Dictators and Democracy in African Development: The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria (African Studies, Series Number 130)

What are the conditions for good governance in Africa, and why do many democracies still struggle with persistent poverty? Drawing on a historical study of Nigeria since independence, this book argues that the structure of the policy-making process explains variations in government performance better than other commonly cited factors, such as oil, colonialism, ethnic diversity, foreign debt, and dictatorships. The author links the political structure of the policy process to patterns of government performance over half a century to show that the key factor is not simply the status of the regime as a dictatorship or a democracy, but rather it is the structure of the policy-making process by which different policy demands are included or excluded. By identifying political actors with the leverage to prevent policy change and extract concessions, empirical tests demonstrate how these "veto players" systematically affect the performance of two broad categories of public policy. This Madisonian dilemma has important implications for African countries struggling with the institutional trade-offs presented by different regimes.--Amazon.com Cover 1 Half-title 3 Title page 7 Copyright information 8 Dedication 9 Table of contents 11 List of tables 12 List of figures 13 Preface 15 Acknowledgments 19 Introduction 23 Government Performance in the Literature 27 The Regime Type Explanation: Does Democracy Deliver? 28 State Wealth: Poor States, Poor Performance? 33 Ethnicity Explanations: Primordialism and Parochialism 35 Leadership 38 An Alternative Explanation 42 The Structure of the Book 48 1 A Theory of Institutions, Preferences, and Performance 54 Veto Player Theory: Defining the Terms 56 A Typology of Veto Players and Criteria for Identifying Them 57 Informal Institutions and Veto Power through Military Factions and Regional Vetoes 59 The Policy Consequences of Veto Players 66 Factors Determining Veto Player Impact 67 Formulating Hypotheses from the “Distributional” and “Commitment” Traditions 69 Conclusion 74 2 Veto Players in Nigeria’s Political History since Independence 77 Two Veto Players in the First Republic’s First Government (1960–1964) 79 Coalition Collapse and the First Republic under a Single Veto Player (1965) 84 The Aguiyi-Ironsi Regime: A Dictator’s Ambitions Checked by a Regional Veto (1966) 85 Yakubu Gowon Contends with a Military Council Veto (1966–1975) 88 Mohammed/Obasanjo: Three Veto Players and an Unexpected Succession (1975–1979) 91 Partisan and Presidential Veto Players during the Second Republic (1979–1981) 94 Three Institutional Veto Players and the Second Republic’s Swift Decline (1982–1983) 97 A Veto from Buhari, a Veto from Idiagbon (1984–1985) 99 A Triumvirate of Veto Players during Babangida’s Early Years (1985–1990) 102 Pressure Builds for a Transition and a Fourth Veto Player Emerges (1990–1993) 105 Abacha after the Failed Transition: From Two Veto Players to One (1993–1998) 111 Obasanjo’s Return: Four Veto Players for the Fourth Republic (1999–2003) 117 Obasanjo’s Second Term and Institutionalization under Three Veto Players (2003–2007) 128 Conclusion 134 3 The Impact of Nigeria’s Veto Players on Local and National Collective Goods 142 National and Local Collective Goods as Measures of Government Performance 145 Macroeconomic Performance 146 Judicial Performance 149 Education Policy Performance and Student/Teacher Ratios 153 Local Collective Goods and Government Consumption 157 Predicting Nigeria’s Policy Performance with Veto Players 159 Controlling for Intervening Factors 160 Testing the Coordination Hypothesis 166 Testing the Logroll Hypothesis 171 Nigeria’s Madisonian Dilemma 174 A Qualitative Examination of Policy Performance, 1961–2007 176 Postcolonial and Postwar Government Performance 177 The Second Republic and Nigeria’s Second Attempt at Democracy 181 Authoritarian Rule: The Long Stretch, 1983–1999 183 The Return of Democracy, the Return of Obasanjo 188 Summary: Trends and Outliers 192 Conclusion 194 4 Analytic Equivalents in Ghana and Zimbabwe 198 A Few Notes on the Uses of Case Studies 201 Ghana’s Transformation from Institutional Uncertainty to Regime Formation 204 Background: Imperial Imprints on Society and Economy 206 Post-Nkrumah Politics: Regime Change as Policy Reversal, 1966–1981 208 Predemocratic Institutional Consolidation 212 Summary 215 Veterans, Voters, and Emergent Vetoes in Zimbabwe 216 Elections and Protests as Paths to Power Sharing 217 Getting to the 2008 Global Political Agreement to Share Power 222 Summary 226 Conclusion 227 5 Madison’s Model Unbound 233 Advancing Comparative Analysis in Africa 235 Patronage and Government Performance in Africa 239 Veto Player Analysis in Developing Countries, with Developing Institutions 241 Subnational Coordination, Identities, and Federalism 242 Advancing the Study of Comparative Authoritarianism 243 Hope Springs Eternal? Nigeria’s Fourth Republic 246 The Tainted Transfer of Power 247 An Acting President Acts Presidential 251 Madison’s Model Unbound 256 Appendix 1 Possible Measurement Error in the Clearance Variable 261 Appendix 2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables 263 References 265 Index 297 Drawing on a historical study of Nigeria since independence, this book argues that the structure of the policy-making process - by which different policy demands are included or excluded - explains variations in government performance better than other commonly cited factors, such as oil, colonialism, ethnic diversity, foreign debt, and dictatorships. This Book Argues That The Structure Of The Policy-making Process In Nigeria Explains Variations In Government Performance Better Than Other Commonly Cited Factors.