively Unscathed? In This Book, Thomas B. Pepinsky Uses The Experiences Of Indonesia And Malaysia And The Analytical Tools Of Open Economy Macroeconomics To Answer This Question. Focusing On The Economic Interests Of Authoritarian Regimes' Supporters, Pepinsky Shows That Differences In Cross-border Asset Specificity Produce Dramatically Different Outcomes In Regimes Facing Financial Crises. When Asset Specificity Divides Supporters, As In Indonesia, They Desire Mutually Incompatible Adjustment Policies, Yielding Incoherent Adjustment Policy Followed By Regime Collapse. When Coalitions Are Not Divided By Asset Specificity, As In Malaysia, Regimes Adopt Radical Adjustment Measures That Enable Them To Survive Financial Crises. Combining Rich Qualitative Evidence From Southeast Asia With Cross-national Time-series Data And Comparative Case Studies Of Latin American Autocracies, Pepinsky Reveals The Power Of Coalitions And Capital Mobility To Explain How Financial Crises Produce Regime Change. Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Dedication......Page 7 Contents......Page 9 List of Tables......Page 11 List of Figures......Page 13 Acknowledgments......Page 15 Terms and Abbreviations......Page 17 Two Countries, Two Trajectories......Page 21 Understanding Adjustment and Authoritarian Breakdowns......Page 24 Data and Methods......Page 29 The Plan of the Book......Page 31 2 Coalitional Sources of Adjustment and Regime Survival......Page 34 The Reform Game......Page 36 Financial Crises and the Problem of Adjustment......Page 40 Solutions......Page 42 Players and Policies......Page 44 Predictions......Page 50 The Global Scope of the Argument......Page 52 Conclusion......Page 55 Appendix......Page 56 3 Authoritarian Support Coalitions: Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia......Page 60 The New Order......Page 62 Fixed Capital: ABRI and the Pribumi Entrepreneurs......Page 65 Mobile Capital: The Konglomerat......Page 73 Mahathir’s Malaysia......Page 81 The Malay Masses......Page 84 Fixed Capital: New Malay Entrepreneurs......Page 89 Discussion: Alternative Models of Authoritarian Politics......Page 97 4 Adjustment Policy in Indonesia, June 1997–May 1998......Page 102 Crisis Onset......Page 105 Fiscal and Trade Policy......Page 107 Monetary Policy......Page 111 Finance and Corporate Policy......Page 114 Exchange Rate and Capital Account Policy......Page 125 Alternative Explanations?......Page 135 5 Adjustment Policy in Malaysia, June 1997–December 1999......Page 139 Crisis Onset......Page 141 Fiscal and Trade Policy......Page 144 Monetary Policy......Page 150 Finance and Corporate Policy......Page 153 Exchange Rate and Capital Account Policy......Page 163 Alternative Explanations?......Page 172 6 Authoritarian Breakdown in Indonesia......Page 175 Ex Ante Unlikely, Ex Post Inevitable......Page 176 Legitimacy......Page 177 Massive Groundswell of Discontent......Page 179 Irrationality......Page 181 Structural Contradictions......Page 182 Late New Order Politics......Page 186 From Economic to Political Crisis......Page 188 The Konglomerat and Chinese Indonesians......Page 192 Final Months of Regime Unity......Page 196 Riots, Exit, and Endgame......Page 200 Conclusion......Page 205 Postscript: From Authoritarian Breakdown to Democratization......Page 207 7 Authoritarian Stability in Malaysia......Page 212 ‘‘The Tragedy That Didn’t Happen’’......Page 213 Mild Crisis......Page 214 Mahathirism versus Anarchy......Page 215 The Party System......Page 216 Successful Adjustment......Page 217 Mahathir’s Malaysia in 1997......Page 218 From Economic to Political Crisis......Page 220 Anwar versus Mahathir......Page 222 Containing Domestic Opposition......Page 224 International Retreat and Domestic Offensive......Page 230 Capital Controls and Crackdown......Page 231 The 1999 General Elections......Page 236 Conclusion......Page 242 8 Cross-National Perspectives......Page 245 Capital Account Restrictions and Regime Survival......Page 246 Chile, 1981–1985......Page 258 Argentina, 1981–1983......Page 263 Uruguay, 1981–1985......Page 268 Mexico: 1980s and 1990s......Page 270 The Latin American Debt Crisis in Mexico......Page 271 From Orthodoxy to the Tequila Crisis to Authoritarian Breakdown......Page 275 Conclusion: Cross-National Perspectives on Crises, Coalitions, and Change......Page 280 9 Conclusions......Page 284 Theories of Authoritarianism......Page 286 Open Economy Politics......Page 289 Authoritarian Breakdowns......Page 291 Normative Implications......Page 294 References......Page 299 Index......Page 333 Crises, Adjustment, And Transitions -- Coalitional Sources Of Adjustment And Regime Survival -- Authoritarian Support Coalitions : Comparing Indonesia And Malaysia -- Adjustment Policy In Indonesia, June 1997-may 1998 -- Adjustment Policy In Malaysia, June 1997-december 1999 -- Authoritarian Breakdown In Indonesia -- Authoritarian Stability In Malaysia -- Cross-national Perspectives -- Conclusions. Thomas B. Pepinsky. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 279-311) And Index. Thomas B. Pepinsky examines how coalitions and capital mobility in Indonesia and Malaysia shape the links between financial crises and regime change.--Résumé de l'éditeur