Donors, technical assistance and public administration in Kosovo (Humanitarianism: Key Debates and New Approaches)

The reconstruction of Kosovo after 1999 was one of the largest and most ambitious international interventions in a post-conflict country. The United Nations, other major multinational organisations and many large bilateral aid donors all played a role in restoring stability and establishing governance in the territory. This book looks beyond the apparently united and generally self-congratulatory statements of these international actors to examine what actually happened when they tried to work together in Kosovo to achieve this goal. It considers the interests and motivations, and the strengths and weaknesses of each of the major players and how they contributed to the creation of new institutions in public finance and public sector management. Although in general the international exercise in Kosovo can be seen as a success, in the sphere of public administration the results have been mixed. More than fifteen years later, some institutions of government perform well while others face ongoing challenges. The book argues that much of the current day performance of the Kosovo government can be traced to the steps taken, or not taken, by these international actors in the crucial first years. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 2 Series information......Page 3 Title page......Page 4 Copyright information......Page 5 Table of contents......Page 6 Acknowledgements......Page 7 Abbreviations......Page 8 Introduction......Page 12 Kosovo as a case study of development assistance......Page 15 The benchmark......Page 16 Public finance and the civil service......Page 17 Theories of development......Page 18 Development and post-conflict reconstruction......Page 19 Critiques and alternatives to development......Page 21 Development in practice......Page 23 The development agenda in Kosovo......Page 26 Kosovo’s institution-building outcomes......Page 27 Outline of the book......Page 29 Notes......Page 32 How Kosovo became an aid project......Page 38 Defining the ‘liberal peace’......Page 39 Putting development into UNSCR 1244......Page 40 The ‘blank slate’, the ‘lost decade’ and the ‘window of opportunity’......Page 42 The question of ‘ownership’......Page 43 Kosovo in June 1999......Page 44 Serb exodus......Page 45 The challenge of civil administration......Page 46 Political developments since 1999......Page 47 The Joint Interim Administrative Structure (January 2000 to March 2002)......Page 48 Provisional Institutions for Self Government (February 2002 to February 2008)......Page 49 Supervised independence (February 2008 to September 2012)......Page 50 Notes......Page 51 2 The actors......Page 54 The United Nations......Page 55 The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)......Page 56 UN performance......Page 57 The UN Office of Civil Affairs (Pillar II)......Page 58 Pillar II performance......Page 60 Relations between the UN and other international actors......Page 61 The European Union......Page 62 The Europeanisation objective of EU assistance......Page 63 Europeanisation in Kosovo......Page 64 The EU in UNMIK (Pillar IV)......Page 66 EU development assistance: EAR and ECLO......Page 68 EAR performance......Page 69 The United States......Page 71 National interest and US assistance......Page 72 USAID and PFM......Page 73 USAID performance......Page 75 US relations with other actors......Page 77 UK Department for International Development (DFID)......Page 78 International financial institutions: The World Bank and the IMF......Page 79 World Bank assistance......Page 80 The IMF’s role......Page 82 International attitudes to Kosovars......Page 83 Kosovar attitudes to the international Mission......Page 85 The other Kosovars – Kosovo Serbs......Page 86 A difficult partnership......Page 87 Notes......Page 88 Donors, public finance and ‘liberal peace’......Page 97 PFM development in Kosovo......Page 99 The Customs Service......Page 100 Tax administration......Page 102 Challenges in revenue collection......Page 103 Kosovarisation of revenue agencies......Page 104 Europeanisation of the tax system......Page 105 Revenue issues after independence......Page 106 Central Fiscal Authority......Page 107 Banking and payments......Page 109 Budget planning and expenditure policy......Page 111 Transfer of financial management functions to the PISG......Page 112 Fiscal policy under the PISG......Page 114 Public procurement......Page 115 Financial Administrative Instruction No 2 1999......Page 116 The 2004 PISG Procurement Law......Page 117 2007 amendments to the law on public procurement......Page 118 The 2011 Procurement Law......Page 119 The 2014 amendments to the law......Page 120 Internal audit: Pillar IV and USAID 1999–2003......Page 121 The EU and public internal financial control......Page 122 PFM outcomes......Page 124 Successes......Page 125 Failures......Page 127 Getting the basics right......Page 128 Donor unity......Page 129 Resources and effort......Page 130 The ‘blank slate’ factor......Page 131 Insulation and professionalisation......Page 132 Notes......Page 133 Weber, bureaucracy and development......Page 141 The Kosovo civil service in 1999......Page 143 Civil service pay......Page 145 Employment terms and conditions......Page 146 Beginning a Kosovar-led administration......Page 147 UNMIK Civil Service Regulation 2001/36......Page 148 Public administration under the PISG......Page 149 DFID’s Personnel Policies and Procedures Project and Administrative Direction 2003/2......Page 150 Getting to Westminster: The Senior Public Appointments Committee (SPAC)......Page 152 A guarantee of fair treatment: the IOB......Page 153 Civil service salaries and the EU pay and grading project 2004–5......Page 154 Capacity development and public administration reform......Page 157 The civil service since independence......Page 158 The Civil Service Law 2010......Page 159 The Law on Salaries of Civil Servants 2010......Page 161 Civil service size and cost......Page 162 Corruption......Page 164 Productivity, efficiency and government performance......Page 165 Unclear objectives......Page 166 Inadequate and inappropriate resources......Page 167 Political challenges......Page 169 Peace versus development......Page 170 Notes......Page 171 The goal of transformation......Page 177 The transformation strategy......Page 178 Outcomes......Page 180 What worked and what didn’t?......Page 181 Donor capacities......Page 182 Merit recruitment and political insulation......Page 183 The UN and civil administration......Page 184 Ownership and aid effectiveness......Page 185 The need for large investments......Page 186 The future......Page 187 Notes......Page 188 References......Page 190 Index......Page 211 This book looks beyond the apparently united and generally self-congratulatory statements of The United Nations, other major multinational organisations and many large bilateral aid donors to examine what actually happened when they tried to work together in restoring stability and establishing governance in the territory.