Dictatorship and Information : Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Communist Europe and China

## Abstract This study offers a systematic theory of the institutional solutions to the dictator’s dilemma, which arises from the incapacity to calibrate repression and concessions due to the lack of information about elite and popular discontent. Empirically, the book presents a detailed discussion of the types of information-gathering institutions created in autocracies, paying particular attention to the difference between standard mechanisms for the retrospective assessment of overt dissatisfaction and the more sophisticated channels for anticipatory evaluations of latent discontent. The book argues that the creation of institutions for the involuntary collection of information is straightforward, but that only certain regimes successfully promote the voluntary provision of information, which is essential for anticipatory governance. In ethnically heterogeneous countries, compactly settled ethnic minorities present a further obstacle for establishing a panoptical authoritarian vision. These problems notwithstanding, communist regimes are especially adept at developing sophisticated systems that mobilize the party, State Security, and internal journalism to assess levels of discontent. Methodologically, the book demonstrates that documents prepared for regime insiders are more likely to shed light on a secret activity like information collection than officially released materials. Theoretically, the book argues that although the dictator’s dilemma can be solved and abundant information does extend authoritarian lifespans, information cannot ensure the indefinite survival of dictatorships. The book is based on detailed analysis of the origins and evolution of information-gathering systems in communist Bulgaria (1944–1991) and in China (1949–present), supplemented by eight case studies of information collection in the complete range of authoritarian regimes. "This study offers a systematic theory of the institutional solutions to the dictator's dilemma, which arises from the incapacity to calibrate repression and concessions due to the lack of information about elite and popular discontent. Empirically, the book presents a detailed discussion of the types of information-gathering institutions created in autocracies, paying particular attention to the difference between standard mechanisms for the retrospective assessment of overt dissatisfaction and the more sophisticated channels for anticipatory evaluations of latent discontent. The book argues that the creation of institutions for the involuntary collection of information is straightforward, but that only certain regimes successfully promote the voluntary provision of information, which is essential for anticipatory governance. In ethnically heterogeneous countries, compactly settled ethnic minorities present a further obstacle for establishing a panoptical authoritarian vision. These problems notwithstanding, communist regimes are especially adept at developing sophisticated systems that mobilize the party, State Security, and internal journalism to assess levels of discontent. Methodologically, the book demonstrates that documents prepared for regime insiders are more likely to shed light on a secret activity like information collection than officially released materials. Theoretically, the book argues that although the dictator's dilemma can be solved and abundant information does extend authoritarian lifespans, information cannot ensure the indefinite survival of dictatorships. The book is based on detailed analysis of the origins and evolution of information-gathering systems in communist Bulgaria (1944-1991) and in China (1949-present), supplemented by eight case studies of information collection in the complete range of authoritarian regimes"-- Provided by publisher Fear pervades dictatorial regimes. Citizens fear leaders, the regime's agents fear superiors, and leaders fear the masses. The ubiquity of fear in such regimes gives rise to the "dictator's dilemma," where autocrats do not know the level of opposition they face and cannot effectively neutralize domestic threats to their rule. The dilemma has led scholars to believe that autocracies are likely to be short-lived. Yet, some autocracies have found ways to mitigate the dictator's dilemma. As Martin K. Dimitrov shows in Dictatorship and Information , substantial variability exists in the survival of nondemocratic regimes, with single-party polities having the longest average duration. Offering a systematic theory of the institutional solutions to the dictator's dilemma, Dimitrov argues that single-party autocracies have fostered channels that allow for the confidential vertical transmission of information, while also solving the problems associated with distorted information. To explain how this all works, Dimitrov focuses on communist regimes, which have the longest average lifespan among single-party autocracies and have developed the most sophisticated information-gathering institutions. Communist regimes face a variety of threats, but the main one is the masses. Dimitrov therefore examines the origins, evolution, and internal logic of the information-collection ecosystem established by communist states to monitor popular dissent. Drawing from a rich base of evidence across multiple communist regimes and nearly 100 interviews, Dimitrov reshapes our understanding of how autocrats learn--or fail to learn--about the societies they rule, and how they maintain--or lose--power. In 'Dictatorship and Information', Martin K. Dimitrov offers a systematic theory of the institutional solutions to the dictator's dilemma, which arises from the incapacity to calibrate repression and concessions due to distorted information about elite and popular discontent. Dimitrov argues that communist regimes are especially adept at developing sophisticated systems that mobilize the party, state security and internal journalism to assess levels of dissent