Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan (Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center)

Democracy is supposed to be the antithesis of hereditary rule by family dynasties. And yet “democratic dynasties” continue to persist in democracies around the world. They have been conspicuously prevalent in Japan, where more than a third of all legislators and two-thirds of all cabinet ministers in recent years have come from families with a history in parliament. Such a high proportion of dynasties is unusual and has sparked concerns over whether democracy in Japan is functioning properly. This book introduces a comparative theory to explain the causes and consequences of dynasties in democracies like Japan. Members of dynasties enjoy an “inherited incumbency advantage” in all three stages of a typical political career: selection, election, and promotion. However, the nature and extent of this advantage, as well as its consequences for elections and representation, varies by the institutional context of electoral rules and candidate selection methods within parties. In the late 1980s, roughly half of all new candidates in Japan’s long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party were political legacies. However, electoral system reform in 1994 and subsequent party reforms have changed the incentives for party leaders to rely on dynastic politics in candidate selection. A new pattern of party-based competition is slowly replacing the old pattern of competition based on localized family fiefdoms. "Although democracy is, in principle, the antithesis of dynastic rule, families with multiple members in elective office continue to be common around the world. In most democracies, the proportion of such "democratic dynasties" declines over time, and rarely exceeds ten percent of all legislators. Japan is a startling exception, with over a quarter of all legislators in recent years being dynastic. In Dynasties and Democracy, Daniel M. Smith sets out to explain when and why dynasties persist in democracies, and why their numbers are only now beginning to wane in Japan-questions that have long perplexed regional experts. Smith introduces a compelling comparative theory to explain variation in the presence of dynasties across democracies and political parties. Drawing on extensive legislator-level data from twelve democracies and detailed candidate-level data from Japan, he examines the inherited advantage that members of dynasties reap throughout their political careers-from candidate selection, to election, to promotion into cabinet. Smith shows how the nature and extent of this advantage, as well as its consequences for representation, vary significantly with the institutional context of electoral rules and features of party organization. His findings extend far beyond Japan, shedding light on the causes and consequences of dynastic politics for democracies around the world" (4éme de couv.) Although democracy is, in principle, the antithesis of dynastic rule, families with multiple members in elective office continue to be common around the world. In most democracies, the proportion of such "democratic dynasties" declines over time, and rarely exceeds ten percent of all legislators. Japan is a startling exception, with over a quarter of all legislators in recent years being dynastic. In Dynasties and Democracy , Daniel M. Smith sets out to explain when and why dynasties persist in democracies, and why their numbers are only now beginning to wane in Japan--questions that have long perplexed regional experts. Smith introduces a compelling comparative theory to explain variation in the presence of dynasties across democracies and political parties. Drawing on extensive legislator-level data from twelve democracies and detailed candidate-level data from Japan, he examines the inherited advantage that members of dynasties reap throughout their political careers--from candidate selection, to election, to promotion into cabinet. Smith shows how the nature and extent of this advantage, as well as its consequences for representation, vary significantly by the institutional context of electoral rules and features of party organization. His findings extend far beyond Japan, shedding light on the causes and consequences of dynastic politics for democracies around the world. The presence of dynasties seems to run counter to widely held conceptions of democratic opportunity and fairness. Yet they persist throughout the modern democratized world. Looking at the institutional change in Japan's party system as a comparative model, Daniel M. Smith examines the factors that contribute to their development over time and space and the advantages that members of dynasties reap throughout their political careers. Aladdin est un jeune garçon de rue qui vit dans la magnifique cité d'Agrabah. Il ne rêve que d'une chose : prouver sa valeur et épouser la princesse Jasmine, la fille du Sultan. Lorsqu'il découvre une lampe magique, le puissant Génie à l'intérieur lui offre la possibilité de réaliser trois voeux. Mais est-ce le meilleur moyen de gagner le coeur de Jasmine? [4e de couverture] Aladdin Est Un Pauvre Garçon De Rue Qui Découvre Une Lampe Magique. Lorsqu'il Rencontre La Princesse Jasmine, La Fille Du Sultan, Aladdin N'a Plus Qu'un Souhait : Devenir Un Prince Pour Pouvoir épouser Sa Belle. Mais Est-ce La Meilleure Solution Pour Gagner Le Coeur De La Princesse ? Dès 3 Ans.