Dominoes and Bandwagons : Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland

Fearing the loss of Korea and Vietnam would touch off a chain reaction of other countries turning communist, the United States fought two major wars in the hinterlands of Asia. What accounts for such exaggerated alarm, and what were its consequences? Is a fear of the domino effect permanently rooted in the American strategic psyche, or has the United States now adopted a less alarmist approach? The essays in this book address these questions by examining domino thinking in United States and Soviet Cold War strategy, and in earlier historic settings. Combining theory and history in analyzing issues relevant to current public policy, Dominoes and Bandwagons examines the extent to which domino fears were a rational response, a psychological reaction, or a tactic in domestic politics. Contents......Page 10 Contributors......Page 12 1. Introduction......Page 16 2. Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior......Page 33 3. Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition......Page 64 4. Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?......Page 98 5. The Truman Administration and Global Responsibilities: The Birth of the Falling Domino Principle......Page 125 6. Soviet Inferences from Their Victories in the Periphery: Visions of Resistance or Cumulating Gains?......Page 158 7. Soviet Perceptions of American Foreign Policy After Afghanistan......Page 203 8. The Soviet Decision to Withdraw from Afghanistan: Changing Strategic and Regional Images......Page 233 9. Russian and Soviet Strategic Behavior in Asia......Page 263 10. Conclusion......Page 289 B......Page 304 D......Page 305 G......Page 306 J......Page 307 M......Page 308 P......Page 309 S......Page 310 W......Page 311 Z......Page 312 A collection of essays on military defence strategy, which considers historical applications of the "domino theory", the psychological dynamics of the US-Soviet relationship vis-a-vis Eurasian boundaries. It also examines whether the USSR actually infers a lack of resolve from American retreats.