Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of Compliance (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, Series Number 104)

International politics has become increasingly legalized over the past fifty years, restructuring the way that states interact with each other, with international institutions, and even with their own constituents. The area subjected to the most intense restructuring has perhaps been human rights. The rise of the international legalization of human rights now makes it possible for individual constituents to take human rights claims against their governments at international courts such as the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights. This book brings together theories of compliance from international law, human rights, and international relations to explain the increasingly important phenomenon of states' compliance with human rights tribunals' rulings. The central argument of the book is that compliance with international human rights tribunals' rulings is an inherently domestic affair. It posits three overarching questions: First, why do states comply with human rights tribunals' rulings? Second, how does the compliance process unfold and what are the domestic political considerations around compliance? Third, what effect does compliance have on the protection of human rights? This book answers these questions through a combination of quantitative analyses and in-depth case studies from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Italy, Portugal, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Cover 1 Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals 3 Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law 5 Dedication 6 Title page 7 Copyright page 8 Contents 9 Acronyms 13 Acknowledgments 15 1 Human Rights Tribunals and the Challenge of Compliance 17 I. Two Anecdotes from the Americas 17 II. Introduction to the Book 19 III. The Human Rights Tribunals in Context and in Practice 20 The European Court of Human Rights 20 The Inter-American Human Rights System 24 IV. Questions about Compliance 27 V. Book Outline and Methodology 29 2 Explaining Compliance with Human Rights Tribunals 35 I. Compliance from the Bottom Up: Democratic Institutions and Domestic Politics 35 II. The Agents and Actors of Compliance 37 III. Explaining Compliance with Human Rights Tribunals 41 Demonstrating a Commitment to Human Rights 41 Setting and Advancing Domestic Human Rights Agendas 45 Democratic Preferences and Begrudging Compliance 47 IV. Competing Explanations for Compliance 49 Tackling Endogeneity 49 Coercion 50 Enforcement 51 International Law as Instructive and Constitutive 53 V. Conclusion 55 3 Domestic Institutions and Patterns of Compliance 57 I. Challenges of Measuring Compliance with Human Rights Tribunals 57 II. The Compliance with Human Rights Tribunals (CHRT) Dataset: An Overview 60 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 60 The European Court of Human Rights 61 Additional Case and Obligation Characteristics: Types of Mandates and Obligations 63 III. Estimating Compliance with Human Rights Tribunals: Statistical Analyses 68 Robustness Checks 76 4 Compliance as a Signal of States’ Human Rights Commitments: Uribe’s Colombia 82 I. Colombia and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: An Overview 82 II. Domestic Political Institutions and Constraints in Colombia 84 III. Uribe’s Incentives to Express a Commitment to Human Rights 85 IV. Using Human Rights Rulings: The Novelty of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 89 19 Tradesmen: A Reputational Boost with Reservations 90 V. Unwilling and Implicated: A Dearth of Compliance Coalition Partners 93 VI. Conclusion 97 5 Leveraging International Law’s Legitimacy to Change Policies: Compliance and Domestic Policy Promotion in Argentina and Portugal 98 I. Leveraging International Law at Home: Between Style and Substance 98 II. Argentina: Institutions and Incentives for Compliance 99 Domestic Institutions in Argentina 100 Using the Inter-American Court’s Rulings to Confront the Past and Build a “New Argentina” 103 Leveraging the Court’s Rulings to Ultimately Address the Past 105 III. Portugal: A Brief Study of when Judges Take up the Mantle of Compliance 109 IV. Conclusion 113 6 The Bitter Pill of Compliance: Preferences for Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law 114 I. The United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights 115 The United Kingdom’s Compliance Record 117 II. The Trouble over Terrorists: The European Court’s Reshaping of the Global War on Terror and Immigration in the United Kingdom 118 Deportation and Detention 120 Stop-and-Search Laws 123 III. DNA and Prisoners’ Voting Rights: Different Types of Security, Same Compliance Dynamics 124 Storage of DNA from Innocent Citizens 124 The Row over Prisoners 125 IV. Conclusion 127 7 Compliance Failures: Russia, Italy, and Brazil and the Politics of Noncompliance 129 I. Russia: Problems of Caseloads and Compliance 130 Constraints on the Kremlin 132 The Politics of Partial Compliance in Russia 135 II. Italy: Moving beyond Reparations to Reform the Rule of Law 137 Why Italy Won’t Comply with the European Court of Human Rights’ Rulings 138 Addressing Challenges to the Rule of Law 139 The Crucifix Debate 140 III. Brazil: The Unwilling Participant 141 Formal and Informal Institutional Constraints in Brazil 142 Brazil’s Inconsistent Compliance: A Comparison 143 The Prospect of Changes in Brazil’s Compliance Practices 146 IV. Conclusion 148 8 Conclusion: The European and Inter-American Courts in Context 150 I. Summary of Central Argument 150 II. Extensions to Other Tribunals 153 The United Nations’ Human Rights Treaty Bodies 155 The African Human Rights Institutions 158 Asia-Pacific Human Rights Institutions 160 The International Criminal Court 161 III. A Larger Research Agenda 165 Long-Term Effectiveness and Compliance 166 Beyond Compliance: Courts, Constituents, and States 166 IV. Best Practices 169 V. Compliance and Human Rights Tribunals Revisited 172 Works Cited 175 Index 199 International Politics Has Become Increasingly Legalized Over The Past Fifty Years, Restructuring The Way States Interact With Each Other, International Institutions, And Their Own Constituents. The International Legalization Of Human Rights Now Makes It Possible For Individuals To Take Human Rights Claims Against Their Governments At International Courts Such As The European And Inter-american Courts Of Human Rights. This Book Brings Together Theories From International Law, Human Rights And International Relations To Explain The Increasingly Important Phenomenon Of States' Compliance With Human Rights Tribunals' Rulings. It Argues That This Is An Inherently Domestic Affair. It Posits Three Overarching Questions: Why Do States Comply With Human Rights Tribunals' Rulings? How Does The Compliance Process Unfold And What Are The Domestic Political Considerations Around Compliance? What Effect Does Compliance Have On The Protection Of Human Rights? The Book Answers These Through A Combination Of Quantitative Analyses And In-depth Case Studies From Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Italy, Portugal, Russia And The United Kingdom.-- Human Rights Tribunals And The Challenge Of Compliance -- Explaining Compliance With Human Rights Tribunals -- Domestic Institutions And Patterns Of Compliance -- Compliance As A Signal Of States' Human Rights Commitments : Uribe's Columbia -- Leveraging International Law's Legitimacy To Change Policies: -- The Bitter Pill Of Compliance: Preferences For Human Rights, Democracy, And The Rule Of Law -- Compliance Failures: Russia, Italy And Brazil And The Politics Of Non-compliance -- Conclusion: The European And Inter-american Courts In Context. Courtney Hillebrecht , University Of Nebraska-lincoln. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 159-182) And Index. International politics has become increasingly legalized over the past fifty years, restructuring the way states interact with each other, international institutions, and their own constituents. The international legalization of human rights now makes it possible for individuals to take human rights claims against their governments at international courts such as the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights. This book brings together theories from international law, human rights and international relations to explain the increasingly important phenomenon of states' compliance with human rights tribunals' rulings. It argues that this is an inherently domestic affair. It posits three overarching questions: why do states comply with human rights tribunals' rulings? How does the compliance process unfold and what are the domestic political considerations around compliance? What effect does compliance have on the protection of human rights? The book answers these through a combination of quantitative analyses and in-depth case studies from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Italy, Portugal, Russia and the United Kingdom.-- Provided by Publisher