Dispositionalism: Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Synthese Library, 417)

"According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties - often called 'powers' - by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, it is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to unveil the very foundations of science. The present collection of essays brings together both strands of interest. It elucidates the ontological profile of dispositionalism by exploring its ontological commitments, and it discusses these from the perspective of the philosophy of science. The essays are written by both proponents of dispositionalism and sceptics so as to initiate an open-minded, constructive dialogue."--Back cover Acknowledgements Contents Contributors Chapter 1: Dispositionalism: Between Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science 1.1 The Debate on Dispositionalism 1.2 The Twofold Aim of the Present Collection 1.3 A Journey Guide References Chapter 2: Ontology of Powers 2.1 Ontology 2.2 The Basics: Substance and Property 2.3 Powers as Relations 2.4 Real Powers 2.5 Causation 2.6 Powerful Qualities 2.7 Substantial Persistence 2.8 Dénouement References Chapter 3: What Does the Doing? On Powers, Things and Powerful Things 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Powers Versus Powerful `Things ́ 3.3 Regarding Powerful Particulars 3.3.1 Causation and Causes 3.3.2 Powerful Particulars and Their Properties 3.3.3 Powerful Particulars and Trope Theory References Chapter 4: Active Bearers: The Ontology of Mental Dispositions 4.1 Mental Dispositions and Their Manifestations 4.2 Powerless Dispositions - Powerful Agents? 4.3 Powerful Dispositions - Powerless Agents? 4.4 Agents in a World of Powers References Chapter 5: Powers, Activity and Interaction 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The `Ghostliness ́ of Powers 5.3 Relationality 5.4 The Bipolarity of Causation 5.5 The Modality of Powers 5.6 Conclusions References Chapter 6: What Are Manifestations? 6.1 Four Candidate Categories 6.2 Manifestations: The Basics and Beyond 6.3 A Near Fatal Poisoning 6.4 Manifestations as Processes 6.5 Manifestations as Events, States, or Properties 6.6 Conclusion References Chapter 7: Powers, Persistence and Process 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Mumford ́s Argument Against (Powerful) Perdurance 7.3 Williams ́s Argument for Powerful Perdurance 7.4 Weighing Up the Arguments: Causation and Dynamism 7.4.1 Causation 7.4.2 Dynamism 7.5 Powerful Persistence and Process 7.6 Conclusions References Chapter 8: Powers, Probability and Statistics 8.1 Causation and Regularity 8.2 Tendencies 8.3 Tendential Strength and Probability 8.4 Interpreting Statistical Data 8.5 Frequentism 8.6 Propensities 8.7 Probabilistic Tendencies 8.8 A Case for Causal Singularism 8.9 Conclusion References Chapter 9: What Powers Are Not 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The Representation of Powers as Vectors 9.3 Powers Are Not Vectors 9.3.1 Power-Vectors Are Not Vectors 9.3.2 Powers Are Not Analogous to Vectors 9.4 Conclusion References Chapter 10: A Dispositional Account of Causation, with Some Remarks on the Ontology of Dispositions 10.1 Introduction-Dispositions and Causes 10.2 (SD) Plus the Simplifying Assumption-The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions 10.3 The Denial of Centering 10.4 Causes and Conditions 10.5 Collective Causes 10.6 Counterfactual Dependence? 10.7 Problems and Solutions 10.8 Ontological Considerations (I)-Complex Dispositions and the Non-transitivity of Causation 10.9 Ontological Considerations (II)-Powers 10.10 Conclusion-Causation and Explanation References Chapter 11: Powers, Dispositions and Laws of Nature 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The Distinction Between Powers and Dispositions 11.3 Laws as Parts of the Truth-Makers of Disposition Attributions 11.4 Conclusion References Chapter 12: Doing Away with Dispositions: Powers in the Context of Modern Physics 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Dispositionalism: The Standard Account 12.3 Symmetries in Physics 12.4 The Dispositionalist Responds 12.5 From Statistics to Spin 12.6 Seating Spin 12.7 Internal Symmetries 12.8 Taking Up Some Tools References Chapter 13: Organic Powers 13.1 Introduction: Powers and Organisms 13.2 Powers Theory as a Teleological Metaphysics 13.3 Organisms and Immanent Powers 13.4 Organic Immanent Behaviour: Possible Interpretations 13.4.1 Immanent Powers as Autopoietic Functions 13.4.2 Organic Powers, Intrinsic Purpose, and Flourishing 13.4.3 Autopoietic Powers, Normativity, and Value 13.4.4 The Evaluative Account of Flourishing: Costs and Challenges 13.5 Might the Organic/Inorganic Distinction be Fuzzy After All? 13.6 Conclusions References Author Index Subject Index